The spatial-temporal production of public space within the context of demonstration

Mapping the unrest collective practices of Beirut Central District

Reem Ali Mahmoud Albarakat

Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

The University of Leeds

School of Civil Engineering

December 2020

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to the memory of the soul that loved and believed in me, my uncle, Usama Abdel Halim.

I will always miss you!

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to all people, without whom I would not have been able to complete this research.

My sponsor at the Applied Science University, Jordan.

My Supervisors Dr Gehan Selim and Professor Mohammad Basheer for their consistent academic and personal support and guidance during the running of this project.

All staff of the School of Civil Engineering at the University of Leeds, with special thanks to Mrs Victoria Masters for all the considerate guidance.

I would also thank Dr Amal Iaaly and Mr Henri Khouzami who helped with dense tutoring to enable me using GIS; and all my interviewees and friends in Lebanon who generously provided me with the material I needed.

In addition, I would like to thank my friends in Leeds, who fulfilled my experience with their love, care, stimulating discussions and happy distractions to rest my mind outside of research.

Special acknowledgements go for those who overcome the distance and were the nearest all the time:

My parents, the true love, the wise counsel, the sympathetic ear and the very first memory of learning how to spell a word or hold a pencil.

My sisters: Duha and Ne'am, who always show up perfectly at the right time.

The sweetheart Fajer, who continuously overwhelms my heart with love.

And my warmest gratitude for the real friendship, that had my back day by day along my journey, Arch Yazan Al Nimrat.

Abstract

It becomes especially evident during the rebellion how cities represent physical and symbolic terrain for socio-political reform. Protesters redraw the urban geography to challenge the current spatial configurations of control by selecting meeting points, tracing protest paths, and choosing occupation sites. This research calls the changes in the space-object relationship and its role in developing the production of contested spaces, within the context of demonstration. It aims at building a chain of theoretical and empirical evidence to inform the theory with empirical data that highlight and explains the modification in the theoretical model of the experiential production of space, within the public setting in Beirut.

This research analysis multi entities of the routine and eventual features that contribute to the explanation of the spatial-temporal production of public space in Beirut Central District. Combined protest event and user's experience methods established a systematic narrative that is correlated to the spatiotemporal identity of the practices, along with the citizens' perception of the space and events. The methodology utilised a collection of scattered resources, developed an equation and grid system that allocated the crowd on an equally divided time-lapse using GIS. The research produced a visual narrative of the spatial allocation, population, and densities of the occupiers' crowd of the defined protest events. The analysis of the distinguished crowd's layouts shows a high probability of correlation between the dynamics of the crowd and arousing the sense of being threatened – translated into violent actions.

By reflecting on other examples of the Beiruti story of contesting public spaces, the research concluded that the collective perception of spatial dominance has changed. The crowd's preferences of focusing on dominating connections rather than area indicated that, on eventual phases of producing public spaces in Beirut, the potential domination of the social objects contributed stronger to the production of the unoccupied space.

Publications (Articles and conferences)

The individual's role in bridging the cyber and physical platforms in the context of political demonstration – Al Tahrir square as an example.
PhD Planning and Architecture-Conference, Queen's University Belfast and University College Dublin.

24. 05. 2016
Queen's University Belfast, Belfast

Everywhere and Nowhere: An Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Symposium on Imagined Spaces (symposium) - attended

20. 06. 2016
University of Nottingham, Nottingham

Radicalism vs. Consistency: The Cyber Influence on Individuals' Non-Routine Uses in Public Spaces.
Parametricism vs. Materialism: Evolution of Digital Technologies for Development

07-08. 11. 2016
SOAS University of London, London

Radicalism vs. Consistency: The Cyber Influence on Individuals' Non-Routine Uses in Public Spaces, the case of Cairo
"Advanced Technologies for Sustainable Systems" Selected Contributions from the International Conference on Sustainable Vital Technologies in Engineering and Informatics, BUE ACE1 2016, 7–9 November 2016, Cairo, Egypt. Springer International Publishing AG 2017, Y. Bahei-El-Din and M. Hassan (eds.), Advanced Technologies for Sustainable Systems, Lecture Notes in Networks and Systems 4, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-48725-0

07-09. 11. 2016
British University in Egypt, Cairo

The Cyber Impact on Political Performance: The Activation of Users' Role and The Competition for The Ownership of Space.

BRISMES annual conference: Movement and Migration in the Middle East: People and Ideas in Flux

05. 07. 2017
University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh

Politics and Spaces of Protest in Lebanon and the Middle East (Seminar & Workshop) – attended and participated in the organization and running of the manual mapping workshop

23. 10. 2017
Lebanese University, Beirut, Lebanon

Competition for the Ownership of Space: It belongs to me!

Mapping Urban Unrest in Beirut's Public Spaces (Seminar & Workshop) – attended, presented and participated in the organization and running of the manual mapping workshop

25 - 27. 10. 2017
Beirut Arab University, Beirut

Conducting a research abroad: the essentials of the case study research fieldwork

PGR Conference, School of Civil Engineering - participated in the organization and running of the conference

21 – 22. 03. 2018
University of Leeds, Leeds

Poster for non-specialist audience

The PGR poster showcase

09. 05. 2018
University of Leeds, Leeds

Spatial Modelling of Conflict & Urban Conditions (seminar) - attended

06. 2018
University of Leeds, Leeds

Re-shaping Riyadh Alsolh: Mapping the influence of cyber and physical demonstration practices on the functionality and connectivity of Riyadh Alsolh square's surroundings
The City Re-Shaped (seminar)

11-12. 09. 2018
University of Leeds, Leeds

Recreating the square by crowd: Mapping the influence of the demonstration practices on the functionality and connectivity of public spaces
PGR Annual Conference

2-3.04.2019
University of Leeds, Leeds

Actual vs. potential dominance of spaces occupiers: an analysis of crowds' competition during protest events in Beirut, Lebanon
BRISMES Annual Conference 2019: Interdisciplinarity in Middle East Studies by The British Society for Middle Eastern Studies (BRISMES)

24-26.06.2019
University of Leeds, Leeds

Table of Contents

Dedication ..... **ii**
Acknowledgements ..... **iii**
Abstract ..... **iv**
Publications (Articles and conferences) ..... **v**
Table of Contents ..... **viii**
List of tables ..... **xi**
List of figures ..... **xii**

Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION **1**
1.1 The Role of Space in the Current Global Political Dissent Phenomenon 1
1.2 Contextualisation: Beirut as a Contested City 9
1.3 Research Problem 13
1.4 Research Question(s), Aim & objectives 14
1.5 Gap in Knowledge 17
1.6 Research Design and methodology 18
1.7 Research significance and contribution to knowledge 21
1.8 Risks and research limitations 23
1.9 Research structure 28

PART I THE CONTESTATIONAL PRODUCTION OF SPACE: Theoretical Application on the Case of Lebanon **34**

Chapter 2 THE ROLE OF CONTESTATION AND CONSOCIATION IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF BEIRUT **35**
2.1 Introduction 36
2.2 Internal and external players shaping the Lebanese balance. 42
2.3 Whose City: shaping Beirut 51
2.4 Space as a theorized concept: The understanding of Beirut's spatial politics 59
2.5 Conclusion 83

Chapter 3 2015 MANIFESTATIONS: ROOTS DEEPER THAN THE GARBAGE CRISIS 87

3.1 Introduction 88

3.2 Reconstruction, Privatization & Gentrification 90

3.3 Quartered City & Sense of Space 95

3.4 The Political Mobilization of Beirut's Society 100

Conclusion of Part I 117

PART II URBAN SCENES FROM BCD: Mapping the Uses of the District 120

Chapter 4 METHODOLOGY VISUALIZING THE URBAN UNREST PRACTISES 121

4.1 Introduction 122

4.2 Research methods: Combining the protest event and user experience methods 129

4.3 Building up the narrative: reconstruction the scattered archive 145

4.4 GIS mapping: visualizing a numerical time-series dataset of the spatial allocation, population and densities of the occupiers' crowd of the defined protest events 149

4.5 Analysis parameters 158

4.6 Conclusion 160

Chapter 5 THE ROUTINE URBAN SCENE OF BEIRUT DOWNTOWN: DEFINING THE SPATIAL CONDITION OF THE CASE STUDY 161

5.1 Introduction 162

5.2 Approaching the analysed entities 166

5.3 The contribution of the physical objects in setting the spatial conditions of the Public Square 169

5.4 The contribution of the social objects in setting the spatial statement of the BCD 186

5.5 Conclusion 196

Chapter 6 THE EVENTUAL URBAN SCENE OF BEIRUT DOWNTOWN: THE POLITICS OF THE DISTRICT 198

6.1 Introduction 199

6.2 Approaching the analysed entities 204

6.3 Visualizing the numerical narrative of the protest movement of 2015: mapping the spatiotemporal changes of the crowd's population, distribution and placement 211

6.4 A review of the established spatial relationship between the protestors and the square during the demonstration events 232

6.5 The spatial features of the protestors' crowd 237

6.6 Dominating Downtown Beirut: The changes of the spatial features of the protestors' crowd between 2005 and 2015 239

6.7 New chapters of dominating the city: the endless contest of the institutional ascendancy, capital exploitation, and protestors' occupation 246

Conclusion of Part II 259

PART III RE-DEFINING THE DOMINANCE OF SPACE: ACTUAL VS POTENTIAL OCCUPATION 261

Chapter 7 THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL DOMINATION ON MEDIATING THE PRODUCTION OF UNOCCUPIED SPACES 262

7.1 Introduction 262

7.2 Research interpretations: What do our maps mean? 271

7.3 Research implications: How has the collective perception of the spatial dominance changed? 280

Conclusion of part III Research recommendations 289

Chapter 8 CONCLUSION 292

References 303

List of tables

TABLE 2-1: THE ESTIMATED SECTARIAN DISTRIBUTION OF BEIRUT POPULATION (MULTIPLE SOURCES) 52
TABLE 2-2: A SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSED THEORIES AND THEIR RELATION TO THE CASE OF BEIRUT 85
TABLE 3-1: THE COMPONENTS OF A QUARTERED CITY 97
TABLE 4-1: THE PARAMETERS OF THE GIS CELLS FID {0 – 20}: ORIG_FID, OBJECTID, ID, AREA, PERIMETER, CODE, FID 152
TABLE 4-2: ANALYSIS PARAMETERS CODING 159
TABLE 5-1: THE ZONES OF OBSERVATION 188
TABLE 5-2: NUMERICAL REPRESENTATION OF THE RECORDED SAMPLE, MARTYRS SQUARE 02.11.2017 14:00:15 – 14:05:00 190
TABLE 5-3: AVERAGE COUNT OF THE TRAFFIC FLOW IN EACH ZONE PER HOUR PER 100 SQM 192
TABLE 5-4: AVERAGE COUNT OF THE TRAFFIC FLOW IN EACH SQUARE PER HOUR PER 100 SQM 192
TABLE 5-5: PERCENTAGE OF THE FLOW OUT OF THE TOTAL MOVEMENT IN EACH ZONE PER HOUR PER 100SQM 193
TABLE 5-6: PERCENTAGE OF THE FLOW OUT OF THE DEFINED MOVEMENT IN THE DISTRICT PER HOUR PER 100SQM 193
TABLE 6-1: SAMPLE – THE DISTRIBUTION OF DEFINED, STABLE AND TRANSITIONAL STATEMENT OF EACH TIME LAPSE, 22.08.2015, 14:00 – 21:50 GMT 214
TABLE 6-2: FIELDS 0 – 10 AND 1963 – 1973, EXAMPLE OF THE FIELDS DEFINITION, PARAMETERS AND CODING SEQUENCE 215
TABLE 6-3: SAMPLE – THE .XLS TABLE FORMAT OF THE CROWD POPULATION PER FILED PER TIME LAPS (22.08.2015, 17:30 GMT) 215
TABLE 6-4: EXAMPLE OF PROTESTORS POPULATION IN CELLS FID {240 – 274}, 24.08.2015 SHOWS THAT THE ACTIVE PROTESTING HOURS WAS ONLY BETWEEN 14:30 – 18:00 GMT 227
TABLE 6-5: THE SPATIAL FEATURES OF THE DEFINED PATTERNS 239

List of figures

FIGURE 1-1: DOMINANCE VS DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENTAL SURVEILLANCE AND PUBLIC CHALLENGE, PHOTOGRAPHS FROM DIFFERENT PUBLIC SPACE OCCUPATIONS AROUND THE WORLD. 3
FIGURE 1-2: MURAL BY BRIGADAS RAMONA PARRA, "NO MORE SACRIFICE ZONE", ANTI-CAPITALIST SLOGAN.......... 5
FIGURE 1-3: THE EMBEDDED ENTITIES OF THE CASE STUDY 18
FIGURE 1-4: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: THE FLOW OF THE RESEARCH RESOURCES AND METHODS TOWARDS MAPPING THE EVENT 20
FIGURE 1-5: SQUARE AS A SYMBOL OF THE PROTEST MOVEMENT – (A) TAHRIR SQUARE, CAIRO, (B) FOURTH CIRCLE, AMMAN AND (C) TAHRIR SQUARE, BAGHDAD.......... 22
FIGURE 1-6: ESTIMATED RESPONSE RANKING IN RELATION TO THE CONTEXTUAL SITUATION IN LEBANON AUGUST 2017 – JULY 2018. 27
FIGURE 1-7: THE KEY SOLUTION OF RESPONDING TO THE RESEARCH CHALLENGES/OPPORTUNITIES 27
FIGURE 1-8: THE FLOW OF THE RESEARCH TERMINOLOGY ALONG THE RESEARCH STRUCTURE 32
FIGURE 1-9: THE THESIS IN A3 PAGE – A FLOW OF THE RESEARCH TERMINOLOGIES, TOOLS AND OUTCOME 33
FIGURE 2-1: A) LEBANON LOCATION – ORTHO-PROJECTION, B) LEBANON BORDERS AND MAIL CITIES.......... 36
FIGURE 2-2 CONTEMPORARY MAP SHOWING THE DIVISION BETWEEN MARONITES AND DRUZE BETWEEN 1840–60 36
FIGURE 2-3: THE DEMOGRAPHY OF MOUNT LEBANON, A) INNER LOOP: 1844 ESTIMATES FROM M. BOUREE TO FRANÇOIS GUIZOT, PARIS, 30 JULY 1844, B) OUTER LOOP: 2018 ESTIMATES FROM THE GENERAL ELECTION REGISTRATIONS. 38
FIGURE 2-4 A) THE MOUNT LEBANON MUTASARRIFATE 1914. B) MOUNT LEBANON (1862 – 1917)HIGHLIGHTED WITHIN A MAP OF MODERN REPUBLIC OF LEBANON .. 39
FIGURE 2-5: G.01 MILITARISATION RANKING OF LEBANON AND COUNTRIES IN ITS VICINITY. INDEX RANGE:1-125. MAP EXTRACT, SLIGHTLY SUPPLEMENTED. SOURCE BICC 2014: 7, MAP 1 41
FIGURE 2-6: A) SHOOTING KILLED TWO AIDES TO A LEBANESE MINISTER SALEH AL-GHARIB IN MOUNT LEBANON TO PREVENT A PLANNED VISIT OF MARONITE MINISTER JUBRAN BASIL, REUTERS, 30.06.2019. B)A TWEET BY THE DRUZE LEADER OF THE PROGRESSIVE SOCIALIST PARTY WALID JOUMBLATT, DEFENDING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE POWER BALANCE IN MOUNT LEBANON 30.06.2019 – TRANSLATED FROM ARABIC BY MICROSOFT. 47
FIGURE 2-7: CONFESSIONAL DISTRIBUTION IN LEBANON ACCORDING TO 2009 MUNICIPAL ELECTION DATA. BY SERGEY KONDRASHOV - HTTP://WWW.KATAGOGI.COM/LV2009/LEBMAP.ASPX?L=EN, CC BY-SA3.0, HTTPS://COMMONS.WIKIMEDIA.ORG/W/INDEX.PHP?CURID=23421707.......... 48
FIGURE 2-8: THE SECTARIAN DISTRIBUTION OF BEIRUT 1889 (KOURI, AMEEN) AND 1895 (ALQABBANI, ABDULQADIR) 53

FIGURE 2-9: BEIRUT PHASES OF URBANISATION (YASIN, 2011) 54
FIGURE 2-10: BEIRUT LAYOUT DURING THE CIVIL WAR 1975-1977 55
FIGURE 2-11: POLITICAL POSTERS IN THE STREETS OF BEIRUT 57
FIGURE 2-12: A) AERIAL VIEW OF BEIRUT 1943. SOURCE: MICHEL ÉCOCHARD (PHOTOGRAPHER) ARCHIVE,AGA KHAN DOCUMENTATION CENTRE AT MIT., B) AN AERIAL VIEW OF LEBANON'S CAPITAL BEIRUT. PHOTOGRAPHER: STEPHANE DE SAKUTIN/AFP/GETTY IMAGES 58
FIGURE 2-13: THE FIRST PHOTO SHOT IN BEIRUT BACK IN 1839 BY THE FRENCH ARTISTS HORACE VERNETAND GOUPIL-FESQUET. THE SITE SHOWS PART OF BEIRUT'S FAMOUS ANCIENT WALL, PRINCE MANSOUR ASSAF'S SERAILLE, ALL THE WAY TO ACHRAFIEH HILL.. 58
FIGURE 2-14: BEIRUT GREEN LINE (SOURCE: KASSIR, 2006: 555) 79
FIGURE 3-1: DEMOLITION AND PRESERVATION OF BEIRUT CENTRAL DISTRICT (SCHMID, 2006) 93
FIGURE 3-2: GENTRIFICATION IN FURN AL-HAYEK: EVICTION, DEMOLITIONS AND CONSTRUCTIONS. SOURCE: FIELD SURVEY CONDUCTED BY ÉLÉONORE BOISSINOT & HISHAM ASHKAR, 2011. ILLUSTRATION BY HISHAM ASHKAR 2018. 94
FIGURE 3-3: A POSTER THAT REPRESENTS SOLIDERE PROJECT AS A DEFORMATION THAT REMOVES THE HEART OF THE CITY [THE HEART OF THE PEOPLE] "WOE TO A NATION WHO TAKEN THEIR HEART AWAY DOES NOT MAKE THEM REVOLT" 102
FIGURE 4-1: THE CRITERIA OF CASE STUDY SELECTION AND ITS ROLE IN INFORMING THE RESEARCH. 123
FIGURE 4-2: BASIC TYPES OF DESIGN FOR CASE STUDIES. SOURCE: YIN, R. K. (2012). APPLICATIONS OF CASE STUDY RESEARCH (3RD ED.). WASHINGTON DC: SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC. 125
FIGURE 4-3: (A) THE CHECK LIST OF THE CASE STUDY COMPATIBILITY TO THE RESEARCH REQUIREMENTS; AND (B) THE EMBEDDED ENTITIES OF THE CASE STUDY............. 126
FIGURE 4-4: CHANNELS AND NEWSPAPERS CODE.. 133
FIGURE 4-5: INTERVIEW STRUCTURE 137
FIGURE 4-6: SHOTS FROM THE MAPPING WORKSHOP.. 142
FIGURE 4-7: URBAN OBSERVATION OF THE MAIN STREETS, BUILDING AND URBAN FEATURES FROM THE STUDY AREA 144
FIGURE 4-8: BUILDING UP THE NARRATIVE – RECONSTRUCTION THE SCATTERED ARCHIVE 148
FIGURE 4-9: GIS BASE MAP – BCD.. 151
FIGURE 4-10: THE SPATIAL EXTENT OF THE SPATIOTEMPORAL LAYERS 151
FIGURE 4-11: THE POLYGONS OF ALL VOIDS IN THE STUDY ZONE – EACH UP TO 100 M 152
FIGURE 4-12: EXAMPLE OF THE TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION OF GENERATED DATA FROM GROUP A (BLACK) AND GROUP B (GREY) VIDEOS – 23.08.2015, 14:00 – 22:00 GMT 154
FIGURE 4-13: EXAMPLE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPATIAL STATEMENT – DEFINED (BLACK), TRANSITIONAL (GREY) AND STABLE (BLANK), OF EACH TIME-LAPSE – 23.08.2015, 14:00 – 22:00 GMT 154
FIGURE 4-14: EXAMPLE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF CROWD POPULATION PER POLYGON – SELECTED POLYGONS ATTRIBUTE TABLE 156

FIGURE 4-15: (A) DOT DENSITY POINT ARCGIS MAP AND (B) CROWD'S LAYOUT (DATE-TIME) 157
FIGURE 5-1: BEIRUT CENTRAL DISTRICT – RIYADH ALSOLH, NIJMEH AND MARTYRS SQUARES, WITH SURROUNDINGS AND CONNECTIONS 165
FIGURE 5-2: AERIAL PHOTO OF BEIRUT CENTRAL DISTRICT...... 167
FIGURE 5-3: THE EMBEDDED ENTITIES OF THE CASE STUDY – (A) THE INSTITUTIONAL ROUTINE OCCUPATION OF THE BCD, AND (B) THE INDIVIDUALS' ROUTINE OCCUPATION OF THE BCD 167
FIGURE 5-4: A VISUAL TRAVEL ALONG THE HISTORICAL TIMELINE OF BEIRUT CENTRAL DISTRICT – THE LEADING DYNAMICS 168
FIGURE 5-5: THE ACTUAL EXECUTION OF THE PARKING LOT AT ZONE B (02.11.2017, A. 09:30, B. 14:30) 171
FIGURE 5-6: THE MAIN THREE ZONES OF THE SOLIDERE MASTERPLAN OF THE BCD 171
FIGURE 5-7: THE SPATIAL PROXIMITY OF THE BUILDINGS THAT REPRESENTS THE (A) INSTITUTIONAL AND (B) RELIGIOUS AXES OF THE SECTARIAN REGIME IN ZONE A – BCD. EDITED PHOTO OF (A) PUBLISHED AERIAL PHOTO OF THE ZONE, AND (B) THE DESIGN MODEL OF SOLIDERE PROJECT 172
FIGURE 5-8: MARONITE CATHEDRAL OF SAINT GEORGE AND MOHAMMED AL-AMIN MOSQUE 173
FIGURE 5-9: A PUBLISHED EXPERIENCE OF THE SELECTIVE ACCESSIBILITY OF FOREIGNERS TO NIJMEH SQUARE 174
FIGURE 5-10: THE CONSUMERISM OF THE BCD – ZOOM IN TO THE DENSE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SHOPS AND RESTAURANTS IN SECTION OF THE DISTRICT. 175
FIGURE 5-11: MASTERPLAN OF SOLIDERE PROJECT – FACILITIES AND USES CHART IS CREATED OUT OF DATA PUBLISHED IN SOLIDERE ANNUAL REPORTS 176
FIGURE 5-12: THE INSTITUTIONAL (FUNCTIONAL) DOMINATION OF THE BCD, LAND USE DISTRIBUTION IN BCD AS PROJECTED FROM OBSERVATION WORK, GOOGLE EARTH AND GOOGLE MAPS DATA...... 177
FIGURE 5-13: LAND AREAS DISTRIBUTION IN SOLIDERE MASTERPLAN – DATA FROM SOLIDERE ANNUAL REPORTS...... 178
FIGURE 5-14: MODES OF CITIZENS' ENGAGEMENT WITH PUBLIC SPACES IN: (A) WAYGAND STREET 1958, (B) SOLIDERE – BEIRUT SOUKS 2008 AND (C) RIYADH ALSOLH SQUARE 2015 180
FIGURE 5-15: ALMOST EMPTY DAY-SHOT OF PARLIAMENT STREET TOWARDS NIJMEH SQUARE, 01.11.2017 – 13:56 181
FIGURE 5-16: MULTI-LAYERED MILITARISED BARRIERS AT EL MA'RAD STREET TOWARDS NIJMEH SQUARE, 08.11.2017 – 15:14 182
FIGURE 5-17: THE IMPACT OF THE BARRIERS ON THE STREETSCAPE OF THE STREET LINKING BETWEEN RIYADH ALSOLH AND NIJMEH SQUARES. A- DESIGN MODEL, B- REAL SHOT 08 NOVEMBER 2017, 15:52 183
FIGURE 5-18: THE IMPACT OF THE MILITARY MONITORED BARRIERS ON THE TRAFFIC IN BCD, A- EVACUATED STREET FROM WAYGAND ST. (AKA MUNICIPALITY ST.) TOWARDS NIJMEH SQUARE (01 NOVEMBER 2017, 16:42(, B- HEAVY TRAFFIC ON WAYGAND ST. TOWARD BEIRUT SOUKS (01NOVEMBER 2017 ,16:44)...... 183
FIGURE 5-19: THE IMPACT OF THE INSTITUTIONAL OCCUPATION AND POLICE BARRIERS ON THE ACCESSIBILITY OF THE BCD...... 185

Figure 5-20: the spatial allocation of the defined zones of observation in (Table 5-1) ... 187
Figure 5-21: A selected sample of the photo-recorded observation, Martyrs square 02.11.2017 14:00:15 – 14:05:00 ... 189
Figure 5-22: Percentage of the flow out of the total movement in each zone per hour per 100sqm ... 193
Figure 5-23: Percentage of the flow out of the defined movement in the district per hour per 100sqm ... 193
Figure 5-24: Traffic density at Nijmeh square entrances, space and surroundings (day and evening time) ... 195
Figure 6-1: The embedded entities of the case study – the individuals' eventual occupation of the BCD ... 204
Figure 6-2: Weight of the resource involvement in initiating and detailing the maps of the protest events took place in the BCD July 28th – September 30th, 2015, Beirut, Lebanon ... 205
Figure 6-3: Total Protesting days of 01.08 – 30.09.2015 per square ... 207
Figure 6-4: Monthly distribution of protesting events (01.08-30.09.15) ... 208
Figure 6-5: Intervals of major protest events, a. 22-24.08.2015 and b. 19.21.09.2015 ... 208
Figure 6-6: Protest events timeline – defining major intervals ... 208
Figure 6-7: Initial understanding of the spatial features of protestors vs. state's territories during the protests – a. Initial setting, b. expansion of state's territory, c. shrinkage of state's territory ... 210
Figure 6-8: Protestors in Martyrs square, 2015 ... 211
Figure 6-9: The movement of the protestors' crowd 22.08.2015, 14:00 – 21:50 GMT ... 218
Figure 6-10: photos of the main features of the event 22-24.08.2015 ... 219
Figure 6-11: The graffiti on the concrete barrier placed opposite to the Governmental palace ... 221
Figure 6-12: Scenes from 22.08.2015 ... 222
Figure 6-13: The mapped story of 22.08.2015 ... 223
Figure 6-14: Scenes from 23.08.2015 ... 224
Figure 6-15: The mapped story of 23.08.2015 ... 225
Figure 6-16: Scenes from 24.08.2015 ... 226
Figure 6-17: The mapped story of 24.08.2015 ... 227
Figure 6-18: photos of the main features of the event 19 – 21.08.2015 ... 228
Figure 6-19: Abu0Rakhousah souk – occupying the BCD with lower-income oriented economic function. "Here is Al-Balad (city centre) not Solidere." ... 230
Figure 6-20: The mapped story of 20.09.2015 ... 231
Figure 6-21: Theme of 19.09.2015, gathering at the flea market located in Riyadh Alsolh surroundings, 14:40 – 18:00 GMT ... 231
Figure 6-22: Lebanese activists tweet on the (a) the vitality of the space during the demonstration and (b) the placed new gates on the entrances of the Nijmeh square ... 235

FIGURE 6-23: OBSERVED LEFTOVERS OF THE PROTESTORS GRAFFITI FROM THE PROTEST MOVEMENT 2015 – RIYADH ALSOLH SQUARE, OPPOSITE TO THE NIJMEH SQUARE ENTRANCE, PHOTOGRAPHED ON 01.11.2017. “FOR WHOM IS THE MILITARIZED PRESENCE?” 235
FIGURE 6-24: OBSERVED LEFTOVERS OF THE PROTESTORS GRAFFITI FROM THE PROTEST MOVEMENT 2015 ALONG AL-AMIR BASHIR STREET – PHOTOGRAPHED ON 08.11.2017. A. “REVOLUTION”, B. A SENTENCE FROM A FAMOUS LEBANESE SONG ABOUT THE SECTARIANISM “TAKE CARE OF YOUR ID, HOLD IT FIRMLY”, C. SCATTERED SENTENCES “IS THERE ANY OTHER PLACE MORE BEAUTIFUL THAN LEBANON” “YOU STINK” AND THE FIRST SENTENCE OF THE NATIONAL ANTHEM OF LEBANON “WE ARE ALL FOR THE COUNTRY” 236
FIGURE 6-25: THE PATTERNS OF CROWD’S LAYOUT 238
FIGURE 6-26: CARICATURE FROM AL-NAHAR NEWSPAPER ARCHIVES WITH THE CAPTION “FORMATION OF THE NEW GOVERNMENT” AND REPRESENTING A HAND, IMPLIED TO BE THAT OF THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT, GIVING HALF THE GOVERNMENT SEAT TO PRIME MINISTER OMAR KARAME. 241
FIGURE 6-27: THE DIVISION OF PROTEST SPACES – (A) THE PROTESTORS FROM THE 14TH OF MARCH CAMPAIGN IN MARTYRS SQUARE, AND (B) THE PROTESTORS FROM THE 8TH OF MARCH CAMPAIGN IN RIYADH ALSOLH SQUARE 242
FIGURE 6-28: “THE DEMONSTRATORS POURED INTO THE "FREEDOM RIVER" FROM MARTYRS SQUARE TO ST. GEORGE: TAKE PICTURES, ZOOM IN AND ZOOM OUT, AND WE WILL NOT SURRENDER BEFORE VICTORY IS ACHIEVED.” HEADLINE FROM AL-NAHAR NEWSPAPER REFERRING TO THE LARGE NUMBER OF ANTI-SYRIAN PROTESTORS THAT TOOK OVER BEIRUT’S CENTRAL DISTRICT. 243
FIGURE 6-29: THE INCREASE OF THE COLLECTIVE ACTIONS TOOK PLACE IN LEBANON (2017 – 2020) 247
FIGURE 6-30: COLLECTIVE ACTIONS BY MODE OF ACTION, LEBANON 2017 – 2020 247
FIGURE 6-31: LEBANESE PEOPLE RECLAIM DOWNTOWN BEIRUT, 20.10.2019 249
FIGURE 6-32: SCENES FROM MARTYRS SQUARE ON (A) 27.10.2019 AND (B) 06.11.2019 251
FIGURE 6-33: SETTING A LIVING SPACE AT RING ROAD, NEAR BORJ ALGHAZAL, 27.10.2019 252
FIGURE 6-34: THE PROMOTING POSTER OF “THE HUMAN SHIELD” 255
FIGURE 6-35: AN OVERVIEW OF THE KEY PROTEST SITES IN BEIRUT WHICH HAVE BEEN RECLAIMED BY PROTESTORS BEIRUT 2019 (THE CIVIL SOCIETY KNOWLEDGE CENTRE – LEBANON SUPPORT 2019) 258
FIGURE 7-1: THE FLOW OF THE RESEARCH TERMINOLOGY ALONG THE RESEARCH STRUCTURE 262
FIGURE 7-2: SCREEN NUMBER 1 OF A DRONE FOOTAGE VIDEO 00:00:26 – OCCUPIED RIYADH ALSOLH SQUARE, 23.08.2015, BEIRUT 264
FIGURE 7-3: SCREEN NUMBER 2 OF A DRONE FOOTAGE VIDEO 00:00:39 – EVACUATED NIJMEH SQUARE, 23.08.2015, BEIRUT 266
FIGURE 7-4: SCREEN NUMBER 3 OF A DRONE FOOTAGE VIDEO 00:00:47 – MISUSED MARTYRS’ SQUARE, 23.08.2015, BEIRUT 268

FIGURE 7-5: THE MAIN BUILDINGS AND SPACES THAT AFFECTED THE PRODUCTION OF THE PROTESTORS AND STATE'S TERRITORIES, DURING THE PROTEST EVENT, BEIRUT, 2015. 272
FIGURE 7-6: AN EXAMPLE OF (A) THE DOT DENSITY DISTRIBUTION, (B) THE ABSTRACTED LAYOUT OF THE CROWD OF PROTESTORS AND (C) THE PROTESTORS AND STATE'S TERRITORIES – 23.08.2015, 16:00:00 GMT 273
FIGURE 7-7: THE SPATIAL FEATURES OF THE RECOGNISED LAYOUTS OF THE PROTESTORS' TERRITORY AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE STATE'S TERRITORY DURING THE PROTEST EVENTS IN BEIRUT 2015 274
FIGURE 7-8: THE CREATION OF THE DEFENDING SPACE OF A GROUP OF PROTESTORS ... 278
FIGURE 7-9: THE PROPOSED TRANSFORMATION OF TOWARDS THE POTENTIAL ACTION TO MEDIATE THE OBJECTS-SPACE RELATIONSHIP. 282
FIGURE 7-10: FOR THE SAME SPATIAL AREAS, MORE CONNECTION PORTS LEAD TO MORE POTENTIAL DOMINANCE. 288

Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

1.1 The Role of Space in the Current Global Political Dissent Phenomenon

A young street vendor named Mohammed Bouazizi, who set himself on fire in public at the end of 2010, did not plan to launch a revolution in Tunisia. Considering the set of protests, rebellions, and military struggles extending from Morocco to the Gulf that the international community has called the "Arab Spring," the young vendor definitely could not have foreseen that he would inspire the inhabitants of the Arab world to pursue social reform. The acts of Bouazizi struck a chord around the world primarily because Bouazizi personified an immense portion of the populace that would become the power behind the Arab Spring demonstrations: young, single, unemployed or underemployed, desperate and profoundly furious with the local regimes for failing to address these issues. The Arab Spring was not inspired by Bouazizi because he was unique, quite the opposite, he inspired demonstrators because his condition was not at all exceptional (Mulderig 2013)

We are seeing parallel uprisings by young people in Lebanon and Iraq, who have pressured the governments based on sectarianism of each country to resign. Demonstrations continue as a full end to sectarian politics is demanded by each country’s youth. Youth demonstrations in Hong Kong, which began as opposition to the extradition bill, have now evolved to demand the resignation of the Chief Executive of the territory and absolute sovereignty from mainland China. Thousands of youth in Haiti, in an attempt to overthrow President Jovenel Moïse, marched in the streets in September to rally against poverty, injustice and corruption in the government.

Though young people have always been at the forefront of political demonstrations, the 2011 Arab Spring marked a new period of political activism for young people. The Arab Spring revolutions

have also been a catalyst for a wave of youth demonstrations and social movements around the world, from the “Y'en a Marre” in Senegal, “Los Indignados” in Spain, the “Occupy” Movement in numerous countries like the UK and the #FeesMustFall in South Africa, to the “Umbrella Movement” in Hong Kong, and the #BlackLivesMatter Movement, in addition to the deposition of entrenched dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen.

With more than 50% of the global population under the age of 30 in 2012, the planet has never been so young. The majority of these young people live in developing countries, with over 70 % of the population below the age of 30 in sub-Saharan Africa. The majority of young people are largely excluded from major socio-economic institutions and political processes, both in developed and developing countries. As such, young people around the world are undergoing “waithood,” an extended suspension phase in which people are hindered or refused access to social adulthood. Many young people cannot afford to form families and households regardless of their class background and are unable to become completely independent and engage in adult life's rights, obligations and responsibilities. Waithood is also defined, besides material deprivations, by political marginalisation, a loss of dignity, and a lack of expression. Although young people in developing countries have experienced waithood as a result of failed neoliberal structural adjustment policies, poor governance, corruption, and the lack of civil liberties, youth also experience this phenomenon in developed countries in which increased youth unemployment rates to unprecedented high numbers after the economic crisis of 2008 created what some have called the “boomerang generation”: youth who return to their homes and count on their parent after graduating. In the West, most young people are no longer able to live according to societal expectations for material and social well-being and are disassociated from politics. While the experiences of waithood are not entirely foreign, due to the failed neoliberal economic policies

and the increased political marginalization of youth in this globalized world, they have become more widespread and exacerbated. Youth in rich and poor countries are affected, beyond the differences in their material, cultural, and political circumstances, by similar problems of political and socio-economic exclusion and restricted futures.



Figure 1-1: Dominance vs Democracy: Governmental Surveillance and Public Challenge, photographs from different public space occupations around the world.

This global generation that is undergoing these struggles has had enough. They're out on the streets to get their points across and have their voices heard and to claim political and socio-economic space for themselves. I argue that these movements seem to have one significant thing in common, considering their diversity in terms of geography, emphasis and immediate consequences: young people dealing with waithood and political marginalization play a central role. The most recent wave of youth protests, I also contend, seems to have learned a few lessons from the Arab Spring's shortcomings.

In this perspective, is there a dominant phenomenon worldwide? – perhaps a world picture – that ties the Occupy movement to the Arab Spring? Or there is a singular image (to shorten the question quite drastically) that captures and perhaps even inspired the widely observed synergy and

infectious mimicry between, for instance, Zuccotti Park and Tahrir Square; or the CHAZ (Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone), Chile student movements, and the Beirut Uprisings in 2015 and 2019?

Chile has a long tradition of student demonstrations, typically mobilizing against the privatized education system imposed by Augusto Pinochet's military dictatorship. The most recognizable aspect of the student movement has traditionally been street marches. These are, however, just part of a wider repertoire of contention. In 2011, students occupied hundreds of buildings for long periods of time all over the country. Hunger strikes and coordinated flash mobs were also held by student groups. On the 13th of June 2016, 35 universities and 105 high schools were occupied. The multimillionaire businessman, Sebastián Piñera, serving his second term as president, described Chile as an "oasis of calm" in the midst of a tumultuous Latin America just a few days before the start of the popular revolt in October 2019. His words coincided with the picture - a mirage - that the country had presented to the rest of the world for decades: a stable democracy, favourable macroeconomic indices, a decline in poverty, a rise in per-capita income, and high levels of access to consumer goods, among other characteristics that made Chile the uncanny case of effective neoliberalism in an area traversed by political instability and widespread opposition to the application of such monetary formulas. Nevertheless, the revolt that has driven and kept the country in its most vital social and political crisis since the end of the dictatorship has also caused this appearance to collapse and disclosed the foundation of inequality impeding a system that was formed by the military dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990) and the Chicago Boys by blood and fire.

A $0.04 increase in the subway tariff was implemented at the beginning of October 2019 in the city of Santiago. A couple of days later, high school students started organizing direct action days, calling on individuals to stop paying the ticket as a sign of protest against the government's

enforced measure. Under the slogan "Evade, don't pay: another form of struggle," the act of jumping over turnstiles at metro stations spread rapidly and student organizations called for a day of massive evasion on Friday, October 18. The reaction to the call by the population was massive and demonstrations took place at the main metro stations in the region, which faced violent repression by the Chilean Carabineros (an armed police force under the Ministry of the Interior) and the temporary closing of public transport in several central points of Santiago. During rush hour, when millions of people were returning home from work, chaos ensued. The population, indignant at the police action and the response of the government, poured out into the streets at nightfall, banging their pots and pans. Barricades grew across the capital, and in a matter of hours, the country's largest social revolt had started, ranging from a reaction to the rise in prices to a general challenge to living standards imposed by orthodox neoliberalism for more than forty years.



Figure 1-2: Mural by Brigadas Ramona Parra, “No more sacrifice zone”, anti-capitalist slogan[1]

[1] The term "Sacrifice Zones" has been coined to reflect those places that concentrate a large number of polluting industries, always affecting the poorest or most vulnerable communities.

For four and a half decades, the commodification of all facets of social life, including elements such as health care, water, pensions, and education and the constitution of a form of state that is at the service of corporate exploitation through subsidies to private social service providers, guaranteeing them large levels of profits, has been the foundation of crude neoliberalism in Chile. These trends have led to a steady rise in inequality in increasingly larger segments of the population and the accumulation of high levels of social dissatisfaction. Some data can be used to outline this situation in practical terms: 26% of GDP is concentrated in the top 1% of the population, while 50% of households with lower incomes possess just 2.1% of the country's wealth, making Chile the most unequal country in the OECD and one of the thirty with the worst distribution of income worldwide. Fifty percent of employees earn around $460 a month and an average of $340 in pension contributions, figures that are absolutely inadequate to care for life and hold a much higher percentage of the population in poverty than official statistics accept. This situation largely explains the large debt levels of the population, which, in accordance to recent data from the Central Bank, hit record levels in the last trimester of 2019, representing 75% of the disposable income[2] of Chilean households.

There is an increasing sense of exhaustion and consciousness of living in an unjust country under these circumstances in which ordinary people must make immense efforts to make ends meet while large companies profit from a framework built for them. Repeated cases of price-fixing on basic commodities, tax evasion, military and carabinero tax fraud, among other company and state corruption cases, have drained the patience of those who feel the weight of those violations. One

[2] Disposable income, also known as disposable personal income (DPI), is the amount of money that households have available for spending and saving after income taxes have been accounted for (investopedia, n.d.).

of the first slogans that arose from this uprising was "It's not 30 pesos, it's 30 years"; it was one of those that best sums up the uprising’s meaning. For decades, the Chilean people have accumulated resentment, indignation, and dissatisfaction, before the rise in subway fare was the detonator of a social earthquake that signalled, among many other things, the end of a neoliberal consensus in a country that was its cradle and an exemplary model until a few weeks ago.

From the above description, from corruption to wealth inequality and neoliberal fiscal policies, one can already sense the similarities to the Lebanese context. A similar phenomenon is also taking place in a country that seems to bear no resemblance to the “third-world country” Lebanon: the US. For a long time, Capitol Hill in Washington, DC has been the heart of radical action. It has had a reputation as the "queer district" of Seattle since the 1970s. The progressive spirit on Cap Hill saw the area take centre stage and become the centre of the 1999 WTO protest in Seattle. Since then, Cap Hill has been gentrified, but the sense of community has never been genuinely repressed or substituted. Rather, the generations of employees that have been treated poorly by neoliberal capitalist policies have been trialled and matured. This has all escalated to a breaking point as the police were reported killing George Floyd in Minneapolis on May 25, 2020. This act would eliminate the powder keg of injustice from the United States and drive the whole country into a state of turmoil. On the fourth day of the demonstrations, Seattle erupted, and protesters witnessed the same reaction of police violence and repression seen in nationwide protests. Tear gas was commonly used, with video recordings showing entire streets shrouded by a foggy cloud. A man crashed his car into the demonstrators on June 8 and shot a protester who was trying to avoid the attacker and defend others. The police allowed the shooter to walk into their line as was seen in shocking footage released on social media. They did not apprehend the attacker until later that evening. Within the ranks of the demonstrators, this assault built up militancy, with leaders

recommending that those who can arm themselves to help protect the barricades. Following the attack, cops were told to leave the precinct in the neighbourhood of Capitol Hill, fully expecting the demonstrators to set the building on fire which would allow for a mass arrest. Much to their bewilderment, that did not happen. Instead, to defend themselves, the demonstrators started to construct barricades. Short moments after the police left the scene on Capitol Hill, and before the barricades were erected, a feeling of excitement surged through the air. The demonstrators, recognizing that the police had withdrawn, started marching with no fear of repression. At this exact moment, the protest transformed into an autonomous zone. In front of the police station, the group settled and began the process of forming a zone of approximately six blocks.

“In my understanding, an autonomous zone is an area where state authority has been consciously rejected. What makes those blocks on Cap Hill autonomous is that the police have been pushed out, and people are free to self-manage. A big side effect is that folks can just go out there and live unlike the rest of capitalism, which forces us to always be consuming or working, you can just be in an occupation like that, which is incredibly liberating.”

(Laura, @anarchomastia, eyewitness)

How do those above-described phenomena of social resistance compare to Lebanon? Popular mobilizations in Lebanon were considered unparalleled in the history of the country, owing to the resilience of demonstrators, the massive crowds, the territorial spread throughout the country and

among the diaspora, and the essence of the discourse (socio-economic demands, fighting wealth inequality, and denouncing collaboration between political and business / financial elites).

1.2 Contextualisation: Beirut as a Contested City

It was clear that the criticism of the status quo by young protestors in Beirut's Central District in 2015 went beyond sectarian distinctions. Sectarian leaders, who in the past, enjoyed total allegiance as the protectors of each sect, were openly questioned by their own societies. No leader has been exempted, from Christian Foreign Minister and the President's son in law Gebran Bassil, to Sunni Prime Minister Saad Hariri, to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, to Shiite Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, as the demonstrators shouted in unison, "Thieves!". Despite the government's resignation, young Lebanese pledged to stay the course until this sectarian, kleptocratic system is drastically altered. So far, however, the structures and political ideologies that turn protest movements into formal political parties continue to be avoided by the Lebanese youth. It would be incorrect, however, to treat these mobilizations as entirely new, or as the direct product of single, timely grievances. To contextualize the ongoing demonstrations, mapping collective action activities over time is vital. It not only questions prominent readings of this recent cycle but also leads to new ways of political practice and participation in Lebanon's political sphere.

Mapping exercises disclose that the protests in October are followed a steady rise in collective action mobilizations around socio-economic demands, motivated by years of corruption, clientelism, peripheral neglect, and, more lately, austerity measures, similar to the situation in both Chile and the USA. In fact, 324 collective actions were mapped in 2015, 468 in 2016, 419 in 2017, and 188 in 2018. 2018 saw a fall in collective action in favour of multiple modes of political action, coinciding with the much-postponed parliamentary elections. Until October 2019, 200

mobilizations had already taken place in 2019. By the end of the year, the number increased to 2,102. In addition, the demands of the protests in October echo and build on those of previous demonstration cycles, such as the movement around the crisis of waste management in 2015 or the protests in 2011 demanding the end of the sectarian regime.

The emphasis on spatial disruption was omnipresent and theoretically unavoidable considering that invasive disruption must be resorted to by activists who have little institutional control. This spatial disruption manifested itself in the 2015 manifestations in various forms. First, there was a fixation on the occupation of the square of parliament as a broader target for the Harak. In addition, organizers issued the government a 72-hour ultimatum at the height of the Harak's momentum to fulfil a series of demands or risk escalating action (Dakroub, 2015). The government took its gamble, and the civilian invasion and occupation of the Ministry of Environment was its punishment. Although the ministry itself is a major disruptive organization, the aim was instead to occupy the room and the "spectacle" it creates. This was also embodied in the temporary occupation of Riyadh Alsolh Square and the spontaneous assaults on Downtown Beirut's upper-class character, from the extensive graffiti on the walls to the use of the streets to housing food and second-hand goods markets for the working class.

4 years later, as reports began to come in of demonstrators gathering in other Lebanese cities on October 19, news arrived of widespread iconoclasm against the constructed expressions of power: knocking down political posters depicting party members, targeting Mohammad Raad's Hezbollah's MP offices in Nabatiyeh, smashing Nabatiyeh's Amal Party banner (Daou, 2019). Though in the protest chants a new form of public open shaming of the political elite formed, new geographies were being authored. If, as Swyngedouw wrote, it is true that revolutions are 'an aggressive intervention mechanism in which (public) space is reconfigured and [...] a new socio-

spatial order is inaugurated,' then that is precisely what the uprising in Lebanon is achieving. Spaces such as the Beirut-Jounieh highway are being used as sit-ins, which on any other day are usually a forest of billboards and signs for advertisement. Buildings that were shut down by Solidere during the post-war rebuilding in the restored downtown area have been resuscitated. People visited the Grand Theatre, the decaying Saint Vincent de Paul church, and the former Metropole Cinema (aka the Egg) for the first time since the beginning of the civil war. The Egg has since become a centre for university seminars, open mic nights, legal advice, and rave parties free of charge, reminiscent of the university tent at the Occupy camp in London's St Paul's Square in 2011, and the 2016 Nuit Debut protest at Paris' Place de la République. The restored downtown Beirut area is part of the sectarian post-war machine. The goal was to promote a neutral zone in the middle of the city, to embody the new 'Lebanon for all,' planned and built through a private/public capital venture operated by Solidere and facilitated by the Council for Development and Reconstruction. However, it became more analogous to a room for no one due to skyrocketing land prices, a shortage of public space and expensive services. Here, attempts to create spaces for public and memory contemplation about the country's past were expunged by more profitable real estate developments. Consequently, since the early 2000s, and particularly since the murder of Rafiq al Hariri, the town centre has gradually become a space for protest.

It becomes especially evident during the rebellion how cities represent physical and symbolic terrain for socio-political reform. Protesters redraw the urban geography to challenge the current spatial configurations of control by selecting meeting points, tracing protest paths, and choosing occupation sites. There was one common denominator in the latest demonstrations in Chile, Hong Kong, and Catalonia and the wave of protests around the world in 2011, along with the Arab Spring and Occupy movements: the deliberate invasion of space not just as a form of protest, but as a

main demand and message. When Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah and Micheal Aoun the President ask protesters to pick leaders and make clear demands when international commentators say that sectarianism cannot be removed because that is Lebanon's identity, they ignore one critical point: protesters already have made their demands by seizing key spaces and reusing them for their vision of a state beyond the sect.

This is why the defining moments of the global revolution of the 21st century, the “images” that promise to become monuments, are not images of faces but of space. They are not figures, but rather are the negative space or ground on which a figure appears. The picture of the occupation of space itself is the figure that circulates worldwide, which embraces Chile, Seattle and Minneapolis, and the downtown of Beirut, and has perhaps been ignored because it is concealed in plain sight. But the occupation has no definite shape or entity other than the mass and the individual's dialectical poles, the gathered crowd and the single, unidentified resistance entity. And, it should be noted, occupation is not just a visual and physical presence in a room, but a rhetorical and discursive activity. The strategy of predicting the claims of an opponent by pre-empting them is explicitly related to the trope of occupation, taking the initiative in a room where one knows in advance that there will be opposition and counterarguments. As the original sense of the word shows, occupation is, in the context of the rhetoric of public space, the seizure of an empty location, one which is meant to be res nullius, not occupied by anyone, not property which is privately owned. It is a demand in its own right, a demand for presence, an assertion on being heard before any particular political demands are made; a demand that the public is able to assemble and stay in a public place. But the call for occupation is made in a complete understanding that public space is, in reality, pre-occupied by the state and the police, that the ever-present threat of violent eviction sustains its peaceful and democratic existence, seemingly open

to all. In this way, Occupation attempts not only to take control of empty space in an argument but also to elicit an answer and frame it in advance. Both positive meaning and negative meaning of occupation are equally important, meant as the taking of empty space; it's also negative function in the creation of empty spaces which is paradoxically also a space of plenitude and fullness. Typically, this version of occupation is characterized as a refusal to say something while also saying it at the same time.

1.3 Research Problem

Cities are gaining massive influence around the world, especially considering their role in globalization as cosmopolitan hubs. For the first time in history, since 2013, the majority of the world’s population lives in cities. Cities are the place where people live, work, and innovate, but they are also places where major injustices and oppression arise. This is the case of Beirut, Lebanon’s capital and its most vital city, a city which has historically been heavily contested, whether through the domination of the wealthy and ruling elite, the war, or numerous protests and uprisings. Additionally, it is important to reframe the way space, especially space of protests, has been studied in academia. The persistent functionalist epistemological assertions of the discipline often restrict aspects of space to either a tool for achieving specific movement aims or to the mere physical location of contestation, rather than an analytical lens through which to examine contestation. The relation of space and protest, however subtle, seems to often be one of the causal mechanisms— where space impacts the trajectory and outcome of the protest. However, the recent waves of uprisings and occupations highlighted how closely related space and social movements are. Nonetheless, despite the newly revived scholarly interest in the role of space during protests, little attention so far has been paid to the role of space in protests' long-term effects, especially in

terms of collective identity building in social movements. In thinking through spatialities, it is possible to point to the relationality of spatiality as both an insightful heuristic tool and a legitimate object of study. Here, the social and the spatial are mutually constitutive, as individuals and collectivities are simultaneously producers of and produced by spaces.

1.4 Research Question(s), Aim & objectives

The conception of the state's ownership of public space and its control over its physical and psychological accessibility have shaped the spaces and the extent of public engagement within them. On the other side, civil movements challenge this dominance and contribute to the reshaping of the spaces through different modes of political gatherings. Several spaces in the Middle East have developed their significance through the competition of conflictual actors; however, there is a lack of practical evidence for the theoretical explanation of the rise of the value of the absolute (unoccupied space) in the conception of dominance.

This research calls the changes in the space-object relationship and its role in developing spatial production within the context of demonstration spatial collective practices. Believing in the reciprocal reliable relationship of the individual and crowd in shaping their own territories, the research moves continuously between the individual and plural scale of practices using the philosophical and structural approaches of describing the space within phases of urban unrests, where the change in the spatial occupiers/competitors and their practices change the appearance and the functionality of the space.

Along the following chapters, this research answers the following sub-questions:

1. What are the main the elements that shape up Beirut as a case of contestation?

2. How to visualise the urban dominance through mapping archived spatial practices?
3. How does Beirut represent an established case of contestation that reflects on the appearance and daily uses of the spaces of the city?
4. How does Beirut represent successive chapters of eventual representation of contesting the spaces of the city?

This research aims at building a chain of theoretical and empirical evidence to inform the theory with empirical data that highlight and explains the modification in the theoretical model of the experiential production of space, within public settings. As the personal territories of individuals – through which they act, stands for the concept of producing the space, through the perception, understanding, and development of their territories; the research anticipates producing a model which describes a modified conception of personal space – its perceived definition, features, and impact on the spatial practices, therefore the production of space.

As this chapter constructed the understanding of the development of the production of space as an instrument of popularising dominance, the rest of the thesis meets its aim through achieving the following objectives:

(1) Investigate the conceptual ground of the conflictual and consociation production of space in Beirut – Lebanon. This includes the understanding of Beirut's spatial politics emphasizing the dynamism of space and its relation to time. To facilitate this understanding, spatiality is discussed through its: (a) relevance to the distinction between relativist and absolutist conceptions of space; (b) elaborating the context of Beirut and the mutual relationship that exists between the space and the people of the city; and (c) the capitalism impact on producing socio-spatially segregated city [Beirut].

(2) Investigate the development of political mobilisation in Lebanon and its relation to the shaping of the city [its spaces]. This includes understanding the chained relationship between the sectarian influences, the capitalist spatial dynamic of Beirut and the segregation of its residents. Through theoretically analysing the spatial divisions of Beirut Central District and the impact of Solidere development project on the real-life experience of the city's residents, the capitalism and neoliberalism's transformation and production of space are linked to the: (a) sectarian interests; (b) conflicting actors fighting over the domination of space; (c) tensions and confusions about the residents' sense of place and identity; and (d) political movement of 2015.

(3) Examine innovative methods of visualising the urban dominance through mapping spatial practices of unrest and patterns of conflict against the citizens' modes of engagement during the case study examined. This includes place-centred maps to show the active crowds and activities taking place in a setting within a set time interval through the annotation of maps, plans, videos and photographs. Utilising this objective, a systematic narrative of the spatiotemporal identity of the practices is established with a sensitive inclusion of the citizens' perception of the space and events. This has facilitated a huge archive of scattered resources to create a multi-layered visual document the spatial allocation, population and densities of the occupiers' crowd of the defined protest events.

(4) Characterise the contribution of both physical and social objects of the Beirut central district in setting the spatial statement of the district. This includes analysing the impact of the building's uses, urban elements, vehicles and pedestrians' movement and the militarized presence on the appearance and functionality of the public spaces within the district.

(5) Characterise the elements, character and attributes of the crowd's experience of physical space and defining the new cognition of this experience and its influence on revolutionising

practices in public spaces. This includes visually analysing the patterns of spatial practices using the elements of the users' positions and the values attached to the relationships between them. The theoretically grounded structure of the space occupation and the attached competition to the spatial alliance, empirically, points and explains the modification in the space-object relationship and its role in developing spatial production.

(6) Develop a framework that integrates a description of the modified conception of personal space and its impact on the plural spatial practices [production]. This includes integrating the practical evidence and theoretical justification of the influence of the spatial connectivity in enhancing the dominance of the occupied [or potentially occupied] spaces.

1.5 Gap in Knowledge

Nearly 20 years ago, William Sewell noted that "most studies bring in spatial considerations only episodically, when they seem important either for an adequate description of contentious political events or for explaining why particular events occurred or unfolded as they did." This reality did not fundamentally change despite an influx, since the 1990s, of case studies analysing the relation between space and protest, leading to the creation of the field termed "social movement studies" or "social movement theory." Most analyses mostly focused on the resources in protesters' tactical repertoires, a terrain that sets policing strategies, or an actant that influences movement-building. As such, it seems that little theoretical work has been produced on the spatiality of protest in the past 15 years. When it comes to the MENA region and Lebanon in specific, such endeavours become even rarer. In fact, most academic research on the Arab Spring takes on a socio-political and historical framework that often does not analyse space as a function of protest in-of-itself. As for the 2015 manifestations, there have been scarce, non-coordinated and non-comprehensive mapping efforts.

1.6 Research Design and methodology

This research is explanatory research that informs the theoretical understanding of the experiential production of space with practical evidence of spatial practices from the contribution of individuals and institutions in shaping the central district in Beirut. The analysed practices were unable to be manipulated because their context was found to be as relevant to the phenomenon as the practices themselves. Therefore, a case study was utilised to provide practical evidence. Analysing multi entities within a single case study allowed a deep and comprehensive analysis of the related routine and eventual features that contribute to the explanation of the phenomenon.




Figure 1-3: the embedded entities of the case study

The selected socio-political movement defined the main elements of the eventual entity (the main body of the research evidence) and provided with the exact implementation of the theoretical terminology to serve the research objectives through the utilized case study, through mapping a collective action (demonstration) of a massive non-homogenised group of creators (the crowd of

occupiers) in a significant space (square) of competition for dominance (production) within a set of time intervals.

Protest event and user experience methods were used to establish a systematic narrative that is correlated to the spatiotemporal identity of the practices, along with the citizens' perception of the space and events. This selection helped the research to include the physical and social dimensions of the space-object-action relationship. The research was designed to rely, mainly, on a protest event method – which enables to track the spatial events with a reliable sensitivity to the time factor. In parallel, the user experience method has enriched the methodology with more occupiers-related views. The two methods together proceeded to achieve the research outcomes and to remain aligned to the theoretical base and all its elements: space, object and action. However, this added value had to be discussed concerning the researcher sensitivity in avoiding the misconception of the borders between the user memory and opinion. This point is essential to serve in the subjectivity of the method and the reliability of its outcomes. Through utilising a huge archive of scattered resources, the research produced and visualised a reliable document of concrete verbal and visual narratives, with several opportunities of analysis. By developing an equation that converts the initial annotation of crowd's location and density and applying it on an equally divided time-lapse, and through utilising the features of the GIS, the created visual document allows serving the research with several layers of data that are correlated to a specific spatiotemporal situation; therefore, wider opportunities of analysis purposes. And for the first time in analysing protesting crowds in Lebanon, the human eye perspective visual records were used to allocate the distribution of the crowd's densities. Such risky decision enhanced the used resources and expanded the opportunities to apply this methodology on similar urban events with limited aerial

footage. However, careful utilization of the fixed architectural and urban elements was essential to minimize the impact of visual illusions that are linked to human eye perspectives.

Finally, the produced visual narrative of the spatial allocation, population and densities of the occupiers' crowd of the defined protest events was analysed through linking a list of independent parameters to the occurrence of violent actions as a parameter of indicating the level of arousing the territory defence.

Working on this methodology faces several unexpected challenges that were attached either to the complexity of the secto-political environment in Beirut or to the limitations of the PhD scope, time and facilities. In parallel, other unplanned opportunities were at some points the keys to achievement. And for both, the flexibility of the researcher to the opportunities and obstacles, along with a strong prepared background of the research environment and a continuous considering of assessment and adaptation have maximised the benefits of the case study.




Figure 1-4: Research methodology: the flow of the research resources and methods towards mapping the event

1.7 Research significance and contribution to knowledge

This research decided on selecting a case study that provides a unique scene of occupying a square for the purpose of reshaping the space and, beyond, its socio-political meanings of domination. The picked case study criteria included having a concrete historical and futuristic context of a continuous story of the contested square(s). Selection criteria included as well as locating the case within the MENA region. The regional interest justifications included having a good level of knowledge regarding the background of the possible cases; the ability to approach the cultural keys of the research community; bridging communication difficulties through speaking a common language and having a common cultural background that enabled me to understand the local accent (the meaning and context of some local words); in addition to a well-constructed understanding of the main dynamics that control the country, which contributed to the achievability of some targets of the fieldwork [this will be discussed in chapter four].

Beirut, the host of most political collective activities in Lebanon, stands for a well-constructed case study, considering the following highlights: the sophisticated political, social and sectarian context; the long history of contesting the domination of the space of the city; and the continuity of highly repetitive collective demonstrating actions that established a phenomenon of occupying squares. Additionally, Beirut was a safe selection in comparison with other regional cases.

The other possible regional cases were assessed either to be widely covered with research, such as the Egyptian case – this includes but not limited to (Al-Ani et. al. 2012, AlSayyad & Guvenc 2015, Alsayyad 2012, Bardici 2012, Douai 2013, El-Khatib 2013, El-Sharnouby 2015, Ezbawy 2012, Galal 2013, Gregory 2013, Haghani 2015, Holmes 2012, Iskander 2011, Kadry 2015, Mohamed 2015, Said 2014, Said 2015, Salama 2013, Telmissany 2014, Winegar 2012); too unsafe and complicated to approach, such as the Libyan, Syrian and Iraqi cases which have been in a fragile

situation for several years; or cases that had limited occupation movements that did not establish a political or a spatial phenomenon, such as the Bahraini case of Pearl square that hosted the protests in 2011 and the Jordanian case of Al-Husseini mosque, Alnakhil square, Abdelnasser square and the Fourth circle protests in 2011-2012 and 2018.



Figure 1-5: Square as a symbol of the protest movement – (a) Tahrir Square, Cairo, (b) Fourth Circle, Amman and (c) Tahrir Square, Baghdad.

This interdisciplinary research that integrates sociological theories, applying for political context, using geographical tools to explain a spatial phenomenon. It provides a comprehensive analysis of the features that shape the central district in Beirut, including the contribution of institutions, urban elements and people during the routine and non-routine phases of facilitating the public spaces of the district. It, also, provides with a reliable method/document of estimating the protestor's population and movement. As discussed with a professional institution of estimating crowds' population in public spaces in Lebanon, before the extent use of drone footage, there were no reliable estimations of the protests' crowds in Lebanon. The estimates were mainly a material of media content that are either over or underestimated based on the political message they wanted to deliver. The research has unified the scattered data that are related to the case study in a well-presented visual document that is supported with numerical GIS attributes. This type of

documentation can be used to enrich the available GIS data of the analysed district and to provide futuristic researches with further layers of information. Additionally, this research has correlated observable [and avoidable] spatial features of protestors' crowd to the probability of the occurrence of violent actions. An addition that will, if was numerically proved in multiple cases, inspire the design of public spaces that host demonstration events to reduce the crowd's probability to follow these risky spatial organisations. It also rebuilds and explains the changes in the conception of dominating public spaces on the plural scale and utilizes it to redefine the points of strength for the personal space of individuals within public milieus.

On the other side, there were several methodology-related limitations; however, for the research outcomes side, the more we have of recorded objects (both physical and social) in time was supposed to help in both: enriching the GIS file with several layers of information, and figuring out the main characteristics of the space which has been produced through the experience of the occupiers.

1.8 Risks and research limitations

Politics is the core issue in the Middle East. The region has been into some major political changes led by the Arab Spring, with occasional terrorist attacks. Many countries have settled down, conducting parliamentary and presidential elections, while the conflict is still controlling the scene of others. For those settled countries, economics is the priority issue that motivates the public movements and government decisions. Unemployment, poverty and meeting the demands of new waves of refugees stand to be the main objectives for governments to meet.

Prior to the conducted fieldwork, Lebanon held presidential elections at the end of October 2016 and started forming a new government. Parliament's success in electing the new president reflects

the end of 2.5 years of conflict between political parties and in the streets. However, economic challenges are still the main concern for all governments, especially given the country's extensive borders with Syria and a relatively high number of refugees passing through.

The research took place in Beirut, on the west seaside, away from the contentious borders with Syria in the east and Israel/Palestine to the south. According to the FCO, it is advisable not to travel to specific districts – which are beyond the boundaries of this study – while there have been no attacks in Beirut since November 2015.

Considering the situation, the researcher was prepared with a clear plan of movement hours and places to conduct interviews away from dangerous districts, which marginally restricted the productivity of the fieldwork. The risks were acceptable, and there was no direct threat to the researcher while conducting fieldwork. However, the appropriate procedure was established to deal with and report any unexpected circumstances.

On the other side, the research was challenged with several obstacles during the fieldwork. First of all, I faced several restrictions caused by my nationality. The productivity and efficiency highly improved working in collaboration with Lebanese partners; despite the fact that several obstacles and delays occurred during conducting the majority of the fieldwork. A second obstacle was the security measures put in place in the research area which restricted the observation zone and method. And finally, the complexity of sectarian distribution of the security institutions which appeared clearly in the last week of the fieldwork when the prime minister Sa'ad Alhariri resigned while travelling outside Lebanon was a notable obstacle. The resignation of the Lebanese government has cancelled all the previously acquired approvals from the Lebanese army and raised the need to obtain other approvals that consider the sectarian division of the police institutions in Lebanon. It also eliminated the range of observation in Riyadh Alsolh square for security purposes

and excluded taking horizontal photos within the observation that was under militarized surveillance. Additionally, it eliminated the ability to move within the city due to the heavy traffic occurred by embassies that evacuated their people and caused some interviews to be either rescheduled or cancelled [from the interviewees' side].

In parallel, the distanced part of the work was highly affected by the obstacles that are related either to the Lebanese context or the accessibility of specific data. For example, it is well-known that political milestones or sectarian incidents can expand to affect the country for several months. Conducting the parliament elections in May 2018 eliminated approaching almost all targeted people from the second week of February until July. Even after that, considering that the research sample is all of the key activists who are interested and well involved in the political life in Lebanon, the long months of the government formation [9-10 months] were not easier to approach people online, conduct interviews, obtain some documents, or plan to re-travel to conduct more work in person. Another issue was caused by the limitations of accessing some related data. For some numerical dataset, very few people have access to and are willingness to share the required/correct data and information, leading to the obtention of distorted data which forced me to eliminate a major piece of the research and reform the correlations between the theoretical framework and the created empirical chain of evidence.

Along with the unexpected challenges, some unplanned opportunities may face the researcher. In such a complex and volatile research environment in Lebanon, being flexible and open to the opportunities and obstacles is recommended to keep the fieldwork in control; as well as continuously considering assessment and adaptation to maximise the benefits of the case study.

Therefore, the following issues are recommended to be considered for any similar fieldwork in Beirut Downtown: First, travel should be planned carefully – considering the FCO travel advice.

The hours dedicated to observation and conducting interviews should be selected wisely, with the possibility of pre-emptively engaging a potential researcher who can travel safely if a late observation is needed. Third, instant reports of the places accessed in order to conduct interviews, complemented with the specific time of entering and leaving the places should preferably be recorded and sent immediately to an emergency contact. In parallel, ethical issues should remain a priority to (1) address the causes, motivations and determinants of the selected case study, rather than create the potential for conflict; (2) stick to the academic use of the collected data; and (3) respect the choice of anonymity and carefully select the topics of discussion that avoid emotional distress in order to obtain reliable data and protect the participants against any negative consequences. And finally, it is crucial not to forget to follow the updated FCO advice and submit periodic reports to the school and supervisor during fieldwork.




Figure 1-6: estimated response ranking in relation to the contextual situation in Lebanon August 2017 – July 2018[3].



Figure 1-7: the key solution of responding to the research challenges/opportunities

[3] The estimated plan was affected by unexpected events / incidents

1.9 Research structure

In addition to the introduction and closing chapters, the thesis will consist of six chapters distributed on three main sections:

Part I – The contestational production of space: Theoretical application on the case of Lebanon

Through two chapters: [chapter 2] "The role of contestation and consociation in the production of the central district of Beirut"; and [chapter 3] "2015 Manifestations: Roots deeper than the Garbage Crisis", this part of the thesis will provide the theoretical justification of the selected case study as an authentic statement of historically developed layers of contesting the notions of domination and production among communities and space.

First, a historical overview of Beirut and Lebanon set the opening of this part, through correlating it to the current situation of the country, and the thesis terms. Following, the theoretical discussion of space [informed with the reviewed historical discussion] takes place. This introduction paved the way to the more thorough discussion of spatiality, as it is relevant to the distinction between relativist and absolutist conceptions of space; and elaborates on the context of Beirut and the mutual relationship that exists between the space and the people of the city. More analysis was built of Foucault's work, notably the recollection of history and the concept of heterotopias. This discussion allows moving into Simmel's theories, focusing on how the residents of Beirut deviated from the traditional Simmelian understanding of the city. The analysis then dwells unto the effects of post-modernity, notably with Giddens, Beck, and Lefebvre, to finally end with Bourdieu's fundamental framework with three equally significant notions: habitus, practice, and field. In this sense, the spatial analysis of Beirut's history is paralleled its history, from industrialisation (pre, and during, the civil war) to modernity to post-modernism; considering all the different layers that its peculiar and complex history demands.

The following chapter adopted the narrative of how the complex, peculiar and unhinged neoliberal capitalist spatial dynamic of Beirut is further complicated by sectarian influences. Considering a long history of failed reforms, this chapter argues that the multi-layered dynamics of Beirut, which led to a quartered city, caused further tensions and confusions about the residents' sense of place and have culminated in the 2015 manifestations. It reviews how the city's spatiality influences and is influenced by the segregation of its residents. Pointing out that despite the main goal of the reconstruction is to establish a positive sense of space, (a place of hope, tolerance, and diversity), this chapter argues that the city remained as fractured as it has always been, with alienation and marginalization. Finally, through focusing on political mobilization in Beirut and how its manifestation links the rising inequalities to the spatiality of the city, the chapter paved the way to the next part of the thesis with introducing the 2015 garbage crisis as an extension to the numerous anti-sectarian movements that Lebanon has witnessed in its history.

Part II – Urban scenes from BCD: Mapping the uses of the District

This part of the thesis targets at mapping the relation of the collective spatial practices to the production of their hosting spaces. It analyses the routine and eventual urban scenes of the three main squares of Beirut Central District: Riyadh Alsolh, Nijmeh and Martyrs' squares, and their surroundings; as well as explaining the research methodology that contributed to visualising them. This part consists of three chapters:

[Chapter 4] "Methodology: Visualizing the urban unrest practices". This chapter explains the research methodology of visualising the eventual dominance of public spaces through mapping archived spatial practices during phases of urban unrests. The discussion starts with providing a justified definition of the main elements of the eventual entity of the spatial production with the exact implementation of the theoretical terminology to serve the research objectives through the

utilized case study. Next, discussing thoroughly the main features that give the used methodology its originality. This includes the combination of various methods, building up verbal and visual narratives, creating and visualizing numerical time-series dataset of the spatial features of the crowd, and the use of human eye perspective visual records to allocate the distribution of the crowd's densities. Finally, the research limitations and ethical issues will be reviewed.

Next, the first section of the mapped scenes of the district will be included in the [chapter 5] "The routine urban scene of Beirut downtown: Defining the spatial condition of the case study". This chapter introduces the spatial context of the study area[4]. It analyses two of the three theoretical entities of the case study, which are connected to the routine planned functionality in the central district of Beirut. The chapter utilises multi-layered analysis of the contribution of both physical and social objects of the district to its planned routine functionality.

The last chapter of this part [chapter 6] "The eventual urban scene of Beirut downtown: The politics of the district" will analyse the third entity of the case study, which is connected to the eventual occupation of the district. presents the numerical results of the created equation that used the collected verbal and visual narratives to calculate the population and distribution of the occupiers' crowd. Then, this spatial dataset is visualised through a sequence of GIS layers that show the physical features of the occupiers' crowd and correlate to the identifying of the state's and protestors' territories at each spatial situation. After that, through making use of the physical features of the crowd's territory, the speed of the spatiotemporal changes and the identified verbal narratives of the used tools of marking the field of both occupiers' crowd and state, the tendency

[4] the three main squares of Beirut Central District: Riyadh Alsolh, Nijmeh and Martyrs squares, and their surroundings

to the violent actions of the militarized presence is used to measure the effectiveness of each featured crowd's field to threaten the borders/expansion of the state's field. Finally, the chapter will conclude by reflecting the analysed event to the continuous contest of the institutional ascendancy, capital exploitation, and protestors' occupation of the district.

Part III – Re-defining the dominance of space: Actual vs potential occupation

This part consists of one chapter [chapter 7] "The impact of potential domination on mediating the production of unoccupied spaces". The chapter reflects on the previously stated theoretical conceptions of attaching the space to its social objects. Using the analysed plural patterns of crowds contribution to the hosting space, as well as the other counter crowds, this chapter will discuss the change of the collective understanding of popularising the dominance on space to be detached from the actual position of the actor (creator) for the benefit of the unoccupied absolute space. The found results will be linked back to its theoretical context in order to move the explanation of the mapped change of the experiential production of space from the plural back to the individual scale. In result, the chapter will try to seek for the theoretical justification of the actual vs potential occupation and their role in popularising the spatial dominance.

This part will conclude in presenting the research recommendations before the last chapter [chapter 8] wrap up the research with a brief review of its elements and findings.




Figure 1-8: the flow of the research terminology along the research structure




Figure 1-9: The thesis in A3 page – a flow of the research terminologies, tools and outcome

PART I
THE CONTESTATIONAL PRODUCTION OF SPACE
Theoretical Application on the Case of Lebanon

The spatial dynamics in Beirut's 2015 manifestations is a reflection of the city's peculiar history and fragmentation along several lines - class, religion and sects. Historical violent sectarian clashes coupled with the advent of capitalism and neoliberal policies in addition to years of colonialism only exacerbated sectarian tension, leading to a brutal 16-years civil war. Post-civil war, the city witnessed waves of privatization following neoliberal agendas, leading to gentrification and segregation within the city. Each of those aspects contributed to constant political unease in the country. The 2015 manifestations in Beirut constitute a culmination of this situation and a paragon for the understanding of spatial dynamics of the city with its complexity and the intersectionality of different factors shaping it, historically, and by extension, in its current state.

In other words, the complex, peculiar and unhinged neoliberal capitalist spatial dynamic of Beirut is further complicated by sectarian influences. The multi-layered dynamics of Beirut, from privatization to gentrification, led to a quartered city, which caused further tensions and confusions about the residents' sense of place, which, considering a long history of failed reforms, have culminated in the 2015 manifestations.

Through the following two chapters:

- **[Chapter 2] The role of contestation and consociation in the production of the central district of Beirut**
- **[Chapter 3] 2015 Manifestations: Roots deeper than the Garbage Crisis**

this part of the thesis will provide the theoretical justification of the selected case study as an authentic statement of historically developed layers of contesting the notions of domination and production among communities and space.

Chapter 2
THE ROLE OF CONTESTATION AND CONSOCIATION IN THE PRODUCTION OF THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF BEIRUT

This chapter aims at understanding the sectarian, political and spatial dynamics of Beirut. First,a historical overview of Beirut and Lebanon set the opening of this part, through correlating itto the current situation of the country, and the thesis terms. Following, the theoretical discussion of space [informed with the reviewed historical discussion] took place. This introduction paved the way to the more thorough discussion of spatiality, as it is relevant to thedistinction between relativist and absolutist conceptions of space; and elaborates on the contextof Beirut and the mutual relationship that exists between the space and the people of the city. More analysis was built off Foucault’s work, notably the recollection of history and the conceptof heterotopias. This discussion allows moving into Simmel’s theories, focusing on how the residents of Beirut deviated from the traditional Simmelian understanding of the city. The analysis then dwells unto the effects of post-modernity, notably with Giddens, Beck, and Lefebvre, to finally end with Bourdieu's fundamental framework with three equally significantnotions: habitus, practice, and field. In this sense, the spatial analysis of Beirut’s spatiality paralleled its history, from industrialisation (pre, and during, the civil war) to modernity to post-modernism; considering all the different layers that its peculiar and complex history demands. At the end of this chapter, the elements and factors that shape up the case of Beirut [and that will influence the analysis phase] are, theoretically, concluded.

2.1 Introduction

Understanding the complex spatial dynamics of the 2015 manifestations in Beirut is impossible without a thorough discussion of the peculiar history of Lebanon, its civil war, and the birth of the sectarian and confessionalist system.

Lebanon (figure 2-1), the sensitively distributed 10,452 km^2 (BBC News 2011), is a small country in Western Asia where the earliest evidence of civilization dates back more than seven thousand years. The successive civilisations that ruled this region, the Egyptian, Assyrian, Babylonian, Achaemenid Persian, Hellenistic, Roman and Sasanid Persian empires, had a major influence on the creation and consolidation of the confessional/sectarian structure of the country.



Figure 2-1: a) Lebanon Location – ortho-projection, b) Lebanon borders and mail cities

2.1.1 Lebanon pre-colonization

Beirut is the capital city of Lebanon. It overlooks the Mediterranean Sea and falls roughly in the centre of the country's coastal line. Beirut also played a central role in Lebanon's historical development. In fact, Lebanon's independence is, in brief, a culmination of the economic development that took place over several years in Beirut and Mount Lebanon, an area that is considered to be geographically associated with Beirut and which played a crucial role in the history of the region. From pre-ottoman era to the creation of the state of Lebanon, the Area of Mount




Figure 2-2 Contemporary map showing the division between Maronites and Druze between 1840–60

Lebanon thrived on its economic success due to its silk production industry and its role as a funnel through which grains and other goods (such as cotton and other manufactured products) are introduced to the Syrian Hinterland from the Mediterranean (GIZ, 2016). The silk production was introduced by the Druze Emir Fakhr El-Din who also pushed the Christian population, which was constituted mostly of poor peasants, to leave Christian areas such as Keserwan and move to Mount Lebanon to work in silk production, more specifically, in jobs considered "unworthy" of the Druze. As a result, the demographics of Mount Lebanon shifted, with the Christians becoming a majority (figure 2-2).

The social conflicts are inherent to the class system and division of labour developed into sectarian clashes as a result of the sectarian division of the rich and the poor (Traboulsi, 1995). Duringthe later period of Ottoman empire rule, Beirut developed increasing economic, cultural and political power which led to the creation of "Wilayat Beirut," an independent administrative division within the Ottoman Empire. This Wilayet Beirut covered the coastal lines from the North, specifically Lattakia (now in modern Syria), to the South including Nablus (which is now in Modern Palestine). Hence, the position of Beirut gave it an inherent role as a gateway between the "Arab" and the "Mediterranean" Worlds (GIZ, 2016). As the Ottoman Empire began to decline in power and influence in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, several clashesoccurred between the Maronites and the Druze leading to the partitioning of Mount Lebanon into Christian and Druze sections resulting in a dual northern and southern region governed by a Christian and Druze governor respectively. This division, however, further increased the number of conflicts and their violence. Similarly, the 1860s witnessed a new civil war betweenMaronite Christians and Druze (Lutsky, 1969) which spread to the religiously "mixed" neighbourhoods of southern Lebanon and the Anti-Lebanon mountain range. France intervenedon behalf of the local Christian population and Britain on behalf of the

Druze after the massacres, in which over 10,000 Christians were killed (Traboulsi, 1995) (figure 2-3).




Figure 2-3: the demography of Mount Lebanon, a) inner loop: 1844 estimates from M. Bouree to François Guizot, Paris, 30 July 1844, b) outer loop: 2018 estimates from the general election registrations.

2.1.2 Colonization, Post-colonization, and the creation of the State of Lebanon

In 1920, under the mandate of the French, Syria was partitioned and the state of "Greater Lebanon," with the current geographical borders, was created. Several non-coastal areas such as Baalbek-Hermel or the Bekaa Valley were not considered to be part of Lebanon until this repartitioning of its borders. In this perspective, Greater Lebanon had never been a real, locally-represented or experienced geographical concept, rather, it is a product of the Sykes-Picot Accords with Britain in 1916 which embodied the colonial ambitions of the French (and other colonial powers) who sought to control the Arab provinces that used to be under Ottoman rule

according to their own interest. When analysing this partitioning from an economic geography point of view, it appears that despite the addition of the land ranging from the Anti-Lebanon mountains to the Orontes Valley, the established borders separated Lebanon from its economic stronghold: its hinterland (figure 2-4). As a result, an economy based on trade and banking, rather than productive sectors such as industry and agriculture, was reinforced. The primary role of Lebanon as a regional node for finance and trade inherently created incentives for illicit trades, especially amidst the porous mountainous border to Syria. Additionally, the expanded borders included more Muslim population (Shia and Sunni) from Tripoli and Sidon as well as the Bekaa Valley, into the vital mosaic of the State of Greater Lebanon, which established a unique, Consociationalism-type of political system with a power-sharing mechanism based on religious communities. Moreover, with the creation of Greater Lebanon, Christians would never be a clear majority (Salibi, 1990).




Figure 2-4 a) the Mount Lebanon Mutasarrifate 1914. b) Mount Lebanon (1862 – 1917) highlighted within a map of modern Republic of Lebanon

2.1.3 The geographical and military context of Modern day Lebanon.

The border to Syria was only established after Lebanon's independence as a nation-state in 1943. For this reason, families in Lebanon and Syria are intertwined, with Lebanese families having relatives in Syria and vice versa. To this day, Beirut is Damascus' primary route of access to the Mediterranean Sea. Before the Syrian civil war, agricultural seasonal products, both food products and other industrial products such as pesticides, had a significant impact on the Lebanese economy. Pre- and Post-war, construction labour, as well as other relatively unskilled labour from Syrian refugees in Lebanon constitutes a major part of the Lebanese labour force. Moreover, Lebanon's border to Syria has always been porous, especially given its mountainous nature, which has provided the perfect environment for contraband. On the other hand, the border to Israel has been completely sealed since the Arab-Israeli war (1948-1949) which caused more than 100,000 Palestinians to take refuge in Lebanon, without being able to returnto their homeland ever since. Due to this reality, on a geographic level, Lebanon lies at the heart of an exceptionally volatile region in which almost every country is highly militarized. This is, in fact, the case of Lebanon as well, which is among the most heavily militarized countries in the world, though still less militarized than Israel, Armenia, Syria, Cyprus, Jordanand Azerbaijan which are the most heavily militarized countries in the world according to the BICC militarization index (figure 2-5). This geographical context is not without consequences as Lebanonmust expend significant resources, on both the public and private level and on military personnel, to maintain defense even during relatively peaceful periods. Additionally, there is a large degree of uncertainty under which populations are forced to survive.




Figure 2-5: G.01 militarisation ranking of Lebanon and countries in its vicinity. Index range: 1-125. Map extract, slightly supplemented. Source BICC 2014: 7, map 1

Another piece was added to the population mosaic in Lebanon after the great Nakba in 1948 which resulted in the fleeing of 100,000 Palestinians to Lebanon. Once again in 1970-71, after the defeat of the Palestine Liberation Organization in Jordan, many Palestinian militants relocated to Lebanon increasing their armed campaign against Israel. The relocation of Palestinian bases also led to increasing sectarian tensions between Palestinians, Maronites and other Lebanese factions which ultimately resulted in a civil war the details of which are discussed in another section: “Who’s City: Shaping Beirut.” As a matter of fact, the civil war itself significantly impacted the demographic as well as the political distribution in Lebanon with nearly a million civilians displaced, dead, or disappeared (UN IRIN, 2007).

Despite its small size and the dominance of political, religious and confessionalist perspectives not only in politics but also in writings on Lebanon (Traboulsi, 2012), the country has developed a regional centre for finance and trade, as well as a well-established culture and has been highly

influential in the Arab world. Lebanon was referred to as the "Switzerland of the East" during the 1960s (Moubayed, 2007) and its capital, Beirut, as "the Paris of the Middle East" (Johnson, 2006). On the other hand, periods of political turmoil and armed conflict (1948 Arab–Israeli War, Lebanese Civil War 1975–1990, 2005 Cedar Revolution, 2006 Lebanon War, 2007 Lebanon conflict, 2006–08 Lebanese protests, 2008 conflict in Lebanon, and since 2011 Syrian Civil War spillover), in addition to extensive political, legal, and often military autonomy enjoyed by Lebanon's sects, have impacted the existence, resilience, and continuous shaping of Lebanon.

Hence, Lebanon remains a land of sensitive distribution of different sects which failed to establish a coherent nation rather than sectarian shares. In conclusion, it is found that the religious divide of Mount Lebanon played a central role in the emergence of Ottoman-era proto-Lebanon, the politicization of other Lebanese sects (Reilly, 2015) and the rooting of the geographical distribution of dominance in Lebanon until nowadays (Figure 5, Figure 6).

2.2 Internal and external players shaping the Lebanese balance.

Lebanon is a parliamentary democracy based on confessionalism (BDHRL 2003) to deter sectarian conflict and represent approximately fairly the demographic distribution of the 18 recognized religious groups (four Muslim, 12 Christian, one Druze, and one Jewish) in government (Lijphart 1969 and 1995). The most religiously diverse country in the Middle East (Dralonge 2008) has established a regime in which high-ranking offices are reserved for members of specific religious groups. The President, for example, must be a MaroniteChristian, the Prime Minister a Sunni Muslim, the Speaker of the Parliament a Shi'a Muslim and the Deputy Prime Minister and the Deputy Speaker of Parliament Eastern Orthodox (United States Institute of Peace 2009). Additionally, the national legislating body, the Parliament, is equally divided between the Christians and Muslims (after having been dividedinto a 6:5 ratio until

1990 (United States Institute of Peace, 2009), and proportionately divided between the 18 different denominations and its 26 districts (*aqdya*—singular: *qadaa*). This reality is the result of a complex history. The balance of power was first expressed in the 1943National Pact, an informal agreement struck at independence, in which positions of power (president, speaker of parliament, and prime minister) were divided as explained above according to the 1932 demographic census which showed a Christian majority followed by Muslim Sunni and Muslims Shia's. As the representation was considered unfair and overwhelmingly representing Maronites, the Sunni elite was then accorded more power in theTaif Agreement, but Maronites continued to dominate the system. Shia Muslims then gained additional representation in the state apparatus. As for the constitution, despite its civil theme and its inspiration from the French legal system, the personal status and family laws in Lebanonare subject to the dominance of a set of religious courts which possess a separate set of laws designed for each sectarian community. For example, the Islamic personal status laws are inspired by the Sharia law (El Samad, 2008), while non-Muslims law of inheritance and wills falls under national civil jurisdiction and non-muslim marriage, divorce, and custody are taken into account by the Christian and Druze religious courts as appropriate.

Although the sensitive confessional political balance between Lebanon's various religious groups has shaped the whole political system of the country, it also prevented conducting any official census since 1932. All available statistics are estimated and built on the private census of researchers and organisations, which means an absence of accurate data on the relative percentages of the population of the major religions and groups (US Department of State, 2001), especially considering the fact that the biggest study (conducted on a sample of 130,000 individuals) conducted after 1932, which was completed by the Central Administration of Statistics in 1970, took place 5 years prior to the start of the civil war which deeply affected the demographic/religious map of Lebanon.

Compared to the official census of 1935 and the estimation of 1956 which revealed that the percentage of Christians in Lebanon are 53% and 54% respectively (Lebanese Information Centre Lebanon, 2013), it is believed that there has been a decline in the ratio of Christians to Muslims over the past 60 years, due to higher emigration rates of Christians, and a higher birth rate in the Muslim population (BDHRL, 2010). The Christian population majority is believed to have ended in the early 1960s, but government leaders would agree to no change in the political power balance. This led to Muslim demands of increased representation, and the constant sectarian tension slid into violent conflict in 1958 and again in the grueling Lebanese Civil War, in 1975–90. Christians of various denominations were then generally thought to constitute about 40% of the population, although often Muslim leaders would cite lower numbers, and some Christians would claim that they still held a majority of the population.

The largest Lebanese sects are geographically distributed as follows: The Sunni residents primarily live in Tripoli, Western Beirut, the Southern coast of Lebanon, and Northern Lebanon; while the Shi'a residents primarily live in Southern Beirut, the Beqaa Valley, and Southern Lebanon. On the Christian side, The Maronite (the largest Christian community in Lebanon) residents primarily live in Eastern Beirut and the mountains of Lebanon; while the Greek Orthodox, the second-largest Christian community in Lebanon, primarily live in Koura, Beirut, Rachaya, Matn, Aley, Akkar, in the countryside around Tripoli, Hasbaya and Marjeyoun; and the Greek Catholics live mainly in Beirut, on the eastern slopes of the Lebanon mountains and in Zahle, which is predominantly Greek Catholic (McGowen, 1989) (figure 2-7). The geographical distribution of the Lebanese denominations reveals an ongoing competition for popularising their dominance in the country. Although some parts of the country are mixed in population, some areas are systematically reserved for specific denominations with strict laws;for example, looking at the village of Hadat, which has been primarily Christian since the end of the civil war in 1990, a municipal decision was

implemented to ban Muslims from buying or renting property due to the underlying fear of mixing (The National, 2019). Another exampleis that of the reported shooting by armed Druze which killed two aides of a Lebanese ministerSaleh al-Gharib in Mount Lebanon as an objection to the planned visit of the Maronite ministerof International affairs Jubran Basil (Reuters, 2019). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (the leading Druze political party), Walid Joumblatt, argued that this event took place due to the sensitive balance in ruling Mount Lebanon between Druze andMaronite (Figure 2-6).

Finally, speaking of the Palestinian demographics, around 450,000 Palestinian refugees (nearly a tenth of the country's population) were registered in Lebanon with the UNRWA in 2014. There are also a number of Palestinians who are not registered as UNRWA refugees because they left earlier than 1948 or were not in need of material assistance. The exact number of Palestinians remains a subject of great dispute while the Lebanese government refuses to provide an estimate. Palestinians living in Lebanon are considered foreigners albeit with more restrictions on their freedoms as they are not allowed to attend public schools, own property, or make an enforceable will (Bakri, 2010). In addition to depriving them of gaining the Lebanese citizenship, they were not allowed to work in more than 70 types of jobs (mostly skilled jobs such as Medical Doctors, pharmacists….) until 2005, a number that dropped to 20 in 2007 before they gained the right to be considered foreign workers as any other foreign workers from different nationalities in 2010 (Amnesty International, 2007; Bakri, 2010). About half of Palestinians live in 12 poor and overcrowded refugee camps (UNRWA, 2014). Although these settlements are closer to neighbourhoods than camps, the titling, in addition to the absence of political rights and the limitations in civil rights, is part of controlling the contribution of the Palestinian demographic to the Lebanese distribution of power. Despite enthusiastically giving 60,000 Palestinians the Lebanese nationality (including most Palestinian Christians apart from those who left Lebanon) (Peteet, 1996; Unhcr.org, 1996), the restriction on the Palestinian

presence is upheld by the Christian demographic who insists thatthe Sunni Muslim Palestinian majority would dilute Christian numbers. Similarly, the MuslimShia could look unfavourably upon the concentration of the Palestinian camps in their home areas. On the other hand, Lebanese Sunni groups would be advantaged with providing the Palestinian refugees with the Lebanese nationality (as hinted to several times by the late primeminister Rafiq Hariri) since they would provide additional weight to their denomination.

WORLD NEWS   JUNE 30, 2019 / 6:01 PM / 4 DAYS AGO

Two aides to Lebanese minister killed as convoy hit by gunfire

3 MIN READ

BEIRUT (Reuters) - Two aides to a Lebanese Druze minister were killed on Sunday when his convoy came under fire in an area of support for a rival Druze faction, in what the minister called an assassination attempt.

Saleh al-Gharib, Lebanon's minister of state for refugee affairs, is close to pro-Syrian Druze leader Talal Arslan.

The Mount Lebanon town near Aley where the incident took place is an area of support for Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, a fierce opponent of the Syrian government and rival to Arslan. His Popular Progressive Party (PSP) denied any involvement.

In an interview with Lebanon's al-Jadeed TV, Gharib said the incident had been "an armed ambush and a clear assassination attempt".

"There appears to be a decision to blow up the situation on the mountain," he said.

The National News Agency reported that a PSP member was wounded in the incident.

Jumblatt, Lebanon's main Druze leader, and Arslan are historic rivals whose parties vied for posts in the national unity government formed earlier this year.



Walid Joumblatt @walidjoumblatt · Jun 30

لن ادخل في اي سجال اعلامي حول ما جرى .اطالب بالتحقيق حول ما جرى بعيدا عن الابواق
الاعلامية .واتمنى على حديثي النعمة في السياسة ان يدركوا الموازين الدقيقة التي تحكم
هذا الجبل المنفتح على كل التيارات السياسية دون استثناء لكن الذي يرفض لغة نبش
الاحقاد وتصفية الحسابات والتحجيم

Translated from Arabic by Microsoft

I'm not going to get into any media debate about what happened. I demand an investigation into what happened away from the media. I wish the new grace in politics to realize the delicate scales that govern this mountain, open to all political currents without exception, but which rejects the language of digging grudges and settling accounts And Sizing

Figure 2-6: a) shooting killed two aides to a Lebanese minister Saleh al-Gharib in Mount Lebanon to prevent a planned visit of Maronite minister Jubran Basil, Reuters, 30.06.2019. b) a tweet by the Druze leader of the Progressive Socialist Party Walid Joumblatt, defending the sensitivity of the power balance in Mount Lebanon 30.06.2019 – Translated from Arabic by Microsoft.




Figure 2-7: Confessional distribution in Lebanon according to 2009 municipal election data. By Sergey Kondrashov - http://www.katagogi.com/LV2009/LebMap.aspx?l=EN, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=23421707

Additionally, external competition for dominating Lebanon plays an essential role in shaping the country. After the independence from the French mandate, Lebanon was subjected to a long military occupation by Syria (1976 – 2005) and by Israel in the south (1982 – 2000). Apart from the military occupation, several external players have a role in the political, economic, cultural and religious life of Lebanon through supporting different political parties.

Modern Lebanon has been shaped by two decisive features: its non-negligible Christian population and its long-held exposure to the western world. Considering those two aspects, three main themes emerged in Lebanon's modern history:

- A liberal economy mostly based on the service sector.
- A problematic relationship with the neighbouring countries and overall geographic placement
- The institutionalization of the country's politics based on religious sects (a phenomenonknown as sectarianism)

Sects in Lebanon constitute a seemingly balanced but extremely fragile multicultural framework based on the identification of each person's sect through personal status laws and a certain forced "solidarity" that entrenched itself within all of Lebanon's deepest structures including the public and private sectors (Table 2-1, figure 2-8). This reality led to a struggle between each sect's aspiration for control and power and the balance of economic and socio-political institutions.

However, there are two less-than-obvious functions of sects that are often neglected in the literature. The first is that they act as clientelist networks aiming to buffer the effect of systemic inequalities in the citizens' daily struggle for wealth appropriation and acquisition of state services. The second is their need for and routine requests for outside interference and

intervention for the obtention of more power or even mere survival (the survival of the sect and its influence within the sectarian system).

All in all, the dynamism of Beirut derives inevitably from the turbulent colonial history of Lebanon and its contested national imagination: a mountain haven for religious minorities (Druze, Shi'i and Maronites); a forged negotiation between indigenous elites and colonial powers; a republic of tribes and villages; a playground for the rich; a cosmopolitan mercantile power-sharing enclave; a battlefield for the ideologies of the religious and political; a fusion and eruption of the Arab East and the Christian West; an 'unlikely, fragile, fractured, split, torn' country. The dichotomies and perceptions seem as persistent and contradictory as felt by the Lebanese themselves. This reality also helps to clarify the vague and disputed position that Beirut has always occupied in the common perception, whether under regional control or subject to colonial intervention from the West. The eventual emergence of Lebanon as a state a result of Ottoman governance (Mutasarrifiya period 1860–1914), French compulsory rule (1920–1943), and the national independence movement in 1943—was always overshadowed by the relapse of internal civil violence—1820, 1860–1864, 1958, and 1975–90. The latest and most destructive of these internecine wars (1975–1990) took an estimated 170,000 lives, displaced two-thirds of the population and culminated in the fall into militia rule and military action by Syria and Israel (Larkin, 2010).

2.3 Whose City: shaping Beirut

Throughout this tumultuous time of protracted conflict, the central district of Beirut was both the epicentre of its fiercest brutality and the focal point of the most ambitious proposals for reconstruction. Although ongoing militia battles turned the streets, homes, and public markets of Beirut into a scenario fitting of a post-apocalyptic horror show, planners, architects, and politicians discussed post-war regeneration visions of the city (Larkin, 2010). But what is Beirut? Beirut, the Beta World City as ranked by the Globalization and World Cities Research Network, is the capital and largest city in Lebanon where one can find the main port and the only airport. Beirut is where the Lebanese government is centralized and it plays a crucial role in the Lebanese economy. Currently, finding a concrete definition of Beirut borders is challenging due to the variety of definitions of Beirut including Municipal Beirut, Beirut Governorate, and Greater Beirut in addition to the lack of urban classifications or clearly defined districts in Lebanon (Yassin, 2011).

Table 2-1: The estimated sectarian distribution of Beirut population (multiple sources)

		1832	1861	1889	1895	1911	1914	1921	1922	1925	1932	1945	YEAR
Muslim	Sunni	7000	18000	33000	46951	36000	3900	32882	32882	42552	51906	59593	Announced population (various resources)
	Shia							3274	3274		11379	10379	
Christians	Orthodox (Rome)	4000	13500	30000	8217	77000	38000		12672	53873			
	Maronite	3500	1000	28000	12382		31000	17763	17763		28990	15404	
	Catholic		3500	9900	14		10000	8347	4256		8563	5840	
	Protestant			900				544	642		1943	3760	
	Orthodox (Arman)										3684	36264	
	Orthodox (Syriac)										174	2070	
	Latin			1500								2191	
Druze		800	200	300		400		1524	1522		1235	1926	
Jews		200	1000	1500	889	2500						5023	
Foreigners		100		2000		4100					5850		
Other				300	2		1200	4907	4907			1436	
Muslim		7000	18000	33000	46951	36000	3900	36156	36156	42552	63285	69972	
Christians		7500	18000	70300	20613	77000	79000	26654	35333	53873	43354	65529	
Druze		800	200	300		400		1524	1524		1235	1926	
Jews		200	1000	1500	889	2500						5023	
Other		100	0	2300	2	4100	1200	4907	4907	0	5850	1436	
		15600	37200	107400	68455	120000	84100	69241	77920	96425	113724	143886	TOTAL
Muslim		45%	48%	31%	69%	30%	5%	52%	46%	44%	56%	49%	
Christians		48%	48%	65%	30%	64%	94%	38%	45%	56%	38%	46%	
Druze		5%	1%	0%	0%	0%	0%	2%	2%	0%	1%	1%	
Jews		1%	3%	1%	1%	2%	0%	0%	0%	0%	0%	3%	
Other		1%	0%	2%	0%	3%	1%	7%	6%	0%	5%	1%	




Figure 2-8: the sectarian distribution of Beirut 1889 (Kouri, Ameen) and 1895 (Alqabbani, Abdulqadir)

In the 1850s, Beirut started to host the main political, economic and cultural activities of Lebanon. The city attracted waves of internal migrants from other districts of Lebanon as well as newcomers like Arab politicians and Christians refugees from Ottoman areas (Yassin, 2011). Simultaneously, the city started to develop a form of administrative structure with its first municipal authority, 1868, followed by establishing infrastructure projects: new roads, public squares, electricity generation company, water company, the tramway and the postal system (Saliba, 2000; Zachs, 2005) (figure 2-9). Along with its significant coastal location, the administrative development of Beirut turned the city into a vital regional trade centre and a gateway towardsEurope (Nagel, 2002). Therefore, the city's area was estimated to be increased fifteen times between 1841-1876, expanding outside its medieval wall (Davie, 1996), establishing several new quarters and having, by the early 20th century, its major demographic change as a result ofthe Christians waves of newcomers from other areas in Mount Lebanon and Syria.




Figure 2-9: Beirut Phases of Urbanisation (Yasin, 2011)

The city continued its modernisation plans during the French mandate and independence eras, with major attention to the sectors that can enhance trade with the Western market. The Armenian, Syrian and Palestinian waves of refugees have changed not only the demographics of the city but also its urban expansion and the sectarian identification of its quarters. The city started to develop clearly sectarian districts which hosted the establishment of the militarized groups that changed the demographic and functional landscape of the city during the war 1975-1990. The first 2 years of the war were mostly an urban phenomenon (Fregonese, 2009; Yassin, 2011). Both sides, mostly divided between Christians and Muslims (although not exclusively), committed numerous and major "urban" attacks. The city was hence divided into "West Beirut," predominantly Muslim-dominated and "East Beirut," Christian-dominated. As a result of those violent clashes, families were forced to flee mixed neighbourhoods to homogeneous

sectarian ones. As such, the proportion of Christians in West Beirut went down fromnearly a third (30-40%) to a mere 5% over the duration of the war, between 1975 and 1989. Meanwhile, in East Beirut, notably in Ashrafieh, the already scarce Muslim population (4- 10%) became almost non-existent, contributing less than 1% (Genberg, 2002; Huybrechts,1991; Nasr, 1993).

In parallel to the demographic changes, urban changes were set by the militia leaders to redefine the areas of their dominance. Physical barriers played a major role in shaping the city then, especially along the narrow-evacuated area of the green line which divided the city out from its historical centre southwards (figure 2-10). Furthermore, the urban fabric was functionally and ideologically used to serve the militias perception of territory and identity through dividing the city into small quarters *'qita'* and, firmly control them by blocking streets, piercing buildings to create passages, partitioning neighbourhoods, climbing towers or even commemorating urban warfare martyrs (Fregonese 2009). In the aftermath of the war, extensive efforts were made to rebuild national infrastructure and revive the economy (Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency, 2009). These divisions started to be removed in the early 1990s along with the rehabilitation/reconstruction program of the city.




Figure 2-10: Beirut layout during the civil war 1975-1977

Apparently, the removal of the physical barriers gave the people of Beirut their freedom to move around their city; however, sectarian divisions still officially, spatially, and visually (figure 2-11), overcome the inter-sectarian national sphere. The literature has addressed the reciprocal impactof the socio-political divisions and planning decisions (Hafeda, 2011; Bou Akar, 2012; Fawaz, Harb, & Gharbieh q; Monroe, 2016). The after-war institutional enhancement of the sectarian divisions continues to have its spatial reflections (Yassin, 2011) such as the development of armed militias at specific points as was the case in May 2008 (news reports, 2008; Fregonese, 2017). However, a more systematic and well-entrenched division remains in terms of settlements as the east of the city remains dominated by Christians, the west by Sunni Muslims and the city's southern suburbs by Shia Muslim. Furthermore, flags and posters of the different parties and their leaders are continuously used to mark the territories of dominance within the city. A recent example shed light on the usually hidden or subconscious appearances of the spatial division in Beirut: it was reported in June 2019 that the municipality of Al-Hadath – a Christian town to the south-east of Beirut, took a municipal decision to refuse all rent and property sale to Muslims. Although the decision was widely condemned, several news reports and streamed interviews revealed that this decision, according to some, is justified by the need to protect the Christian identity of the town and is supported by political leaders from different Christian parties.



Figure 2-11: political posters in the streets of Beirut

In conclusion, it is noticed that the effective forces of shaping the spaces of Beirut were a mosaic of history, religion, environment, security, political and economic issues (Kollmar, 2013). Economic issues have affected the people’s feeling of disability, as well as the demography of the city through forcing young people to go abroad for work, while the direct effect was of the political issues of corruption, sectarianism, and discontent with the electoral system. These points were the direct motivations of people’s movement which was the starting point for changes in public spaces.



Figure 2-12: a) Aerial view of Beirut 1943. Source: Michel Écochard (photographer) Archive, Aga Khan Documentation Centre at MIT., b) An aerial view of Lebanon’s capital Beirut. Photographer: STEPHANE DE SAKUTIN/AFP/Getty Images




Figure 2-13: the first photo shot in Beirut back in 1839 by the French artists Horace Vernetand Goupil-Fesquet. The site shows part of Beirut's famous ancient wall, Prince Mansour Assaf's Seraille, all the way to Achrafieh hill

2.4 Space as a theorized concept: The understanding of Beirut's spatial politics

Beirut's history led to a city fragmented along different lines - class, religion and sect. Historical violent sectarian clashes coupled with the advent of capitalism and neoliberal policies in addition to years of colonialism only exacerbated sectarian tensions leading to a brutal 16-year civil war. Post-civil war, the city witnessed waves of privatization following neoliberal agendas, leading to gentrification and segregation within the city (aspects developed more thoroughly in the third chapter of the thesis). Each of those aspects contributed to constant political unease in the country.

The 2015 manifestations in Beirut constitute a paragon for the understanding of spatial dynamics of the city with its complexity and the intersectionality of different factors shaping it, historically, and by extension, in its current state. While space as a specific theoretical concept has been an overlooked and under-addressed component of social theory until fairly recently, it is a crucial component of social, economical and political understanding of Beirut and Lebanon's situation. In fact, space is a central component in the organisation, function, management, control, and practice of social life and social relations. Hence, many social science disciplines have developed an interest in reprioritizing space as a fundamental concept for understanding human relations. Space is not meant to be a pure background to social activity anymore, as if it were something just there, as a natural thing, a container, a void, a vacuum waiting to be found and filled with objects or social life. Rather, space is consistentlyinterpreted and perceived as a function of social relationships, and as such, it is a dynamic andcomplex process which not only represents the desires, interests, beliefs, objectives, and powerstructures per se (individual, hierarchical, or structural), but also possibly clashes with daily uses, practices, and processes (Zieleniec, 2013). Space then works in all environments and on various

levels, from the intimate and micro to the macro and regional or international levels as a result of social structures.

In Beirut's case, not only is it vital to address current spatial dynamics, but also historical narratives of conflicting powers and struggle for control that led to the production of such spaces. But what exactly is space? First, one must note that space as a concept is not synonymous to "place." Although the concepts are interrelated, they are not identical. The terms have often been interpreted and utilized interchangeably, but in studying spatial theories and extending them to the evaluation of social life, greater precision is needed. Space relates to the theoretical concept and interpretation of physical, geographic location. Spaces convert into places whenever they are assigned significance and social meaning by groups and individuals (Zieleniec, 2013). Michel de Certeau proposed that space is indeed the result that is created by all practices which aim to identify, functionalize, and locate it, while place implies attachment bypractices and mechanisms of meaning-making and value-assigning that grant stasis, significance, and prominence in everyday situations (Zieleniec, 2013). Likewise, Yi Fu Tuan,a prominent geographer, connects space with motion, movement, and flux, while the place is associated with values obtained by immobility and pause in use and knowledge (Zieleniec, 2013). It is within this perspective of space that the analysis must lie. In fact, the space in Beirutpre-, during, and post-the 2015 manifestations (as well as throughout Beirut's history) is far from static, as shown in the mapping of daily uses of the space in future chapters (4 and 5). The spaces created and shaped by those three distinct intervals of time in Beirut and its central district are so immensely different that they materialize those theories into a physical reality. Nonetheless, a distinction exists between theoretical models and schemes, and the lived experiences of Beirutis during which values and meanings transform space, through daily activities and utilization, into place. The spaces of Beirut went through, as explained above, phases of destruction (during the civil war), reconstruction (post-civil war), and alienation (as

a result of neoliberal development which will be thoroughly addressed in chapter 3); but the analysis of the spaces would be void without an analysis of the interaction of the actors with them and within them. According to Georg Simmel, the concept of space is constructed, through the bilateral action derived from the socialization process. Simmel recognizes that the aspects of social experiences that take place within a space define the space and are defined by it, reciprocally. This is a fluid symbiotic relationship between environmental (or, in other words, geographical) determinism and social construction, which has implications for subjective experience as well as the systemic and spatial structure of the town/city as a whole or particular physical aspects within it, like avenues, parks, houses, and places and spaces of use, recreation and consumption, or retreat. Space, as he explains it, is not a basic Kantian apriori, something that one can simply experience. On the contrary, it is the reality of what agents feel and experience, the behaviour of consciousness, the symbol and state of relationships between humans. This concept is of major importance in understanding the major shift that took place in Beirut's conflictual creation of space from the fight for Space in Mount Lebanon to the post-industrialism and privatization and gentrification waves to a major interest in control over Beirut and its suburbs.

2.4.1 Beirut spatial dynamics: A relativist approach

As such, the understanding of space theorized so far emphasizes the relative notion of space. In fact, space as a concept in social science has been inspired by and constructed on predominantly two separate, idealist, standard physical concepts: absolutist and relativist. Space's absolutist interpretation is founded on a Euclidean perspective and postulates a dualism between bodies and social life and space. In this paradigm, space persists as a situational backdrop state, devoid of social action and individual experiences. Therefore, social action

takes place within a set andimmovable space. It is not believed that this kind of space is part of social activity.

The Absolute space concept is beneficial in responding to questions about the positioning of groups and individuals in territories and places, the effect of macrostructures on social behaviour, and the reciprocal shaping of behaviour and form. Only the actors' movement in space is considered, but spaces do not move; space is fixed. The absolutist conception of space does not raise questions about space's social structure that extends beyond territory and land. In addition, it is taken for granted that there are territories and places. However, how places and territories might also be a result of the creation of spaces is not taken into account. This framework, perhaps beneficial in certain fields, does not provide helpful tools by which to comprehend the complex dynamics of space in a social setting such as the Beirut 2015 manifestations. Moreover, it is not enough to regard space as a backdrop condition to investigate how multiple spaces intertwine in or populate the same place.

For such an analysis, space's relativist perspective becomes needed. Indeed, and by stark comparison to the absolutist conception, a relativist conception regards space as being constituted by the framework of the objects and bodies' relative positions to each other. Therefore, there are no spaces independent of social relationships determined by actors' roles, social action, and social capital such as power and status. Social relationships take part in the development, emergence, and institutionalization of spaces. This conception has influenced thought about the emergence, development, creation, and growth of social space. The relative positions of components associated with space production — depending on the perspective, for instance, location of material goods, places, links between individual and collective actors — provides an efficient anchor from which to conceive space as the dialectic of absence and presence, space as flows, space as outlets of resistance and power, and space as glocalization. Relativist social space narratives go beyond a strictly physical point of view that would only

view bodies' positioning and relations in space. They also include "action," a concept which is traditionally ascribed to "time." Given the scope of this research, it will mainly address the relativist conceptions of space characterized by thinkers such as Anthony Giddens, Georg Simmel, Henri Lefebvre, Pierre Bourdieu as well as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles in the context of Lebanon and more specifically Beirut.

2.4.2 An intersection of space and capital: the role of industrialization, modernization and neoliberalism in shaping Beirut

Throughout and post-civil war, Lebanon has witnessed both an alarming rise in the practices of authoritarian state apparatuses and a rise in the involvement of the state in these aspects of public planning that are measured either to generate immediate private profits or to enhance the infrastructural environment for private benefit generation instead of development of vital sectors such as healthcare, literacy, and minimal-income housing. In opposition to what is often implied, this phenomenon does not simply entail the overlap between public and private interests. Rather, it is the latter's complete domination over the former. For, to be assured, it is no longer possible to visualize where state ventures end and private ventures begin - not because the Lebanese State is a powerful state that conducts a planned economy but because capital has become the state. State and capital have been assimilated into one and the same, becoming a force or mechanism characterized by the same rhetoric (Harirism). Following Marx, this is what Negri describes as the absolute subsumption of the state and society into capital (Negri, 2018). This framework will be elaborated on in the third chapter.

In fact, an indirect, if not explicit recognition of space and spatial relationships as a function of the complexity of capitalism, its processes, and its alienating reality, can be found in Marx's weighty work on capitalism. This understanding perceives space as a force of production characterized by the devastation of past spaces affiliated with the feudal system of production

and the development of new spaces of industrial capitalist production and flow. In this sense, capitalism as a world system and the spatiality of the extensive division of labour (in the reproduction of labour, the social order, and in industry, more specifically the spatial element of the urban capitalist city) leads to what Engels defines as socio-spatial segregation (Giddens, 1986).

Additionally, in the context of Beirut after the war, it was the foreign and regional investors and developers who influenced memories, urban landscapes, and narratives. Hariri deliberately commercialized the national heritage and transformed the spaces of the city into commodities (refer to chapter 3). The rivalry for spaces and urban places in post-war Beirut played a central role in influencing social and political ties in the region. Attempts to repair public areas were rendered by textualizing those newly forged environments during the reconstruction (neighbourhoods, houses, and monuments) and making them culturally important to the country as a whole, which meant adding them to history. Solidere, the post-war reconstruction project in Beirut, was developing sites in Beirut by institutionalizing them as monuments of history. It is evident through what is called "location attachment," constructing imaginary geographies that allow the connection of particular places with certain principles, feelings and events of history. However, this endeavor that aimed to force a connection to an alien reconstructed central district have failed. The project of Solidere which will be amply discussed in the next chapter, modified the physical structures and building functions and separated the inhabitants from their surroundings. Places once familiar became alien and even forbidden (Sawalha, 2010). Parallels can be drawn with the political conflict over land between the Israeli entity and the Palestinian people forced out of their land or repressed within it, where planners and politicians, in the name of urban change and progress, impose repression and fragmentation. In this perspective, our current debate on the future seeks to recast the past. What's known about the past depends on how it's portrayed, which has to do with the groups'

power in building its representation. Each party remembers specific moments of their alleged history in which their members protected their rights, space, and properties. Some moments are sites of remembrance while others are sites of amnesia and are excluded from daily language and shared memories. As such, urban planning can be seen as a form of spatial dominance and an authoritative power over ways in which communities create their history and recount their collective memory of history. This is a conflict between urban social movements, developers and existing political and economic regimes that are rampant. How critical is the State's position as a hegemonic power that restricts people's choices? Why are different parties forming their policies about the future and the past? It brings us to the idea of "heterotopias," naming locations "away from anywhere." Places that are completely different from all the places people represent and think about. Referring to the significance of constructed cultural meanings that affect the understanding of the places in which people live, there is a disparity between the cultural beliefs, laws, and experiences of people who design and create urban structures and housing and those who end up using them. Known as the "knowledge archaeologist", Foucault also states that spatial awareness takes place via micro-powers. The urban environment is a coveted realm of regulation and control of life whereby spatial modifications run alongside state strategies. While he admits that the discipline of architecture has always been related to political-historical frameworks, Foucault has documented its radicalisation since the eighteenth century, when the shift from hegemony to control and surveillance took place in government. Cities have since become the places of police surveillance, rationalisation and control. Foucault makes reference to the Panopticon, the jail modelled in 1791 by Jeremy Bentham, to help illustrate the fundamental metamorphosis occurring in the relationship between power and space, as it conveys how the perfection of power generally makes its exercise unnecessary.

To complement this analysis, the thesis will build on Georg Simmel (1903/1995)'s on modernity and alienation within cities. Georg Simmel may possibly be considered the very first sociologist of space in that in most of his research, not just in sociology and urban science, but also in his other works, there is a real emphasis on space as a central aspect of the evaluation of modernity using formal sociology. His work "The Sociology of Space" is a significant introduction to the social understanding of space, that, in accordance with his understanding of society as a reciprocal relation, describes the five elements of space (exclusivity, borders distance, stability, mobility and proximity) as a framework for analysing the meaning of space for social processes. Space thereby plays a central role in Simmel's research on forms of social experience as networks that characterize a society.

As characterized by Simmel, Beirut is a representational space, amounting to a succession of impressions and actions, a city in which ephemeral, transient and chance interactions occur. Beirut can be characterized as Foucault's heterotopia: a site of political contention, caught up in the whirlwind of young generations resisting the status quo and striving for a just Lebanon away from sectarianism while tribal and sectarian affiliations still challenge the demand for a non-sectarian identity. In this city in which the impact of the civil war has never been addressed, and which is stuck in a collectivized state of post-war trauma, even the most charged concepts are banalized. Throughout "The Metropolis and Mental Life" (1903), Georg Simmel reflects on the influence that the metropolis has on the mental life of the citizens residing there. For him, the interactions between the urban individual and strangers are impersonal and neutral: Instead of emotionally responding, the metropolitan individual responds mainly in a rational way, thereby generating intellectual predominance through the intensification of consciousness. Simmel references the blasé disposition of the urban individual, the illusion of reason, or the neutral interactions inside among strangers, a condition of physical proximity and mental distance. However, in post-civil war, Beiruties strongly adopted a blase attitude;

not in the Simmelian sense of detaching yourself and protecting yourself from the overwhelming stimuli of the city as just described, but rather to cope with the daily assault of death and violence. As such, even the ideas of martyrdom had lost their meaning: "Everyone is a martyr or from a family of martyrs" (Aghacy, 2015). Martyrs are constantly reproducing themselves. This impetuous attitude to the elevated status of the martyr highlights that the war has banalized all grandiose ideas. In this perspective, Sonja Mejcher-Atassi states "the deconstruction of the image of the martyr goes hand in hand with the deconstruction of other heroic images . . . and a general disillusionment with the Civil War." Throughout a Beirut devastated by an ongoing civil war, the actors aim for secrecy and isolation, not in the Simmelian perspective of urban-type alienation, but the estrangement of the self-caught up in a chaotic and brutal civil war where visible indifference becomes a self-protection and survival mechanism. There are no aimless wanderers in the hazardous war zones of Beirut, but rather persons whose ventures outside are scheduled, deliberate and carried out for particular purposes. In a post-war setting, this mentality remains as walkers try to eradicate a traumatic past. The Simmelian blasé behaviour lingers but through a particular, different context. The young college students, similarly to the war pedestrians, remain mentally withdrawn, and often aggressive to the immediate proximity of strangers inside the city. Whereas the war pedestrians are wary, turning their gaze away in an attempt to escape conflict, the post-war pedestrians dissociate themselves from other individuals in an attempt to obscure the memory mainly embodied by older men or women who epitomize the violent and bloody history (Aghacy, 2015).

It can be argued that the alienation, the blase attitude of city dwellers, is an inherent cause of the capitalist development of modern cities. As such, one needs to explore space evolution in capitalism. As such, sociologists Anthony Guiddens and Ulrich Beck explore the aspects of capitalism in the postmodern; beyond the era of modernization. First, Anthony Guiddens came

up with a theory of modernity that proved extremely relevant in understanding social spaces, including but not limited to Beirut. In his book, The Clash Structure of Advanced Societies, Giddens explains the concept of modernity, which is, in his understanding, a shorthand term for modern society or industrial civilization, in other words, the modern world. In his perspective, it must be broken down into three parts:

1. A set of attitudes towards the world - the idea of the world is open to transformation byhuman intervention.
2. A complex of economic institutions especially in industrial production and a marketeconomy.
3. A certain range of political institutions including the nation-state and mass democracy.

Gidden states that the modern world is like a juggernaut. He describes the juggernaut of modernity as a runaway engine of enormous power which, collectively as human beings, we can drive to some extent, but which also threatens to rush out of our control. The juggernaut crushes those who resist it. And while it sometimes seems to have a steady path, there are many times when it veers away erratically in directions we cannot foresee. The idea of a juggernaut fits with structuration theory especially with the importance in that theory of space and time. The image of a juggernaut is of something that is moving along through time and over physical space. Giddens draws heavily on Marx but stresses that modernity is multi-dimensional and complex. He believes that there are four basic institutions:

- Capitalism
    - commodity production
    - private ownership of capital
    - propertyless wage labour

    - a class system derived from these characteristics
- Industrialization
    - inanimate power sources and machinery to produce goods
    - transportation, communication, and domestic life
- Surveillance capacity
    - the supervision of the activities of subject populations, mainly but notexclusively in the political sphere
- Military power - the control of the means of violence
    - The industrialization of war
    - At the macro level, the nation-state

This framework is especially relevant to the understanding of Beirut pre-and post-civil war. The Lebanese civil war strengthened and/ or added a further layer of forceful stakeholders, sectarian militias, to each of aforementioned basic institutions which substantially led to an erosion of the central state that had lost its monopoly on violence. The idea of a juggernaut also encompasses the reality of Beirut's chaotic and unpredictable political sphere. Militias, transformed sectarian "autonomy" into sectarian "control" (including sectarian cleansing as was the case in East and West Beirut), substantially reconfigured economic space, and are known for developing predatory behaviour (e.g. collection of protection money) that is difficult to rein in. From a systemic perspective, the civil war itself may have at least partially been a mechanism of redistributing resources in an otherwise ossified sectarian economic structure.

The difficult regional setting has its own impact on the economy, among which

- Spillovers of the Palestine-Israeli conflict
    - refugees from Palestine
    - Israeli military interventions

    - Interference by diverse foreign actors interested in influencing the shape andoutcome of the Palestine-Israeli conflict
    - The closed land border to the South
- Long-standing complex and often conflictive relationship with Syria

Gidden's analysis does not stop at describing the basic institutions. Giddens believes that there are three items that give those institutions, and modernity consequently, dynamism:

1. Time and space separation
2. Disembedding of the social system
3. Reflexivity of modern society

Time and space separation means the concept of time and space are changing. Giddins states that in modern society, there has been standardization and globalization of time which allows us to interact with each other without a problem. Each technological advancement expands our space. For the disembedding of social systems, he claims that social institutions are important for local society and have survived a long time. However, because of modernization, they are becoming disembedded from local societies or communities. In this, he says there are two mechanisms:

1. **Symbolic Tokens** which are the media of exchange that can be passed around among individuals and institutions, such as money, and disturb the perception of space. So forexample, Canadian money and European money never meet each other but can carry out transactions with each other. So these symbolic tokens lift transactions out of the local community and produce new patterns across time and space. This theory is especially relevant to modern Lebanon, especially as the peg of the Lebanese Lira against the US Dollar at 1507LBP has provided relative stability to the country and reassured foreign investors.

However, this peg means that the central bank reserves must always carry a USD reserve equal to the equivalent amount of LBP circulating inthe market. In a country which imports significantly more than it exports, the balance has been in near-constant deficit leading to the phenomena that are happening at the time of writing: banks are rationing access to Lebanese Liras, in other words, small proprietors cannot access their money in the banks, and the fear of a devaluation is increasing while black markets are selling USD for more than 20% excess over its pegged price (Arnold, 2019). On a broader scale, the peg of the Lebanese Lira against the US dollar is part of a broader failed economic system with a neoliberal agenda that only benefited the local political and business elite while further increasing the public debt and empowering the general population to a near-complete erosion of the middle class.

2. **Expert Systems** which are systems of technical accomplishment of professional expertise that organize large areas of the material and social environments in which we live today. So that can include doctors, lawyers, scientists who run the community and permit the removal of these social relations from their media context as they move across space and time. In Lebanon, there is a peculiar set of expert systems in which the people regarded as experts, especially those in government, are not experts in theirfield. As such, for years, most ministers had educational degrees completely unrelated to their respective ministries which are criticized every election cycle. There is also an intersection between feudalism, sectarianism and clientelism in defining which leadersare regarded as experts and figures of authority. In fact, the government has been run by the same leaders that actively participated in

the civil war, or in case they were diseased, their children and close relatives, further promoting nepotism and corruption and undermining democratic processes.

The third item that gives modernity dynamism is the **reflexivity of modern society**. Giddens says that social practices are constantly examined and reformed in the light of incoming information about those very practices which alters their character in the end. He says everything is open to reflection in the modern world, including reflection itself, leaving us with a sense of uncertainty. This aspect is the most crucial of Giddens' theory in understanding the 2015 manifestations. Considering the fact that a large majority of protesters, in both the 2015 manifestations and the more recent 2019 revolution, correlates with Giddens idea of the reflexivity of modern society. The younger generations are realizing that the problems with their government are not merely corruption or such rhetoric as "the problem is the other sects" but rather understand that the problems are deep-rooted into this sexist, misogynistic, sectarian, clientelist, neoliberal system whose characteristics just mentioned feed on each other and mutually reinforce each other. They are also realizing that each participant in the current establishment is part of this system and is not, therefore, innocent of this system's violence, oppression, and failures.

Anthony Giddens elaborates on the idea of **space as the duality of presence and absence** in his theory of structuration and incorporates the notion of space as a tool to reconcile the age-old issue of structure and agency. Giddens does not set side by side the actor and the social structures as objective realities. Instead, he sees systems— described as social practices that are dynamically propagated— flow through the very behaviour that actually establishes frameworks. He sets social structures and social behaviour in a spatial-temporal arrangement. Throughout time and space, social behaviours materialise and individuals build their respective places. Although time-geography still considers the material environment only as a limiting

parameter, Giddens argues that such mechanisms could concurrently allow and restrain social actors. The nation-state is the "place" of modern societies, in this understanding of the concept of place. This suggests that in highlighting the structuring of place and space via power and recognition as capital, Giddens supersedes time-geography. Ultimately, structuration theory provides an association between system integration and social integration, spatially demonstrated as the distinction between absence and presence — space is understood as the duality of absence and presence. Giddens envisions the social order issue as one of "time-space distanciation." He is concerned with how dynamics of social inclusion— such as loyalty, friendship, and community — change as remote and "absent" frameworks affect "present" in daily places. Nevertheless, the processes that mediate between the present and the absent stay invisible.

Ulrich Beck, on the other hand, in his book: Risk Society Towards New Modernity released in 1992, redefines the prior understanding of the society in terms of the class structure of the proletariat and bourgeoisie. Modern society faces several global crises, not explicitly related to class, such as global warming, political and environmental downfalls and other prominent risks, or in the case of Beirut, inescapable sectarian tensions and violent clashes. These risks and dangers cannot be mapped out and their causes and outcomes cannot be defined. Hence, the only choice is to face those risks and suffer the consequences. This is what Beck argues in this theory of modernity. In classical modernity, distribution of wealth was the main issue whereas, in the current modernity, the focus is on the prevention, causes and minimizing of risk. Safety is of paramount importance. In his understanding, modernity has created a number of risks for people. He argues that social justice, reasoning, and mass production are now outdated terminology. The world is fast-changing and we are now living in a world which is beyond modern. He calls this second modernity. Second modernity refers to the fact that modern institutions are becoming global while everyday life is breaking free from the hold of traditions

and customs. New modernity distinguishes itself from earlier modernity, which was marked by industrialism, in that second modernity has created risks that, with the advancements in science and technology, are impossible to comprehend. As technology produces these new forms of risks, society is constantly required to respond and adjust to these changes. Society, as he calls it, includes many changes that affect us globally within contemporary social life such as employment pattern shifting, job insecurity, the declining influence of traditions and customs, and other challenges. The Beck States in his book Risk: Society Towards a New Modernity that just as modernization dissolved the structure of feudal society in the 19th century and produced the industrial society, modernization today is dissolving industrial society andanother modernity is coming into being. To sum it up, the thesis of this book is we are not witnessing the end but the beginning of modernity; that is of modernity beyond its classical industrial design. Beck argues that we do have the ability to be a better society because we canevaluate risks and we can take action to reduce them. But in our generation, it is impossible tosurvive without the advantages of modernity. The new and old modernity are completely separate now, with no one being tied to their own constraints because of individualization. New higher consequential risks are facing our society. This 2nd modernity is a time of growing individualization where we become increasingly reflexive; tradition no longer controls who we are, and because of that, we have to reflect on ourselves and the consequences of our actions.

This framework of understanding is especially relevant when taking into consideration most of the sectarian tensions in Lebanon, not only modern but also historical, stem from primarily social problems, namely inequalities in the distribution of wealth. For instance, the silk production in Mount Lebanon in the pre-ottoman era, in which the wealth divide between Christians and Druze led to sectarian tensions. Furthermore, the borders of Lebanon themselves were designed by colonial forces aiming to control the area and its resources. Hence, the reality of the situation is intricately tied to wealth distribution but is also much more complex and

cannot be understood merely in terms of class. Lebanon in general and Beirut, in particular, face their own sets of challenges in post-modernity, especially with a large number of uncertainties in the region and its political instability. Additionally, letting go of traditions and custom is, at a very basic level, an engine of change which is especially relevant in Lebanon in which political beliefs are heavily passed down from generation to generation in the context of sectarianism, feudalism, and clientelism. Hence, every attempt at “de-sectarianizing” Lebanon ultimately stems from the predominantly young generation to break free of the hold of traditions and civil war trauma towards a real secular government and non-segregated community.

To add to the various aspects of modernity, Henri Lefebvre ([1974] 1991) strongly emphasized the mechanisms of production of space using an interdisciplinary approach. Henri Lefebvre is recognized as one of the most prominent thinkers in the latest "spatial turn.” His body of research on various facets of modernity, especially urban, affirms a need to consider space as both a determinant (a process) and a product (a thing) of social relationships and behaviour. To Lefebvre, space is both a tool and a process by which and in which social structures and behaviour take place. Space is hence the result of political, dogmatic and economical forces seeking to demarcate, restrict, and control the behaviours that happen within and through it and as such cannot be understood independently from social relations. In this perspective, Lefebvre stresses that space is susceptible to conflict and dispute over the values and meanings that it represents and connects to. In Lefebvre's analysis of the development of space, the interplay of day-to-day interactions and experiences and traditional and historical systems of production plays a key role. Facets and structures of space (spatial activities), as well as depictions of space (designs, plans, maps, regulations, symbols, signs, etc.) and the subjective experience of space (spaces of representations), emerge for Lefebvre as a complex interconnectedness which generates space collectively. Under capitalism, however, space representations prevail over the

two other aspects in that possession of space infers authority and ability to control and regulate, that is, the ability to constrain and demarcate what activities, events, cultural norms, and so forth are prohibited or permitted in particular spaces. According to Lefebvre, the interplay of the three components of space: structure, function and form should be interpreted holistically as each component alone cannot result in a complete understanding of space. It is crucial to know who is creating what sorts/aspects of space, why and for what ends, and for whom? Yet space understood as a social commodity, is not merely the realm of government. Space is also where daily life's experience of the world occurs, even if its inhabitation and occupation are fraught with values and ideals that can sometimes clash with designers, architects, the state and so one's purposes in creating the space. Space, as such, is the result of social interactions and therefore is not merely a restricting factor, a structuring component, but also the means using which we understand and make sense of the world and invest meaning in our personal lives (Lefebvre, 1991). When discussing the conflicting concepts of space, memory, and identity of Beirut, it is necessary to build on the idea of three interconnecting types of socially created space as described by Lefebvre: the perceived, the conceived, and the lived. The first room is a product of human nature, urban planning and the organization of space. The conceived by contrast covers the abstract, imagined space and the visual order, city signs and codes, governed by elected leaders, planners and economic interests. Lastly, living space explains how people livedaily life, how they create their city through activities, pictures, and symbols as "users" (Hanssen, 2005). Although the structure of Lefebvre is a useful starting point for dismantling the multiple layers of discourse, ideology and practice that influenced the construction and imagination of DownTown Beirut, exploring the urban "spaces of confusion" in the city is also important. Those “spaces of confusion” defy functional reduction but are more complex, fractured and chaotic, arising from "people-to-people confrontations" (Larkin, 2010)

2.4.3 The conception of an alienating city: how Lebanon’s capital became detached from its surroundings and its people

The city of Beirut was actively “conceived” by a political elite to benefit its own interests. Solidere's 30-year "Master Plan" (1994–2024) spans 472 acres: which a third is reclaimed land, 175 acres dedicated to new projects such as a marina, hotels and international trade, and just 54 acres (including 265 main structures) of which are part of the original urban fabric of Beirut. This partially completed project envisages a modern, tourist-friendly, cosmopolitan Beirut focused on Lebanese commerce traditions, innovation, and pluralism. Yet the idea of "Beirut reborn" by Solidere as a 'true layered city of memory' in which "the past tells the future" remains strikingly selective in its context and the memory it elicits. Ancient Beirut is celebrated by the recent discovery and show of Roman baths, Cardo Maximus and Canaanite Tell, while a "héritage path" weaves from manicured mosques and churches to restored Ottoman buildings and French colonial walks reminiscent of their past beauty. Consequently, the traces of a painful and diminishing violent struggle have all but been eliminated and then replaced by an appeal to a more glorious, exalted and heroic history. The Downtown area of Beirut remains "out of reach" and disconnected from the realities of contemporary society.

On several levels, the gap is felt and understood. For starters, there is the spatial dislocation of the Downtown, a consequence of urban planning choices which deliberately disconnected and alienated the centre from its surroundings. That was achieved via the construction of a system of massive car parks and motorways that essentially encircle and dissect the centre from the periphery. The Solidere plan is designed in utter isolation, encompassing the city centre by a narrow ring road and a link to the highway connecting to the airport. The relation comes to constitute a staged kind of favoured memory that is a businessman or tourist's first experience that is, for instance, the experience of a consumer — coming from the airport and being greeted by the modern Downtown. Adding to that point, greater space was created by levellingdensely

populated residential neighbourhoods such as Zokak el-Blatt and Wadi Abou Jamil, part of the traditional urban centre and reforming topography with office blocks in theLevantine style, health spas, and ludicrously expensive designer flats and apartments.

Ultimately, separation is evident across the ultra-modern, economically isolated cityscape of the Down City, which contrasts sharply with the most neglected, ever-expanding urban sprawl of Shi'a Dahiyya in South Beirut, and the poor and impoverished Eastern districts of Nabaa and Karantina. Solidere has failed to rebuild an inclusive heart of a city, a place where everyone identifies in a new social, national and global sense. The overwhelming perception remains that the centre was turned into a refuge for affluent Gulf Arab visitors and a privileged class of global elite, rather than a meeting place for the diverse population of Lebanon. An ethos of consumerism could promote unity across both religious and political divides, yet recurrent sectarian conflicts are not properly engaged or mitigated. Reflecting on the recent spatial changes in Lebanon, it is seen as a public space dedicated to reconnecting a fragmented society through expensive franchises provides a vision of conflict pacification and not one of the solutions. It would appear that the once divisive green line (line of demarcation during the Lebanese Civil War that separated the mainly Muslim factions in predominantly Muslim West Beirut from the predominantly Christian East Beirut) has now been replaced by a red line, generated by Solidere, that is equally dislocating.




Figure 2-14: Beirut green line (Source: Kassir, 2006: 555)

The class implications of Solidere's red-line approach to Beirut are powerful, creating a paradise for the rich that you need to access through the Solidere stage design with a credit card. A rich, extrovert, consuming and ostentatious minority, living and moving on an equal footing with the globalized world elite to which it strives to belong; and a pauperized, increasing majority, trapped with a shrinking economy, narrow horizons and diminishing opportunities. This internal division and social stratification are defined by the Lebanese sociologist Salim Nasr in the broader context of increasing class separation in Lebanon and establishing a two-tiered society. Lastly, a much more critical study of the events indicates that Beirut's Downtown was then hijacked by political parties and leaders rather than being reclaimed by the people, making it a public stage for policymaking and contestation by the Lebanese government, both locally and through the global media. The Downtown’s

transformation into an opportune stage and setting for political power games further undermines its status as a shared public space for reconciliation among a disillusioned and cynical population. A "Garden of Forgiveness" may be symbolically situated in the centre of the city centre, but given the current atmosphere of political uncertainty and neighbourhood mistrust, there is little space for these encounters.

Finally, Pierre Bourdieu develops the idea of space as the reproduction of society. Drawing from the theories of Marx and Weber, Bourdieu develops the concept of a social space characterized by relationships of domination. According to him, social space is made up of classes relatively closed and unequally endowed with different capital (a set of resources that the individual can value in various social situations). He distinguishes four types of capital.

- Economic capital made up of all of an individual's economic resources: his income, hiswealth.
- Cultural capital, the most important for Pierre Bourdieu. This is the body of knowledgeand skills possessed by an individual: his school titles, his cultural goods.
- Social capital, which is formed by the network of knowledge that the individual canactivate to acquire a social position.
- And symbolic capital, which emanates for the individual a certain social prestige in theeyes of others. It makes it possible to value other types of capital.

The place of an individual, or a group of individuals in the social space, thus depends on its endowment in the various capitals. Social hierarchy thus arises from the unequal distribution of these different capitals. First, on a quantitative dimension, the highly endowed agents form

the dominant classes. But also, on a qualitative dimension, depending on the composition of the overall capital volume, like the predominance of economic capital or cultural capital, the position of individuals varies. Pierre Bourdieu, therefore, distinguishes social classes, looking at the possession of this capital, and the habitus. That is to say, ways of being, to think and act specifically to members of this class. Pierre Bourdieu's fundamental framework in the study of space relies upon three equally significant notions: habitus, practice, and field. According to Bourdieu, Practice is what individuals do but is distinct from and should not be confused with the concept of “action” which implies something voluntarily. The practice is not regulated by laws but rather by improvisation; it is hence embodied; it takes time and is positioned in space; it is pragmatic in that it has a direction and results in certain outcomes. The importance Bourdieu puts on practice represents a deviation from the influence of the early writings of Marx and Goffman in Bourdieu's theory. Epistemologically, due to the current difference between official cultural narratives and lived experiences, it's crucial to adhere to what individuals actually do (Jenkins,2002). Also important to Bourdieu is the conditioning of practice by habit, a notion that fits into his framework via the concept of habitus. This idea was not coined by Bourdieu nor exclusive to him, but in his use, habitus refers to inexplicitly embodied conceptual structures and categorization principles— seemingly both individual and collective, despite the individual being the simplest to comprehend — that adapt to objective situations in any particular field of activity in a constantly improvised yet unreflective process. This habitus seems to produce practice in a sense which is quite similar to the relation between deep structures and meaningful utterances in Chomskian linguistics (or, in a similar sense, the relation between cultural manifestations and structure in Levi-Straussian structuralism). The continuing, fairly stable status quo is created and transmitted in this cycle of transition between the external and the internal. This conceptual framework of habitus, arguably rather ambiguously defined, offered the core of Bourdieu's effort to encompass the "ruinous

opposition" between subjectivism and objectivism (Jenkins,2002). The last vertex in the conceptual triangle envisioned by Bourdieu is the field. Broadly defined, it can be considered as a domain that is culturally relevant and institutionally recognized; in other words, a "network of objective relationships" characterized by beneficial values and goods, approved paradigms, accepted relations between means and ends, and challenges to access them all. Examples may include relationships of kinship and comradeship, the political domain, the broad world of art, or professional training. Each field is characterized by its own doxa and suitable habitus which is exchanged between legitimate individuals (Jenkins,2002).

Bourdieu relies on "the game" and "the market metaphors to depict the synchronized and unguided nature of an ordered social space as intersecting fields. Accumulation of capital, as with any market, is at play. Bourdieu, probably influenced by Weber, stresses the variety of capital which can be the ends and means of competitive challenges across all sectors: cultural, social, symbolic and economic capital. Among the fundamental principles that inform different fields, there is a homology that enables individuals to travel between them and generates and strengthens accumulated patterning effects, particularly of hierarchy. At the core of thepractical logics that produce and interrelate the collective logic of fields is the concept of Habitus (Jenkins,2002). According to Bourdieu, before they are understood as anything else, fields should be considered systems of power dynamics. Fields are also the platform and tool of the groups' — establishments' — and individual members' interactions. This is certainly a cycle of symbolic violence that makes it possible to achieve hegemony implicitly and culturallyinstead of through overt force. Therefore, symbolic violence relies on and must promote "misrecognition" (méconnaisance), by which authority is interpreted as self-evident and/or legitimate instead of arbitrary (and refutable) hegemony. Nor is it merely hegemony that is arbitrary: the perceived reality of any social space that is taken for granted, termed a doxa, is a

cultural arbitrary which is neither natural nor in order because it is "superior" in any practical sense (Jenkins, 2002).

2.5 Conclusion

In this chapter the shaping of Beirut was discussed in relation to several theoretical conceptions that approaches the production of space through community, time and practices. The discussion started with the post war blase attitude of Georges Simmel that stood for the Beiruti's mechanism to cope with the daily assault of death and violence. Then, we went through different approaches of the contestation of the city:

First, class and capital of Marx and how they have played an immense role in Beirut's history, from the pre-ottoman era to the civil war and post-civil war, notably considering the different actors' constant fight for increased control over space and capital which cause never-ending tensions. Second, Weber's economic model and bureaucracy that supported the sectarian actors to take control over the shaping the space for their own interests and merging the private, sect and religion with the public (civic identity, socio-economic and political realities). Third, Foucault's approach through which we characterized Beirut as a heterotopia: a site of political contention, caught up in the whirlwind of young generations resisting the status quo away from sectarianism while tribal and sectarian affiliations still challenge the demand for a non-sectarian identity. And fourth, Giddens's and Beck's approaches of modernity that establish for the Lebanese protesters who are challenging the deeply rooted sexist, misogynistic, sectarian, clientelist, neoliberal systems as well as the global crises.

Then, the chapter went through Lefebvre's approach through which we can understand that the city ofBeirut was actively "conceived" by a political elite to benefit its own interests. The Downtown area of Beirut remains "out of reach" and disconnected from the realities of

contemporary society. On several levels, the gap is felt and understood. For starters, there is the spatial dislocation of the Downtown, a consequence of urban planning choices which deliberately disconnected and alienated the centre from its surroundings.

And finally, Bourdieu's fundamental framework of space that relies upon three equally significant notions: habitus, practice, and field; through which, the reality of Beirut and Lebanon, especially in terms of power dynamics and the 'Wasta' (nepotism) phenomenon, can be best understood.

The following table (Table 2-2) summarises the theoretical discussion of this chapter and how Beirut can be approached through the mentioned frameworks.

In the following chapter, a further theoretical discussion will explain how the dynamics, which shaped the spatiality of the city, have driven to the 2015 manifestations.

Table 2-2: A summary of the discussed theories and their relation to the case of Beirut

Georges Simmel	• Space as a bilateral action derived from the socialization process. The elements of space: exclusivity, borders distance, stability, mobility and proximity • Citizens adopt a blase attitude to detach and protect themselves from the overwhelming stimuli of the city	In post-civil war, Beiruties strongly adopted a blase attitude, but rather to cope with the daily assault of death and violence.
Karl Marx	• "time-by-time annihilation of space" Space as a force of production characterized by the devastation of past spaces affiliated with the feudal system of production and the development of new spaces of industrial capitalist production and flow	Class and capital have played an immense role in Beirut's history, from the pre-ottoman era to the civil war and post-civil war, notably considering the different actors' constant fight for increased control over space and capital which cause never-ending tensions.
Weber	• The formation of a practical system of production states that all spatial structure is presupposed by the system of production as well as the state, its economic model, and bureaucracy. • The spatiality of public/private realm and the division of work/household is a necessary precondition to capitalism.	In Beirut's context, state bureaucracy, institutions and power, despite playing a major role in the formation of spatial structure, are superseded by sectarian actors' that circumvent the state and take control over the space for their own interests. The private, sect and religion, is merged with the public (civic identity and socio-economic and political realities).
Michel Foucault	• Spatial awareness takes place via micro-powers. • Spatial modifications run alongside state strategies. • Heterotopias are areas of otherness acting as physical manifestations or utopia approximations. • "Counter-sites" are those in which predominant social and spatial structures are identified, disputed and reversed.	Beirut can be characterized as a heterotopia: a site of political contention, caught up in the whirlwind of young generations resisting the status quo away from sectarianism while tribal and sectarian affiliations still challenge the demand for a non-sectarian identity.

Anthony Giddens	• Understanding modernity as: A set of attitudes towards the world - the idea of the world is open to transformation by human intervention. • A complex of economic institutions especially in industrial production and a market economy • A certain range of political institutions including the nation-state and mass democracy	A majority of Lebanese protestors embody Giddens' idea of the reflexivity of modern society. The younger generations transcend sectarianism and understand the deeply rooted sexist, misogynistic, sectarian, clientelist, neoliberal system whose characteristics feed on each other and mutually reinforce each other and must be destroyed.
Ulrich Beck	• In classical modernity, distribution of wealth was the main issue whereas, in the current modernity, the focus is on the prevention, causes and minimizing of risk.	Modern society faces several global crises, not explicitly related to class, such as global warming, political and environmental downfalls and other prominent risks, or in the case of Beirut, inescapable sectarian tensions and violent clashes.
Henri Lefebvre	• Space is both a tool and a process by which and in which social structures and behaviour take place. Space is hence the result of political, dogmatic and economical forces seeking to demarcate, restrict, and control the behaviours that happen within and through it	The city of Beirut was actively "conceived" by a political elite to benefit its own interests. The Downtown area of Beirut remains "out of reach" and disconnected from the realities of contemporary society. On several levels, the gap is felt and understood. For starters, there is the spatial dislocation of the Downtown, a consequence of urban planning choices which deliberately disconnected and alienated the centre from its surroundings.
Pierre Bourdieu	• Pierre Bourdieu's fundamental framework in the study of space relies upon three equally significant notions: habitus, practice, and field.	The reality of Beirut and Lebanon, especially in terms of power dynamics and the '*Wasta'* (nepotism) phenomenon, can be best understood via Bourdieu's framework.

Chapter 3
2015 MANIFESTATIONS: ROOTS DEEPER THAN THE GARBAGE CRISIS

This chapter adopted the narrative of how the complex, peculiar and unhinged neoliberal capitalist spatial dynamic of Beirut is further complicated by sectarian influences. Considering a long history of failed reforms, this chapter argues that the multi-layered dynamics of Beirut, which led to a quartered city, caused further tensions and confusions about the residents' sense of place and have culminated in the 2015 manifestations. It reviews how the city's spatiality influences and is influenced by the segregation of its residents. Pointing out that despite the main goal of the reconstruction is to establish a positive sense of space, (a place of hope, tolerance, and diversity), this chapter argues that the city remained as fractured as it has always been, with alienation and marginalization. Finally, through focusing on political mobilization in Beirut and how its manifestation links the rising inequalities to the spatiality of the city, the chapter paved the way to the next part of the thesis with introducing the 2015 garbage crisis as an extension to the numerous anti-sectarian movements that Lebanon has witnessed in its history.

3.1 Introduction

Beirut, especially considering its reconstruction after the civil war, can be best analysed in terms of a capitalist city. However, the essence of the relationship between the growth of some types of cities and the different stages of capitalism development continues to be pondered. The type and purpose of a certain region are, according to Marx and Engles, a direct consequence of social and economic organization. Both the connections between various areas and living conditions within a single area can be clarified as results of a given historical moment's mode of production. The discussion can then focus on those aspects of the city which represent the interplay between the accumulating capital and the class struggle.

It is understood that the key elements that characterize the city are the transfer of assets and wealth to private hands, their use for profit to fulfil the desires of the business rather than individual needs, and the physical division between the working class and the ones who hold capital. There is also consensus that the capitalist city isn't a stable institution with absolutely specified features. When capitalism progresses from one point to the next it produces a geographical and social environment suited to its own dynamics of accumulation. Urban settlements had a crucial role to play in capitalism's development but, at the same time, were deeply influenced by its needs. The quest for economies of scale was at the centre of the accelerated growth of urban centres; on the other hand, the demands of the industry made urban advancement possible and necessary.

The key characteristics of this time were the concentration of workers within the towns concentrated industries and manufacturers, with consequent unequal economic growth, and spatial differentiation. Manufacturing industries started moving out of the city centres in the transition to the stage of corporate consolidation and were replaced by different types of services. Successive decentralization waves have become the norm (Gordon, 1984). The old industrial areas were

turned into central business districts as is the case with Beirut's Central District. Empty industrial areas got abandoned, frequently turning the workers 'quarters into ghettos. With the development of industrial complexes and commercial centres and specialized and segregated residential areas, the suburbs began to expand. As such, the question of land value is essential in the understanding of how specific spatial features are defined by capitalist logic. As land became an asset, the capitalists began to realize surplus value, not only by selling industrial goods but by investing in real estate, agreeing on the specific uses of the land according to the criterion that yielded the highest profit.

In this sense, the main characteristic of the capitalist city in the post-industrial era is the growing importance of financial motives with respect to industrial ones. Taking this framework into consideration, after Lebanon's 16-year civil war, with significant devastation and eventually a fractured nation, it was very difficult to rebuild Beirut, with the weakened state withdrawing early in favour of private reconstruction under the governance of the businessman and later Prime Minister Hariri. Hariri formed a private real estate company for the implementation of the reconstruction plans which not only expropriated the previous tenants and owners but also displaced the refugees who had occupied properties in the abandoned city centre. Beirut's reconstruction is defined by exclusion of most of the participating stakeholders. A group of newcomers, war-profiteers and investors replaced tenants, owners, and refugees but also the previous elites from science, society and politics. Therefore, the decision-making was extremely profit-oriented and mostly took place behind closed doors. A radically new concept of urban development and urban governance was introduced in Beirut which resulted in the "privatization of the urban." Because of the profits focus and the exclusion of the stakeholders involved, Beirut's downtown reconstruction provoked a highly contentious public discourse and culminated in a

significant political mobilization of the society. Lebanese society, for the first time since the civil war, had in an unprecedented manner spoken up and commented publicly on the reconstruction. Society's political mobilization was followed by a corresponding "mediatization" of the conflict: the reconstruction struggle was primarily conducted through the media where initiators and opponents sought to promote their reconstruction strategic visions.

With regard to a New Urban Government, urban growth in Beirut after the war was realized mainly within the context of a democratic society (Gordon, 1984). Nevertheless, the reconstruction process is marked by the exclusion of most of the participating protagonists and by a clear business focus that largely disregarded public interests. The complex, peculiar and unhinged neoliberal capitalist spatial dynamic of Beirut is further complicated by sectarian influences. In fact, the multi-layered dynamics of Beirut, from privatization to gentrification, led to a quartered city, which caused further tensions and confusions about the residents' sense of place, which, considering a long history of failed reforms, have culminated in the 2015 manifestations.

3.2 Reconstruction, Privatization & Gentrification

Although it is controversial in the public consciousness, it is mostly agreed in urban literature that the reconstruction that took place in Beirut can be called a paradigm of gentrification. In mainstream consciousness, some supporters of the 14 March alliance and future movement would be inclined to say “Hariri sara2 bas Ammar” (He might have stolen money, but he rebuilt the city); this accusation might come off as negative to a non-Lebanese audience, but actually has positive connotations for the person stating it as it implies that every person in authority in Lebanon has been corrupt and has stolen public funds, while Hariri actually rebuilt Beirut; stealing is negligible. However, a counter-saying, also popular among Beirut is “Ammar Hajar w Dafan Bashar” (He who built stones but killed people) referring precisely to the gentrification process that swept over

Beirut. Hence, it is essential to understand gentrification to properly understand Beirut's dynamics. Gentrification is the cycle of restoring and improving neighbourhoods linked to the migration of middle- and upper-middle-class people into declining inner-city areas, resulting in the displacement of poorer residents. It's necessary to differentiate between revitalisation and gentrification. Although the 'revitalization' of inner-city communities can be a positive outcome for local governmental agencies as it raises the tax base required to provide social services, long-term residents vehemently oppose and battle gentrification -the kind of revitalization that results in the displacement of low income, often minority citizens, by wealthier people. In this perspective, by defining urban growth as a result of capitalist production, David Harvey illustrates the role of money flows into and out of some urban areas as determined by capital needs. Cities are closely connected to economic and spatial reconstruction. A large number of studies have highlighted the influential role of government agencies and other public bodies in stewarding gentrification. In this context, the role of public authorities may take a variety of forms; chief among them, laws and regulations that maintain, encourage and facilitate gentrification. Furthermore, these laws and regulations play a crucial role in shaping the forms in which gentrification progresses in particular urban environments, and therefore constitute a key element in understanding various 'gentrification' modalities worldwide.

Detailed here is how the gentrification project in Beirut was born. With the formation of the private real estate company Solidere (Société Libanaise pour le Développement et la Reconstruction du centre-Ville de Beyrouth) in December of 1992, a final step was taken towards the legal implementation of the privately-financed reconstruction. The Lebanese multimillionaire and building contractor Rafiq al-Hariri had planned and shaped the planning and legal structures of the reconstruction ever since 1990. Hariri was able to influence national decision-makers and achieve

a transition of power in favour of his policy plans because of weak state institutions, which had been undermined by the civil war. Hariri's reconstruction plans were accepted at the time, seeing there was a ravaged city centre populated by numerous refugees, as well as the promise of a long-lasting and complex reconstruction, although serious problems had to be solved: Thanks in part to the restrictive rental rule, the difficult relationship between tenants and owners was characterized by low rental income due to inflation during the war and lack of owners' investment. In addition, during the war, the division of the private estate in the downtown area had increased. The number of owners and tenants had risen to over 120,000 because of the fact that many owners and tenants had passed away which led to their property rights being split among their heirs. Furthermore, during the Civil War, nearly all the residents had abandoned their houses in Downtown Beirut area. Afterwards, several buildings were occupied by several families of refugees who refused to leave without compensation after the war. Therefore, it was impossible to entrust the rebuilding of downtown Beirut to the affected protagonists themselves, as the process involved a fundamental reorganization. However, the establishment of a private joint-stock corporation, the recruitment of private investors and the widespread dispossession of tenants and owners, who, as suggested by Hariri, were rewarded with shares in the real estate business, required a new legal structure. Hariri was able to begin a legislative process and remove all parliamentary concerns and misgivings with his willingness to carry out the reconstruction without any financial assistance from the State. The Lebanese Parliament not only passed a law to this end, but the Council of Ministers has approved a Master Plan for the city centre of Beirut. Prior to becoming Prime Minister in 1992, two of Hariri's most significant reconstruction decisions were made. Hence, the reconstruction could be conducted according to his plans. As head of government, he put his men in leadership positions in all the state institutions relevant to the reconstruction and developed a real monopoly of

decision-making processes (Edde, 1997). His election as Prime Minister was not the result of his restoration efforts but was indicative of the people's desire for an economic upturn. As a wealthy businessman, Hariri appeared most capable of coping with the post-war economic challenges. Hariri would have been capable of completing his reconstruction mission, even without becoming Prime Minister. The legal framework had already been developed before he was elected; hence, in reality, his popular role as Head of Government was more of a handicap: Hariri could no longer complete his projects without being noticed by the public and the media.




Figure 3-1: Demolition and Preservation of Beirut Central District (Schmid, 2006)




Figure 3-2: Gentrification in Furn al-Hayek: Eviction, demolitions and constructions. Source: Field survey conducted by Éléonore Boissinot & Hisham Ashkar, 2011. Illustration by Hisham Ashkar 2018.

Even the election in the autumn of 1998 of a new Lebanese President and a new Prime Minister could not stop Solidere's vision. The new finance minister, George Corm, one of Solidere's former opposers, wanted an optimistic picture of the reconstruction project to draw foreign investors, as the project's failure would be a disaster for economically fragile Lebanon.

In spite of this domestic restructuring, the Solidere project remained faced with the reality of the economy. The overall unfavourable circumstances in the Middle East and world economy have exercised a negative effect on the project ever since 1997. Politically, the sluggish development of the Middle East peace process talks has been an additional impediment. Moreover, in the summer

of 1998, the Asian economic crisis led to the withdrawal of several Far Eastern investors from the project (Harvey, 1998). A new and challenging period seemed to be imminent in 1999: the cost-intensive building works came to an end but had eaten up much of the investment capital, which had to be provided by land sales again.

Beirut's reconstruction continued to be a multinational undertaking that had continuously dedicated itself to attracting investors from foreign countries, not only the Middle and Far East but also from Europe and the United States. Nevertheless, economic growth did not deliver the anticipated boom, and even today, various properties are still up for sale in downtown Beirut. The deterioration of the Middle East peace process and the 9/11 terrorist attacks that happened in 2001 as well as the ongoing Iraq war have been accountable for the further reluctance of foreign investors. In a certain sense, the regeneration of Beirut's city centre has been a victim of its own paradigm: urban privatization.

Finally, when looking at the reconstruction of the Beirut downtown area against the backdrop of a New Urban Government, the key points that were considered were the study of changes and challenges in the context of structural transition and changing political and social experiences. This transition in Beirut not only led to the incorporation of private players into a previously state-controlled top-down decision-making process but also to a far-reaching shift of power in favour of newly developed domains. The rebuilding of Beirut's city centre is an extreme example in this regard and can be seen in context of the weakened state institutions and the post-war situation.

3.3 Quartered City & Sense of Space

Naturally, the aftermath of a gentrification process during reconstruction left Beirut city divided. The layered aspect of the city can be analysed in terms of the quartered city model, developed by

Peter Marcuse (1989). This model serves a dual purpose. One is to create through the power of a metaphor an understanding of the exploitation of the inherent uncertainty in the study of urban growth. The other is to underline the rising social and geographic complexity of capitalist cities. The way this approach is implemented by Marcuse has helped erode the idea of the dual city, which had previously been used to illustrate contradictory patterns within urban society. The dual city concept and the opposition present in it is displayed in sources as diverse as a novel on social conditions by Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities (1960 [1859]), and an early social study, How the Other Half Lives, by Jacob RIIS (1997 [1890]), both of which had a profound impact on the social reform movement of the time, in which the resistance implicit in the dual city idea was articulated. The dual city notion was often used to explain the impact of colonization and the portrayal of the imperial city where, alongside the indigenous centres, Western governments developed their own settlements and compounds. And recently the term has been used to articulate opposing impulses in urban communities as they embrace contemporary communications technology associated with economic transformation, to the advantage of the well-educated and to the detriment of those whose skills have been made redundant. Marcuse (1989) rejects the dual city model by proposing an alternative definition -the quartered city- on the grounds that most residents in cities are neither very wealthy nor very poor, but somewhere in the middle. He distinguishes different social categories that make up an increasingly fractured society and positions them in specific locations of geography and symbolism. Such places - city quarters - are divided by different kinds of walls (Marcuse 1995):. For instance, menacing signs of status; walls, security guards, and "gated communities," rules and regulations; and distance as acknowledgment that geographical remoteness and lack of accessibility can represent a major barrier. The quarter where the wealthy leaders of the corporate elite are situated is the socially impenetrable "citadel;"

the new affluent class is situated in the gentrified areas of the city; and the largely racially and/or ethnically specified community of 'losers' is located in the: "Ghetto." At the same time, the middle and working classes are concentrated in tenement quarters and bland urban neighbourhoods, but also in suburban settlements that are socially and economically small, depending on the preferred lifestyles of the residents, the limitations of their job situation, and the transportation environment that defines the accessibility pattern. The quartered city is thus a multi-faceted reflection - metaphorical and concrete- of the socio-economically and geographically fractured state of contemporary urban society under market forces conditions of neo-liberal control. In brief, the components of a quartered city can be depicted as in the table below:

Table 3-1: The components of a quartered city

The residential cities	Catering for
The luxury areas of the city (the disposable city)	The wealthy
The gentrified city	Middle-class professionals with typically white collar jobs
The suburban city	The sub-urban city presents a class between the lower middle class and the petit bourgeoisie
The tenement city (previously called slums)	Lowered paid workers, lower class (unskilled workers and informal economy)
The abandoned city	Very poor, the excluded, the never employed and permanently unemployed

This framework is especially relevant to the understanding of the socio-spatial fragmentation of Beirut. Present spatial segregation literature in cities does not give a satisfactory account of the form of segregation that exists in modern Beirut in the present day. In fact, it is impossible to apply the very convenient definition of duality to the sense of the divisions that exist in Beirut today – the formal versus the informal city. Similarly, it does not seem to be the case that urban dwellers are increasingly living in urban fragments or partitioned urban quarters (Marcuse, 2002). The applicability of these definitions does not seem true in the sense of the City of Beirut. These ideas are perhaps very appealing because they are neat dramatizations of the situations that affect them. The city of Beirut's fabric attests indeed that spatial socio-economic distinctions are not that tidy. This may have been one of many factors. Firstly, as a result of the continuation of rent control over rent contracts pre-1992, gentrification was hindered and a mixture of income groups continues to exist, especially in parts of the city where private renting was a dominant tenure. Second, the housing market is geographically divided along the lines of confessional membership, resulting in their overlapping confessional enclaves being comparatively very mixed in residentially separate socioeconomic classes. Third, as in other Mediterranean cities, the vertical distinction between economic and social roles is normal and single land use zoning is rare [in Beirut]: a large portion of urban land serves multiple purposes. Most buildings have ground-level commercial, administrative or industrial functions and upper story dwellings. Last but not least, in the light of slow economic growth and increasing public debt, the number of wealthy individuals remains relatively small making the development of self-sustaining enclaves a non-sustainable business to cater for this very small population (Alaily-Mattar, 2010).

The different layers of beirut, coupled with its peculiar socio-economic and political situation, give rise to an equally complex and peculiar sense of place. Sense of place is a multidimensional,

dynamic concept used to describe people's relationship to spatial settings. Local meaning can be defined on different geographical scales: neighborhood, region, or countryside. The expression incorporates two related definitions of sense: (1) comprehension and order, as in "making sense," and (2) sensation and feeling, such as sight, smell, and taste. As an idea, a sense of place recognizes that places are not just space points, but places that assume the significance people attribute to them based on perceptions, feelings, memories and experiences. Therefore, having a sense of place means knowing a location, not only its mere spatial structure but also its roles, users, ownership, etc. Thus, the sense of place in Beirut varies from person to person and over a stretch of time for the exact location. Though, Beirut Civil War took on an overwhelming sense of place (in that case anti-sense of place): Death. In the poem "The Desert" by Adonis which describes Beirut, it is said:

> *"We no longer meet.*
> *Rejection and exile keep us apart.*
> *The promises are dead, space is dead.*
> *Death alone has become our meeting point."*

(Adonis, 1984 in Dados, 2005).

The spatial vocabulary of the poem depicts what once had been a crowded settlement, as 'a desert,' empty of all but death. This desert is both human and spatial at the same time: the siege drained Beirut of human life but also drained it from humanity. The argument that "space is dead" is only made clear in the line "Death alone has become our meeting place." All the city's spaces have become spaces of death because meeting in them is meeting in death. However, by being spaces of death the city's spaces have caused space to die and the city no longer remains as a social place. This space death is also dialog death, "We no longer meet / Rejection and exile hold us apart /

Promises are dead." Fighting rages on without a space for dialogue, until the last fighter drops. The conclusion of the dialogue, in exchange, means that space is left dead. With this in mind, the reconstruction aimed at annihilating this sense of death. Immediately after the signing of the peace agreement in Taif, the reconstruction of central Beirut aimed at restoring stability and harmony and a renewed passion and commitment to get the country and its capital back to normal state, and attracting investment and industry. The reconstruction scheme entrusted by the state to "Solidere" is considered to have been successful in restoring the physical appearance almost twenty years later, of the stock of residential and business buildings, but ultimately not the sense of place. It might not be the case that the prevailing sense of place in modern day Beirut is that of death, but it is definitely one alienation and marginalisation; a necessary consequence of the quaratered nature of the city following its reconstruction and gentrification.

3.4 The Political Mobilization of Beirut's Society

The far-reaching destruction, the widespread expropriations and the decision-making behind closed doors culminated in intense criticism of Beirut's downtown reconstruction. The directly involved protagonists, including the former residents and owners as well as the refugees who had occupied property in the city centre, requested consideration for their interests. The restoration project was condemned by artists, authors and scholars as well as architects and design practitioners. The different parties coordinated to varying degrees. The expropriated owners and tenants assembled in numerous committees and threatened to discourage the restoration project through countless court cases and continuing public-relations campaigns. By their criticism, the various opposition groups sparked a very divisive public debate on the aims and substance of the reconstruction, stated as being the first public debate since the beginning of the war and the first on urban issues in the history of Lebanon. The Lebanese people voiced their concerns for the first

time since the civil war, and sought to control the reconstruction. The most controversial issues were the establishment of a private real estate corporation and the expropriation of tenants and owners but also, more generally, urban planning aspects. The opposition denounced the private real estate company's de facto monopoly and the planning profit perspective that did not adhere to public interests. Another problem listed was the lack of democratic values and public scrutiny. The most criticized elements of urban planning were the large-scale highways and skyscrapers, as well as the morphological division of the city centre. Many experts in the field have criticized the design as a faceless adaptation of a global and standardized architecture, with its bloated block structure and the vast number of high-rise constructions. The critics also lambasted the systematic destruction of the historic fabric, including a variety of undamaged buildings, and even historic monuments. In addition, the critics argued that the incorporation of the central Martyrs' Square into a north-south highway-run axis strengthened the city's religious division into a Christian east and a Muslim west Beirut. The wide “ring” road was often criticized as providing a physical barrier, secluding the area in downtown from the rest of the city: the downtown threatened to become an area of the powerful and wealthy — a totally segregated "island of prosperity." The critics claimed that the functions and services of the future city centre were conceptualized primarily to serve the upper class, ignoring the middle and lower classes. Opposition criticism and resulting public outrage forced Hariri to rethink the first master plan. Solidere's planning experts considered maintaining not only a larger number of historical landmarks but also reducing the number of highways and skyscrapers. While some of the architectural critique was adopted, it adhered to the idea of an immovable property corporation and widespread expropriation. The opposition was not able to bring in any further reforms and were again removed from the decision-making process.



Figure 3-3: A poster that represents Solidere project as a deformation that removes the heart of the city [the heart of the people] "Woe to a nation who taken their heart away does not make them revolt"

3.4.1 Direct Factor to 2015 manifestations - The Garbage crisis

Hundreds of Lebanese residents protested in July and August 2015 against the horrendous garbage mounds in the streets of Beirut and Mount Lebanon. Such scenes have demonstrated the deterioration of infrastructure and interruption of public services that are signs of the state's failure to fulfil its citizens' needs and demands. How do we perceive the State's inability to provide essential public services? How does an overview of this failure provide insight into the Lebanese state's particularities?

Urban academics sought to tackle the inefficiency and instability of Lebanon's public institutions through two dominant paradigms: neoliberalism and sectarianism. Analysis based upon Neoliberalism emphasizes the withdrawal of the state from the areas in which it previously engaged, its promotion of market-led policies and the development of modern, supposedly more powerful institutions and agencies. Urban architecture and building, seen most spectacularly in Solidere, epitomize this kind of transition, leading to gentrification and increased inequality in capital accumulation. Analysis based upon Sectarianism investigates how political groups with sectarian links seize or use state institutions to promote their political interests and territorial ones, for example by building explicitly controlled territories such as the Dahiyeh (Dahiyya, which itself is a suburban area south of Beirut which now includes several municipalities and towns), therefore weakening the state’s authority. Yet neoliberal and sectarian definitions aren't mutually exclusive; they can be combined. Both paradigms stress how various social and political powers take charge of state structures in ways that contradict central sovereignty as per the formulation of the Weberian theory of a state geared towards achieving the public good.

Throughout the civil war, different groups used public utilities such as water or electricity as tools to achieve influence or to reinforce power imbalances. In increasingly divided territories, political-

sectarian militias replaced the Regime, which practically ceased to control and maintain order. Beirut's water supply, for instance, came from reservoirs in the city's eastern mountains, a region controlled by the Lebanese Forces. The Lebanese Forces threatened closing sluices — and in certain cases did so — to put pressure on their opponents, during the 1982 Israeli invasion in particular. Palestinian-progressive forces managed the Jiyeh (Jiyya) power station south of Beirut and extended a line from the Christian militia-dominated electric grid to their western sector of the capital. These activities influenced reconstruction plans. The factors which regulated the creation of power stations and water sources were not solely technical or financial in these plans. The plans also addressed how certain resources could be managed by warring parties if hostilities were revived. The war also impacted network infrastructure by discouraging investment and maintenance. For instance, families who were coerced to move in search of protection extended the city into areas where service networks were unable to cope with rising demand or where services were lacking. Due to extreme demand, the mass dislocation caused local shortages and degradation of the network. Investment shortages affected both networks and production. Water treatment plants and power stations were not adequately operated by the government nor militia. In spite of the population of Lebanon increasing by fifty per cent since the war, production capacity barely increased. The consequence was large-scale rationing: in the events post-war the national utility reduced electricity supply to around six hours a day. A third result of the war was non-payment which was significantly widespread and can be described by the utility word "theft": illegal ties, metering, etc. The theft came from the expulsion of the state and its replacement by militias, which in some cases coordinated the thievery themselves. However, in some parts of the city, residents depended on theft as the only means of access to electricity, especially in informal settlements where the absence of building permits made legal access impossible (although things

were more complicated in practice). Eventually, the war allowed the development of an illicit water supply from illegal boreholes, a trade in drinkable water (more or less), and private-generator electricity. Such generators were initially owned by individuals, and then collectives were established. During the second half of the war, commercial companies were established around these private service provisioning, often regulated by militias, which charged exorbitantly inflated prices. After the war, people wanted critical public service provision to return to the pre-war situation in which the state, although with challenges, was delivering services.

The rehabilitation of infrastructure was a key goal within the reconstruction strategy of the Lebanese government in the 1990s. This policy was aimed both at restoring normal living standards and at fostering economic growth, recognizing working infrastructure as a key condition. The Lebanese government received a significant amount of financial assistance, mainly from foreign organizations, to accomplish these aims. The task of leading and organizing the country's reconstruction effort was given to the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR). However, in the reconstruction program, the renovation of the Beirut-el-balad (centre in Arabic) was regarded as a separate element. Dar Al Handasah, a consultancy firm, developed a proposal for the Government of Lebanon for a region named the Central District of Beirut (BCD) and defined what was conceived as the core of Beirut. The goal of the Solidere project was to restructure the image of the city centre, el-balad, and use it as an instrument and emblem for the country's recovery economically. Solidere vowed to make the centre-el-balad- a place for mending war-torn Lebanon, a place where Beirutis and Lebanese by projection from all faiths and sects would interact peacefully. The reuniting process of the war-divided region was going to begin from the centre, the core. However, this supposedly noble project turned into a gentrification process that oppressed lower income classes, and gave one political party control of the city which

removed opposing political forces from the community (Alaily-Mattar, 2010). The core -el-balad- became Solidere, and Solidere became a symbol of the governance system of Hariri. Transport, energy and waste sectors, along with drinking water and sewage, were given priority by the Government, according to reports from the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) for the period 1992-2010. There is a remarkable difference between the huge amounts invested in these programs and their chaotic results. It instantly raises concerns about spending efficiency and management quality, casting doubt on the adequacy of governance at both the national and urban levels. The Salim al-Hoss (1998-2000) and Hariri (2000-2004) Governments turned to multilateral and European sources of financing. The new financiers were awarding loans in exchange for structural reform commitments, particularly in public water and electricity services. At the same time, the government rapidly enforced waste management and telecommunication privatization, and attempted to privatize highways but failed. Privatization was not the product of external coercion, but rather represented the interests of part of Lebanon's economic and political elite, which intended to directly benefit from the participation of the private sector. The financial sector was prioritized over industry and agriculture. The plans also developed and emphasized physical infrastructure, leaving out human capital. Advocates of this plan claimed that a revitalized financial sector would be a driving force for economic growth throughout the world. As such, Beirut has been rebuilt at the cost of the entire country.

After the war, the state immediately turned its focus to the waste field. Collection systems almost broke down during the years of war, and waste disposal became chaotic. Several illegal coastal waste dumps became major public health issues. Such dumps justified many major urban development projects in downtown Beirut and in Bourj Hammoud. In order to tackle Beirut’s waste issue, the government decided to license a private corporation, which would obtain public

funds and work on a scale larger than the metropolitan area, the government decided to tackle Beirut's waste issues.

The CDR awarded local firm Sukleen the contract for waste collection for the area in 1994. Then in 1997 Sukomi was awarded a license by the CDR for waste management and inert waste storage at dump sites. Parent company Averda owned both Sukleen and Sukomi. By then, Sukleen's waste collection operation had extended to include all of Mount Lebanon except the Jbeil district (Jubayl). The CDR explained the expansion by talking about the benefits of a scale economy. Yet the size of Sukleen's activities and its strategic choices proved ineffective. The costs of the service, including storage and treatment, were very expensive, especially as compared to those in other areas like Tripoli and Sidon. Many questioned the environmentally friendly treatment and storage: Sukleen has overfilled its dumps and inadequately sorted its waste. The CDR had intended to implement waste-to-energy processes before 2015, burning waste to improve electricity generation. They would follow this move with a broader overhaul of the waste collection and treatment sector at a wider span in the Beirut area. The garbage crisis that occurred in 2015 was the result of the delay by the CDR in adopting these plans and overfilling dump sites.

The waste sector reveals the challenges of applying an instrument specifically influenced by the ideals of neoliberalism. The government structured the service following a tendering process according to an awarded public license. The organization chosen had no experience in the handling of large scale wastes. The chairman, Maysara Sukkar, was a real estate developer known for his ties to Hariri. To many analysts and journalists, the issuing of this public license to the private sector illustrated not only the neoliberal agenda adopted by the chairman of the CDR, but also a degree of clientelism, as they believed Sukleen was contributing to the Future Movement, the Hariri family's own political party. Regularly, the government extended the contracts for Sukleen

without a fair bidding process. Hariri's opponents in the Najib al-Miqati government attempted to examine existing contracts but failed, possibly because of hidden power networks inside the CDR.

Additionally, the waste sector reflects the contradictions between the CDR-represented central government and local authorities. The municipalities are responsible for the administration and procurement of waste management facilities according to Lebanese law. Nevertheless, when the government adopted the new system, most municipalities were not able to assume these obligations. Financing comes from the Independent Municipal Fund, whose funding is focused on a blend of taxes and fees. The central government, on behalf of the municipalities, gathers these taxes and fees, and is expected to redistribute them to the municipalities -which it only does partly and without observing specific laws. Therefore, the central government funds waste management facilities with money taken from the municipalities, without informing the municipalities and without charging a different waste management fee to the people. Municipalities had various views on the incremental extension of Sukleen's operating area to include almost all of Mount Lebanon. Many were glad that Sukleen was kept responsible for waste management as centralized control reduces the amount of illegal dumping in ravines and enhances the ecosystem. Others felt they paid a large price for the service without getting any insight into the conditions of operation. Following the recession of 2015, many requested that municipalities reclaim responsibility for waste services. Several critics of the current system claim that transportation of waste over long distances to the only two known dump sites is among the root causes of the high cost of the operation. Yet local resistance, led by the municipalities, has stopped the CDR from developing new sites for waste. In relation to citing environmental threats -and the implications for the real estate market- municipalities have protested in parochial and religious terms new landfill sites, refusing to import the waste of other groups.

The introduction of private operators into the waste sector by the Lebanese Government was an early reform attempt. The deal for a public service license undeniably changed the former anarchic environmental situation. But this result was obtained by the government by opaque means that favoured a corporation with connections to certain political-financial interests, and whose contract was extended without accountability in the process. Those inconsistencies and the discovery of corruption in the sector contributed to lively protests in 2015. Protesters articulated demands for greater influence over this service and introduced various alternative schemes. But even as these demonstrations have made the power of the political leaders more precarious, the "temporary" solutions of the government continue to replicate the status quo in large part. Dump sites hold a risk of damaging the environment because the government has not implemented a recycling policy and has extended the contract with Sukleen (Verdeil, 2018).

3.4.2 Anti-sectarian movements in Lebanon and the 2015 manifestations

In Lebanon a movement against sectarianism will entail a shift in political culture and political institutions. First of all, it must presuppose a new political understanding marked by a thorough dedication to deconfessionalization; otherwise, any initiative initiated or implemented by a Lebanese group to desectarianize the structure will acquire confessional tones. However, the 2015 movement, which had borrowed from earlier anti-sectarian movements (notably isqat an-nizam at-ta'ifi movement), grew rapidly, first on social media, and then in the capital's streets. In reality, the movement depended massively on Beirut and Lebanon's cybercity dimension to coordinate and improve public relations and the awareness of the public before they took to the streets.

Cybercity's role in the formation of this movement is thus undeniable. A cybercity is a 'city' where people interact in a space that is virtual using networked devices, with the city acting as the

community metaphor. It is a virtual space for computer-mediated interaction and communication which serves different social and business purposes. The bigger aspect of cybercity is linked to the idea of cyberspace. In the modern world, the internet can be seen as the global cyberspace. Creating a cybercity consists of creating a network rich in material, or, in its most advanced form, a model of virtual reality based on a highly realistic picture of a city (not necessarily material or literal). Cybercity is more than just an 'artificial' construct. Rather, it develops new social activities and uses value for specific people, offering a link with their goals and needs between the people and global virtual space. The idea of cybercity is similar to concepts like the virtual city, the physical city, the Interactive city and the techno-city, for obvious reasons. The fundamental difference is that cybercity is more synonymous with variations of urban life, even with something more revolutionary and unpredictable than the city's other interpretations. Basically, a cybercity can be described in the same way as a virtual town. In a narrow sense it is the whole range of city government operations delivered across the communication networks to residents and stakeholders. In a wider sense a cybercity is conceived mainly as a web-based urban structure in which people communicate with each other and use services or purchase goods, or in the case of Lebanon, build a movement. Indeed, the core of this city creation is the riches of a web-based postmodern 'urban' life. A cybercity can thus be seen as a series of socially and commercially driven practices organized around the city concept on the internet, including numerous expressions and representations of urban life (Ari-Veikko).

Initially, the movement that sparked the manifestations, "You Stink" was a small movement which started mobilizing mainly on social media, where the hashtag "# tol3etre7etkom" ("you stink") circulated. The group approached the political establishment with this slogan, and their obvious reluctance and/or refusal to overcome the garbage crisis. On July 25, the movement had more or

less simultaneously launched its Facebook page with other pages and small-scale protests, as well as statements pillorizing the exacerbated garbage crisis, on one end, and political negligence in coping with it, on the other end. "You Stink" articulated concerns for which a large part of the populace related, as the recession and the ever-growing piles of garbage impacted the everyday lives of everyone. The movement thus gained much support among the public, which was expressed primarily on social media in Lebanon during this early phase. The very spontaneous campaign called for the first protests on 28th July in downtown Beirut. As of July 2016, "You Stink" was already on Facebook with 206,389 likes. The movement was gradually growing at the height of the manifestation by bringing new individual actors and activists, as well as leaders of civil society groups, into the social and political scene of Lebanon. Similarly, the movement also became evident through its increasing promotional efforts and on traditional media outlets, where they also acted as the movement's key reference. Prominently, the Lebanese diaspora have organized small groups under the same slogan. The efforts culminated on 31 August in the movement's biggest manifestations (Saleh, 2016). The impact of this cyberspace has not been disregarded by the Lebanese authorities. In fact, according to Human Rights watch, between 2015 and 2018, the number of defamation cases for online speech indicate a 325 percent increase (HRW). The number of such cases has skyrocketed, and the impact has not faded since the movements have lost their momentum in 2015. Recently, (at the time of writing in April 2020), popular journalist Dima Sadek and blogger Gino Raidy were summoned to the Central Criminal Investigation Bureau following a complaint lodged by the Free Patriotic Movement Party on Twitter accusing them of "provoking sectarian violence" and "publishing fake news". Later in the same week, writer and activist Charbel Khoury was summoned at the Cybercrime Bureau and briefly detained over tweets naming an adviser to former foreign minister Gebran Bassil. A warrant

for Khoury's arrest was issued under the cause of "failing to sign a promise to avoid the advisor's public criticism and erase the tweets," but was later released after protests (Chehayeb, 2020). Yet, beyond shrinking spaces for political action and freedom of speech, there are other significant repercussions that were associated with this continuing online and in-street activity, especially the violence of the police that occurred in the on-the-ground protests.

In fact, the movement arose from local development and environmental demands to denounce the complicity of private interest companies (particularly Sukleen, the waste management firm), the sectarian political parties and the Lebanese government, as well as systemic corruption and a lack of transparency. The movement succeeded in mobilizing citizens rapidly in this fatalistic moment, and attendance surpassed the scale of previous movements and anti-sectarian agitation, and it undoubtedly surpassed the initial goals of the movement itself. The overwhelmingly violent response of the government to mostly nonviolent demonstrators led to an even greater support for and involvement in the protests of the revolution. Many protesters on both sides of the current political dichotomy between March 8 and March 14 succeeded in putting together the campaign. Nonetheless, it was not long before police brutality started to lead to the dampening of the campaign, among other factors: gradually, protests began to see a decline in attendance, whilst the campaign and its numerous activist organizations faced criticism and suspicion from many former sympathizers (AbiYaghi, 2017). Divisions among the protesters themselves occurred due to conflicts on whether to name Political figures Individually (#Kelloun_Ya3ni_Kelloun) or keep it vague, with the most controversial figures being those of Shiite Leaders Hassan Nasrallah (Hezbollah) and Nabih Berri (Harakel AMAL). Other divisions included opposing views on social issues, namely the rights of the LGBTQIA+ community. However, one of the most notable divisions was of a political nature: conflict on the position on the war in Syria. In a general sense,

there are two overbearing views of the war in Syria; one that sides with the protesters, emphasizing that they are popular uprisings similar to those that took place in Egypt and Tunisia and the other siding with the regime claiming the fear of a radical sunni takeover of Syria. This disagreement furthered the sectarian tensions in Lebanon as the divide on the Syrian war also took a sectarian nature with the Shiite heavily backing the state (especially considering Hezbollah's military intervention in defence of the Assaadist regime) while Sunnis backed the uprising and Christians were divided among both camps. These divisions can be ascribed to the growing disagreement between the actors of the movement on how to resolve the divisive symbols and expressions of the Lebanese political structure during demonstrations, on one end, and on the other, how to foresee a new and reshaped social and political future for Lebanon. Such ambivalences in the movement disclose one aspect of "a sectarian ghost" as AbiYaghi calls it. In other words, the dilemma of how to deal with sectarian manifestations and signs raises the question "Who are we?" in relation to these forms, and in dissociation from them. It is this phenomenon which often triggers disputes and disagreements which typically lead to mutual allegations of being sectarian or not distancing oneself sufficiently from paradigms of sectarianism. Through this context, the "sectarian ghost" often applies to discussions within the movement itself and to collaborative processes.

Another sectarian debate on the topic of the confessionalization of the garbage crisis itself formed. With the outbreak of the Lebanon crisis, different proposals were considered by the state on solid waste management. The government initially gave a call to various businesses to draft a proposal for the management of solid wastes. Post-cancelation of this plan after internal and external criticism, the government greenlit a waste management plan proposed by the Minister of Agriculture, Akram Chehayeb, but that plan has since fallen by the wayside. Chehayeb is synonymous with Lebanon's "golden age" of environmental activism, the "greening up of

sectarianism." His proposal, however, was strongly criticized by numerous activist groups for not having viable solutions, not taking into consideration environmental impacts, serving the normal clientelistic interests of politicians, and not protecting the municipalities' freedoms, duties and financial prerogatives, not only in terms of clientelism but also in terms of the confessional essence of Lebanese waste management and its solutions. The geographical distribution of landfills was soon linked to the suspected confessional prevalence in those regions, itself linked to the customer-driven way of distributing shares and benefits to the various political leaders and followers. That led to a debate on the confessional nature of the preparations for the garbage crisis. Activists began mocking Lebanon's "confessional garbage" by posting pictures of the ever growing piles of garbage on social media with confessional references to single garbage bags such as "a Shi'i garbage bag in Ashrafieh" (a Christian neighbourhood) (AbiYaghi, 2017). The debate on sectarianism among anti-sectarian movements reveals how this ambivalence in terms of rhetoric and action is linked to issues of domination and distribution within the Lebanese political landscape of current mobilisation capital and agency facilities. Therefore, it is vital not to fall into fatalism and resort to the absolute demarcation of a phenomenon as sectarian or as a revival of sectarianism but rather to examine the complexities of constraint, power asymmetries, mobilization, dominance, and enmeshment within the political and civil society of Lebanon.

More recently, such a reactivation of identity narratives could also be found in the usage of the word “mundassin” (the infiltrators). A significant amount of literature deals with members of the social movement, but little to no attention has been paid to infiltrators of the social movement or, more generally, to actors of the social movement who are in dispute about their allegiances. Nonetheless, as we can see in this section, the "infiltrators" (mundassin) were accused of spreading opposition within the party, or even of carrying out criminal activity to "justify" official action

and/or repression. Amidst the garbage crisis campaign, the state establishment used a wide variety of means in the summer of 2015 to suppress protests: large military deployments, illegal arrests, tear gas, tring civilian demonstrators in military courts, and shooting protesters were just some of the repressive instruments used. Other methods concentrated on weakening the campaign by accusing the protesters of being drug users (thus requiring arrested demonstrators to undergo and pay for their own urine tests) or being exploited and funded by a "small Arab country" thus introducing the notion of "infiltrators." While the Minister of the Interior and Municipalities attempted to categorize "infiltrators" (a word used interchangeably with "trouble makers" and "riot starters") as foreigners (security forces reportedly detained Syrian and Sudanese refugees), it was not much longer till some of the activists themselves began to use the definition of the so-called “infiltrators” as broad and diverse groups of the Lebanese population started joining the demonstrations for the first time.

The somewhat disproportionate knee jerk reaction of the state towards unarmed demonstrators (including many children and elderly) demanding fundamental civil rights led to an even greater mobilization. A lot of people joined the protesters in downtown Beirut to express solidarity with the campaign and condemn the response of the state to it. At those protests, tensions began to emerge among the protesters. Though some —mostly young men— demanded for a forceful removal of the security blockades installed by the police to isolate the demonstrators from the seats of power, others approached the wall of armed police (and army) chanting “silmiyeh, silmiyeh” ('Non-violence, non-violence') to voice their rejection of violently confronting the state in any way. (This reality is still seen in the October 17, 2020 revolution despite the riots being more violent and widespread.) This stressful situation intensified further in the evening, when the sit-in protest turned into a complete demonstration. The same young men reappeared, running bare-chesteded

through the crowd, holding empty plastic bottles to throw at the policemen and the soldiers. Their apparent willingness to use violence as a method of action as part of the demonstrations shocked many other protesters and angered many of them, who were obviously trying to find an inclusion / exclusion narrative in reaction to the appearance of the "infiltrators." Activist theories about the rioters or "infiltrators" differ according to parties and campaigns. Few activist groups distanced themselves from the rioters by saying that their mobilization was "pacifist and civilized" (hirak musalem wa hadari) and even requesting from the security forces to aid them in keeping the demonstrations free of the infiltrators. Some reversed the stigma and started to brand themselves as "infiltrators" by wearing indisas-stamped T-shirts (infiltration) and mocking the dynamics of exclusion and the naming of some of the protest groups' modes of protest (violence versus peacefulness). All of these narratives can be related to the issue of recourse to political violence and defiance as a method of action in protest movements, not a voluntary problem among demonstrators, although the dominant rhetoric was to emphasize the protest's peaceful nature. Rioters were marked almost immediately as coming from the Khandaq al-Ghamiq, a poor Shi'i neighborhood. Therefore, the problem of the infiltrators — and how to tackle the issue inside the protest movement — eventually touched on several key topics to the self-positioning of the demonstrators and protestors calling for demonstrations against an oppressive, corrupt, and sectarian framework. The issue of religious membership of the infiltrators (and the subsequent political implications), along with their class affiliation, also posed the topic of patronage networks and political offering. Their status as Shi'i youth from an Amal bastion immediately made them suspicious in the eyes of a Beirut-based community primarily consisting of the middle class. Considering the infiltrators as a monolithic group (whether based on religion or class) strips them of any sociological context, disregards their systems of political and social beliefs, and essentially

denies any political consciousness to them. Therefore, the issue of infiltrators seems to pose a problem fundamental to the protesters' own self positioning and perception. On the one side, disassociating themselves from the infiltrators and naming them in relation to their alleged association with one of the key pillars of the corrupt sectarian structure, particularly the Amal movement, meant giving in to the same dichotomous and prevalent view that the mainstream media in Lebanon and the politicians took up in regards to the movement.

Conclusion of Part I

The advent of capitalism has deeply impacted the production of the spaces in Beirut. Following the war, the cityscape is transformed from one of devastation, desolation, alienation and death to one of "rebranding" and changing the sense of place of these spaces' residents. This process took place in an exclusionary manner, completely disregarding tenants, refugees and owners' rights and interests in favour of the unhinged neoliberal interests of the rich war-profiteers. The identity of Beirut and its relatability to the country's residents was majorly overlooked in the reconstruction process which favoured a "post-war amnesia" approach that aimed to annihilate any remembrance of the lived reality of the war. This change took place at the hands of Rafic Hariri and his colleagues in the DRC's newly created private company: Solidere. Due to the peculiar nature of the city and its post-war realities, it is difficult to cleanly categorize Beirut theoretically. The dual city model fails profoundly while Marcuse's more nuanced quartered city model, despite severe limitations, provides useful analytical insight. Due to the mixture of classes in any single area as a function

primarily of confessional membership, outdated rent control, and the lack of single-use zoning, Beirut’s areas do not cleanly conform to any given homogeneous identity.

The control of necessary services (water, electricity, …) and governmental institutions was a major manifestation of the conflicting factions' attempts to assert their dominance over the city. As such, in the process of reconstruction, as the state was weakened, the utilities were left divided amongst private parties meaning that even though reconstruction was underway, crucial aspects were left dependent on secret meetings and under-the-table deals at the whim of the different confessional political parties. Sukleen is one such example in which the garbage disposal services, despite legally falling within the jurisdiction of municipalities in a decentralized manner, was given to an inefficient and highly expensive private company to the interest of businessmen close to the Hariri family and the Future movement. Given that these institutes were meant to generate profit and attract more foreign loans, public interests were buried. When the proof of such projects’ inability to serve citizens' needs became evident (piling of garbage around pickup points, the overflowing of dumps with unmanaged waste), public outcry became one of the few ways people could refute such conditions and plans.

In this perspective, the different factions' attempts to dominate Beirut had very tangible and observable consequences. Political activists began campaigning over the internet - what can be considered Beirut's cyberspace - using the hashtag #YouStink, which culminated in numerous manifestations in Downtown Beirut’s public squares. The protests themselves raised questions of identity and sectarianism as protesters were divided on national and regional issues (most prominently the role of Hezbollah and the position on the Syrian regime) in addition to issues of class as most protesters, predominantly middle-class highly educated beirutis, attempted to distance themselves from lower-class protesters willing to use force and violence turning the

peaceful protests into potential riots. Meanwhile, the government and its informal militias attempted to dominate both of the physical and virtual space of those protests - using disproportionately violent measures to tackle mostly peaceful protests (water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets) - they also summoned civilian activists to military courts and heavily monitored online activity, often bringing activists (or ordinary citizens) to court for sharing anti-government rhetoric. Informally, the use of threats and violence including beatings was predominant.

All in all, Beirut is a divided city with a complex history and fragmented identity which defies most conventional reductionist classifications. It has been shaped by capitalism and neoliberalism's transformation and production of space to suit its needs as well as those of sectarian interests, with conflicting actors fighting over the domination of space with tangible outcomes that shape residents' everyday lives and sense of place and identity.

The following part of the thesis will, practically, trace the modes of popularising the dominance in one of the most important and influential quarters of the city – Beirut Central District (BCD).

PART II
URBAN SCENES FROM BCD
Mapping the Uses of the District


As just mentioned in the previous page, this part of the thesis, practically, trace the modes of popularising the dominance in one of the most important and influential quarters of the city – Beirut Central District (BCD). It targets at mapping the relation of the collective spatial practices to the production of their hosting spaces.

First of all, this part translates the theoretical elements of the experiential production of space into contextualised and observable elements. The Institutional representation, of the previously discussed players and dynamics that shapes the city, and the individuals' presence stands for the objects of the three main squares of Beirut Central District: Riyadh Alsolh, Nijmeh and Martyrs' squares, and their surroundings, where a routine and eventual modes of contestation take place. The relationship between these entities created embedded three entities of the case study, which it their turn, divided this part into three chapters:


- **[Chapter 4] The research methodology: Visualising the urban dominance through mapping archived spatial practices**
- **[Chapter 5] The routine urban scene of Beirut downtown: Defining the spatial condition of the case study**
- **[Chapter 6] The eventual urban scene of Beirut downtown: The politics of the district**

The first chapter will explain the methodology that we followed to build up the visual narrative of the district's conditions; the second will analyse the role of institutions and individuals in setting the routine functions of the district; while the last chapter will focus on the role of the individuals in shaping the district during the events of demonstration.


At the end of this part, the spatial contestation of the district will be, visually, understood.



The observable entities of the case study



Chapter 5



Chapter 6

Chapter 4
METHODOLOGY
VISUALIZING THE URBAN UNREST PRACTISES

This chapter explains the research methodology of visualising the eventual dominance of public spaces through mapping archived spatial practices during phases of urban unrests. The discussion starts with providing a justified definition of the main elements of the eventual entity of the spatial production with the exact implementation of the theoretical terminology to serve the research objectives through the utilized case study. Next, discussing thoroughly the main features that give the used methodology its originality. This includes the combination of various methods, building up verbal and visual narratives, creating and visualizing numerical time-series dataset of the spatial features of the crowd, and the use of human eye perspective visual records to allocate the distribution of the crowd's densities.

4.1 Introduction

To inform this explanatory research with practical evidence of the spatial practices of demonstration in Beirut Central District – which cannot be manipulated, in some political context of 'blurring boundaries from (very relevant to) the phenomenon' (Baxter and Jack 2008), a case analysis methodology was selected to support the theoretical explanation of the temporal production of the space of the users (creators).

In terms of investigating this phenomenon within its real-life context, a research unit [of the protest event] was defined in a time-place setting, within an influential context that it cannot be separated from. According to several scholars, the defined unit can represent either an individual, group, institution or community. This systematic inquiry (Zuker 2009) aims at describing the phenomenon of interest through seeking shreds of evidence within the settings of the case and abstracting them to answer the research question (Gilham 2000).

Even if the abstraction of the evidence can answer the research question, it is important to know that case study research, within human (non-scientific) settings, are related to specificity rather than generalization. All results and shreds of evidence are directly connected to the defined case of the practices of demonstration in Beirut Central District; and cannot be tested in comparison with specific theoretical or literature background. The background works as a context for the research questions through which an inductive model of the research design can assess to what extent the results make sense or the method can be re-applied. This can be even more clear in the subjective cases that exceed the question of "what" do people do to focus on what is behind their practices or the process of producing these practices ("why" and "how" questions); since this setting is not neutral, very dynamic and prevent the researcher from being detached observer.

This type of methodology delays the definition of the used theory to be excavated from the early understanding of the case context (Gilham 2000).

As derived from the definition above, the evidence is the key point of concern in this methodology; and since the generalization is an extremely limited choice in such research, then, it looks at two main points to track the process of finding out the results:

(1) the connectivity of the chain of evidence

(2) the diversity of their resources.

In result, it leads to approaching the case using several sub-methods and resources of data collection.




Figure 4-1: The criteria of case study selection and its role in informing the research.

Applying to this research, the first step was to define the case of the research: the finite entity of a specific context, speciality (of being extreme, unique or of revealing the targeted investigations) and the boundaries between the entity and its context (Yin, 2006, 2009b, and 2011a). The socio-political movement of downtown Beirut 2015 represents a finite entity that exemplifies an outstanding scene of space-creator relationship, with a solid ground of historical repetitions of similar scenes. Allocating the methodology of investigating this movement [within its context] on the 2*2 matrix whose axes are of single/multiple cases and holistic/embedded units of analysis, allowed to select between the four types of case study analysis methods (Figure 4-2):

(1) a single case with a single holistic unit of analysis.

(2) a single case with multiple embedded units of analysis.

(3) multiple cases with a single holistic unit of analysis.

(4) multiple cases with multiple embedded units of analysis.

Generally, the allocation of the methodology on this matrix depends on the purpose of the study; and either it is interpretative that aims at a deeper understanding of the case, or evaluative that sets comparisons between different contexts. This research uses the case study to inform the theory with empirical data that highlight and explain the modification in the theoretical model of the experiential production of space, within public settings. It takes the shape of a single case with embedded units of analysis, which enables for deeper investigation of the case with more dynamics in comparing the units and supporting the results.




Figure 4-2: Basic types of design for case studies. Source: Yin, R. K. (2012). Applications of case study research (3rd ed.). Washington DC: SAGE Publications, Inc.

The socio-political movement of 2015 in Lebanon and its context of the public spaces in Beirut central district present an outstanding scene of the space-object relationship, with a strong role of occupying actions as a mediated element of this relationship. Recorded aerial footage of downtown Beirut during garbage protests 23.08.2015 shows the main three squares of the district (Riyadh Alsolh, Nijmeh and Martyrs) in a synchronous situation that reveals a dramatic difference in the functionality of the square according to its occupier. At the mentioned record, a vital Riyadh Alsolh of protestors was on a short distance from the evacuated Nijmeh square that was occupied by military and police, and an underestimated square at Martyrs that was used as a car park by Solidere. This scene was contextualised within a concrete ground of repetitive correlation of the

appearance and functionality of the district with the direct occupier/dominant (as discussed in the previous chapter).

Hereby, the selected case reveals its ability to convert the abstracted theoretical terminologies related to the space-object relationship into observable parameters.

Within the case, three embedded investigation units were selected to serve the chain of evidence:

1. The institutional continuous occupation of the squares' surroundings.
2. The daily occupation of individuals with routine functionalities.
3. The individuals' eventual occupation.

4.1.1 The entities of the case study: translating the theoretical elements of the production of space into observable elements.

The elements of the entities stand for the observable representations of the theoretical parameters of the experiential production of space as the public spaces of Beirut Central district have been shaped by both institutions and individuals as physical (Buildings, landmarks, urban features) and social (citizens, police, tourists, UN employees, NGOs) objects of the space through planned (routine) and eventual (socio-political movements) actions.




Figure 4-3: (a) the check list of the case study compatibility to the research requirements; and (b) the embedded entities of the case study.

Linking to the theoretical ground of the research methodology, where space's definition has developed into an active component of the socio-cultural phenomena (Lehtovuori, 2012), and a mutual relationship between shaping and being shaped is set between space and community (Dion 2012), urban events have had a key role in the process of public space creation. Individual activists and protest groups contribute to shaping the public space using the tools of feelings, new points of view, sudden changes of perception, new uses and new meanings of the space.

In the writings of scholars, referring to demonstration groups as 'crowd' implies an indistinct and often unpredictable mass, driven by contagious sensation (Park, 1972). In this research, the 'crowd' refers to the physical representation of the gathering of individuals brought together by their common concern, as well as their desire to have a collective image The elements of the entities stand for the observable representations of the theoretical parameters of the experiential production of space as the public spaces of Beirut Central district have been shaped by both institutions and individuals as physical (Buildings, landmarks, urban features) and social (citizens, police, tourists, UN employees, NGOs) objects of the space through planned (routine) and eventual (socio-political movements) actions.

Linking to the theoretical ground of the research methodology, where space's definition has developed into an active component of the socio-cultural phenomena (Lehtovuori, 2012), and a mutual relationship between shaping and being shaped is set between space and community (Dion 2012), urban events have had a key role in the process of public space creation. Individual activists and protest groups contribute to shaping the public space using the tools of feelings, new points of view, sudden changes of perception, new uses and new meanings of the space. in the square. This gathering applies to and represents, both 'the state' and 'non-state' crowds [and their space] as heterogeneous and mutually constitutive territories of competition (Houtzager, 2003; Skocpol &

Fiorina, 1999; Chandoke, 2003; Cornwall & Coelho, 2007, Habermas, 2001). The crowd in this research is the spatial realm of the group where the individuals can define and create space through their position and relations. This crowd practices through a homogenised repetition of individuals' contribution either to physical or other social objects of the space. This repetitive contribution creates the patterns of interaction which describe the development/displacement of the crowd.

The relationship between the individual, crowd, and practice is essential to study and analyse as:

1- The structure of individual's dispositions is non-observable by itself, but it shapes the spatial pattern of the crowd's territory through the repetition of the practices, where the relations within the crowd cannot be realised except in and through the system of placements of the individuals (Friedland, 2009).

2- The crowd's territory provides its individuals with the suitable placement in relation with the situation/context, through homogenising similar positions the dominant relation that motivates the creation of other relations (Elias, 1976) and defines their collective structure.

3- Visible actions shape, and are shaped by, their spheres of action (Friedland, 2009) and its invisible relations (Vandenberghe, 1999). They create through their spatial patterns and locational logics (Lehtovuori, 2016) which are continuously reproduced while continuously responding to various forces and struggles.

In conclusion, the understanding of any of the three variables should go through and be supported by the observation and analysis of the other two as the individual position is a product of the structures of the crowd, a producer of the practices and a reproducer of the structures (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970:244). Additionally, defining the active crowds along with the accurate placement of the selected events within the district, provided the research with the observable

elements of its narrative to be visually built. The selected socio-political movement defined the main elements of the eventual entity (the main body of the research evidence) and provided with the exact implementation of the theoretical terminology to serve the research objectives through the utilized case study, through mapping a collective action (demonstration) of a massive non-homogenised group of creators (the crowd of occupiers) in a significant space (square) of competition for dominance (production) within a set of time intervals.

Therefore, the case study the spatial production of Beirut Central District was approached through three entities:

1- The institutional routine occupation of the BCD
2- The individuals' routine occupation of the BCD
3- The individuals' eventual occupation of the BCD

Finally, the understanding of case entities and its context resulted in designing the methodology depending on the initial information that was taken from the case itself. This has enhanced the outcomes of the selected method and prevented the researcher from imposing preferences (minimise the bias). Also, as it was generated from the understanding of the social and political context, it avoided the majority of the predicted risk and maximised the benefit of people responses.

4.2 Research methods: Combining the protest event and user experience methods

As this research defined physical and social dimensions of the space-object-action relationship, multiple methods were used to establish a systematic narrative that is correlated to the spatiotemporal identity of the practices, along with the citizens' perception of the space and events.

Thus, the research was designed to rely, mainly, on a protest event method – which enables to track the spatial events with a reliable sensitivity to the time factor. In parallel, combining it to the user experience method has enriched the methodology with more occupiers-related views. The two methods together proceeded to achieve the research outcomes and to remain aligned to the theoretical base and all its elements: space, object and action. However, this added value had to be discussed concerning the researcher's sensitivity in avoiding the misconception of the borders between the user memory and opinion. This point is essential to serve in the objectivity of the method and the reliability of its outcomes.

4.2.1 Protest Event Method (PEM)

On the most technical of the research methodology, the Protest Event Method (PEM) examines the patterns of protesters' modes of engagement in the squares within selected outstanding intervals of a continuous series of major events. The selected method has become a key method of social movement research over the past decades (Hutter, 2014, 2019) as it provides "a solid ground in an area that is still often marked by more or less informed speculation" (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002, p. 252). The PEM is used to "systematically assess the amount and features of protests across various geographical areas (from the local level up to the supranational level) and over time (from short periods of time up to several decades)" (Hutter, 2014, p.1).

Applying to the case of the protest movement in Beirut 2015, the PEM was used to analyse the crowd-related factors (population, movement, context …etc) within the space (Riyadh Alsolh, Martyrs' and Nijmeh squares) during defined time intervals. The analysed intervals were defined using a reference point of a major physical change that was applied to space, that dramatically changed its appearance, functionality, and connectivity. The length of each interval was expanded

due to the criteria of being a continuous event of a few days that included a well-distinguished engagement of the occupiers and space; and between the different groups of occupiers themselves. These factors defined the Key spatial events along with a linear review of an entire class of events during the defined timeline. This review was built using the archives of the most independent resource that covered all the days of the event's timeline; and provided the research with reliable information about the protest events in the study zone – temporal distribution, spatial distribution and occupiers' engagement. Then selected interval [will be described using the word 'event' in all following sections/chapters] was defined as a political protest event with the character of an action, connected with societal and/or political demands, have a public character, initiated by collective effort and motivation, and determined by taking place in the squares or their surroundings, within the defined timeline.

Through this method, a general review of literature that is related to the socio-political movement that took place in Beirut, the socio-political movements of Lebanon 2005 and 2015 were selected as they represent the variables of the research question. They represent a significant case to discuss different types of protests that took place during the uprising, all of which yielded different levels of success and impact; and reveal the differences that were brought to the crowd's relationship to space among 10 years of developing direct and mediated experience of spatial perspective. On the other side, both entities provide the targeted events with a reference ground of the ongoing scene of the occupiers of the district and their impact on its appearance, functionality and connectivity. The significance of the 2005 and 2015 protests raised out of a collective initiating effort of the mass population of protesters. Both of them included spatial practices of different groups of occupiers which have directly affected the hosting spaces. However, the availability of visual materials and avoiding the events that were influenced by organised groups that belong to political

parties, resulted in giving the 2015 protest a heavier weight of focus – as it applies to the research criteria of events' selection. The Cedar Revolution of 2005 was minorized to act as a reflection case that will be used along with the routine uses of the district to point out the changes that appear in the events of 2015.

To create the first layer of the dataset of 2015 entities, archived primetime news records were reviewed along a timeline from July to October 2015. For the full dataset, five TV channels were selected to represent three independent channels which are not directly connected to a political party (MTV, New TV and LBCI channels) and two other channels (Future TV and OTV channels) which represent the 14th and 8th political poles of Lebanon. The schematic review of the records that created the initial layer of our dataset relied on two out of the three independent channels. The selection of these two channels was due to their considerable accessible archive of videos that cover all the eventual days during the targeted timeline. Additionally, at this very first phase, the politically managed channels had to be avoided to minimise the bias of describing the events. At this layer, our dataset targeted creating a linear schematic description of the spatial distribution of all protest events that took place in Beirut per day between 28.07 – 30.09.2015[5].

[5] October was eliminated due to the low momentum of protest events.

Code	Resource
Ch1	NEW
Ch2	MTV
Ch3	LBCi
Ch4	Future
Ch5	OTV
NsP1	Annahar
NsP2	Assafir

Figure 4-4: Channels and newspapers code

This layer used the cumulative count of the protest events that took place at each mentioned space in the reviewed records and targeted to establish for the following detailed loop of creating the datasets of the selected events [previously defined]. Thus, it specified the theoretical parameters of the research model to the selected case/entity: (1) the spaces of protest within the district: the main three squares of the district (Martyrs, Riyadh Alsolh and Nijmeh squares) in addition to all voids that is surrounded by Riyadh Alsolh, Waygand, Alshouhada, Damascus and El Amir Bashir streets); (2) the protest events with the maximum impact on the properties of space: 22-24.08.2015 and 20-22.09.2015. and (3) the direct actors of the targeted events and their main categories: protestors and state's groups. The first two parameters were the easiest to define; however, defining the research community required the majority of attention to classify each group of occupiers concerning:

a. Theoretical identifications: these identifications referred the protestors to the creation of their community, whether it was (1) a context-based community [You Stink] a community that have been initiated with a preceding setting of the accumulated garbage issue; or (2) a target-based community [We Want Accountability] a community that was initiated based

on a common ideology that targets an alteration of the corrupted sectarian regime. On the state's side, it applies to the sectarian context of each security institution.

b. Practical identifications: that referred to the role of the activist which raises some pioneers of leading roles (key activist) and supportive larger groups. On the state's side, it applies to the role of each subgroup [army, police, parliament security, civil defence …etc.], its location, directions and expansions of covered area.

This phase provided the research with a concrete base to build up a systematic narrative that initiates its scope, parameters and tools from the case itself. As mentioned previously, it helped to avoid imposing preferences of techniques and minimizes researcher bias. For example, the spatial range to be included, the types of the archival material to be reviewed, and the sampling method (Stratified Random Sampling) that ensure including the key subpopulations of the research community.

4.2.2 User Experience method (UEM)

On a parallel side, the User Experience Method (UEM) aims at adding more human contribution to the built narrative. This relates to the importance of the occupiers as the main element of the research model [social objects] and their major impact on the shaping of the space through their actions. As they belong to different subgroups of the research community, the targeted sample was approached using different tools:

1. Interviews[6]:

This part aimed at supporting the secondary data with the narratives of the protestors themselves. In a linear sequence, semi-structured interviews were conducted with individuals who were significantly active during the research timeline. The interviewees were selected based on the reviewed literature and records, and the possibility to approach them. The sample is a stratified random of pure protesting activists and protesting activists with the professional viewpoints of the movement. The questions were categorised into three main sections: (a) the protesters' motivation and determinants of major moving in the squares; (b) the used tools/techniques to remark the space and show their dominance (immediate ownership); and (c) their perception, memory and identifications of the spaces of the district and its impact on their movement. However, the interviews challenged the formation of the questions and the flow of interview to engage the users' memory rather than opinion on four phases:

1. Introduction: which introduces the research scope to the interviewee and his/her expected contribution to it. At this phase, the interviewees were asked to confirm their consent to contribute to the research, record their interviews, use the mentioned information and reveal/hide their identities.
2. Warm-up: This phase starts with engaging the interviewee's memory of the targeted events by raising questions about the context that led people to go back to occupying the streets in 2015.

[6] This tool was modified several times due to 1. Alterations in the research scope and 2. Conducting part of the interviews during a similar protest movement in 2019.

3. General issues: this phase contextualized the 2015 movement within the political demonstration in Lebanon – referring to the spaces of protest, the state's domination on the public spaces, and the connections between citizens, spaces and democratic activities.
4. Attentive issues: this part on linking to the interviewee's relationship to the spaces of protest, their spatial elements, labelling and controllability of the physical space during the demonstrations.
5. Retrospectives: asks the interviewees to link the impact of the protest movement on the spaces of protest and on their satisfaction of reconnecting to these spaces.
6. Wrap up: a closing question that allow the interviewee to add any final comment on the discussion.

Finally, the obtained data from each interview is verified considering the background of the interviewee, the content of other interviews and the rest of obtained data from different resources. This step was important to ensure that there are no biases and to gather a consistent narrative and testimony.




Figure 4-5: Interview structure

The interviews were conducted either in person or through video calls [14 interviews: 1 in London, 6 in Beirut and 7 online]. All interviews were coded to symbolize that the obtained data are generated during an interview, the year and the serial number of the interviewer. For example, **INT1701** stands for the first interviewer who was interviewed in 2017. Referring the code to the interviewer was used to fit the fact that all data obtained from the same person were coded using the same serial number, regardless of the number of interviews. Additionally, the importance of referring to the year appeared in late 2019 when few (but important) interviews were conducted in parallel with protest movement started in October of the same year. For these specific interviews, some confusion in information between similar cases in 2015 and 2019 were spotted. Also, the

interviewees seemed to be in a very tight comfort zone in comparison to previous interviews and they showed higher sensitivity to the area of discussion. This uncomfortable situation was presented in either missing information or manipulating their memory with opinion [at a higher rate compared to the previous interviews]. During the protest movement in 2019, a careful daily live following of the protest practices and events resulted in reporting the main events and features of the movement, comparing them to the studied movement of 2015 and, thus, setting an awareness of the points to confusion [distinguishing them out and filtering the misleading information]. This was a real time addition to the research method that was initiated by the emerged settings and targeted at retaining the quality of generated data out of these interviews.

Generally speaking, most interviewees were approached via personal connections as they all participated themselves in the protests either as key activists – who were mentioned repeatedly in the reviewed reports and records, or activists with an additional professional perspective in the political movements/spaces of Beirut [researchers, journalists, lawyers]. The sample included a variety of age, gender, political background, sectarian/religious background and belonging community within the protestors crowd [You Stink, We Want Accountability, None]. On the other side, the research failed to approach the state's side. That was because of the complexity of the regime and the sensitivity of conducting politically charged research; however, the state's voice was the strong one to appear physically in the following phase of building up the narrative, as their presence was better established and defined.

For all interviews, some questions raised as the content of the interviewee flow of information alerted some specific points. Additionally, some terminology was used during the interviews to meet the widespread (common) uses. However, they were different from the terminology of the research. For example, the definition of 'real' space: In this research, it is a settled awareness that

the definition of reality is relative, dynamic and it expands to include other types of spaces rather than the physical. On the other side, the common terminology which was used in the interviews takes it more into the physical direction – the traditional definition of space. This was due to the diverse backgrounds of the sample, which is non-specialists in most cases. Additional awareness was established to the differences of the outcomes of the professional interviewees who were more detailed and focused in terms of following the timeline of the movement, while the activists were more connected to actions in their responses.

Involving the interviewees in this research required prioritising some ethical issues. Required approvals were obtained before staring the data collection. During the interviews, it was a must to ensure addressing the causes, motivations and determinants of the selected case study, rather than create the potential for conflict. We respected the anonymity of the participants and ensures that each of them provided with written or recorded consents. The participants' preserved their right to withdraw at any time before or during the interview, as well as asking for not using the data at any time after the interview. The topics of discussion were carefully selected to avoid emotional distress in order to obtain reliable data and protect the participants against any negative consequences; furthermore, we insisted at the beginning of each interview that the collected data will used for academic purposes only.

2. Focus groups:

A discussion of a respondent moderator focus group was recorded on Monday 06/11, 18:30. The group of 15 participants of the Abu Rakhousah flea market preparation consisted of 12 organisers and 3 sellers. The participant who led the discussion increased the dynamic and flow of the discussion within very natural settings for the rest of the group, as he is a permanent member of the group and the one who usually leads their meetings. The discussion was of preparation-related

issues: (1) challenges of weather, infrastructure and related financial issues, the density of activity on space and political updates, (2) The assessment of three alternatives of spaces to place the market (within and around Martyrs' square), (3) the uses of visual and vocal elements to define and emphasise spaces within the market and (4) the users' engagement as a component of the market's existence and activities.

At the end of the discussion, I added a couple of questions about three specific points:

1- The vision towards the sellers' involvement in preparing and organizing the event.
2- The vision towards the enhancement of participants' involvement in the activities of the market.
3- The desired impact of increasing the involvement of the sellers and participants in preparing for and organising the market on its sustainability.

The outcomes from this focus group contributed into the understanding of the second protest event that we analysed later (see chapter 6). The discussion revealed the thoughts and believes of the organisers', which result in their decisions and the applied spatial practices. It also supported the individual interviews that were conducted with some organisers of the flea market.

3. Mapping workshops:

Two manual mapping workshops were conducted[7] in the Lebanese University and Beirut Arab University, entitled Politics and spaces of protest in Lebanon and the middle east and Mapping urban unrest in Beirut public squares. The workshops aimed at contributing to detailing the layer of activists' memories in connection to the space-action relationship. Visual material was used to

---

[7] In collaboration with revolt in square project and their partners in Beirut

engage the participants to recapture and share their memories. The video was carefully designed to highlight several scenes of the calmest and most dangerous moments of the targeted events, as well as the physical changes that were imposed on the spaces. The divided groups of 4-6 persons each succeeded to encourage the participants to be involved and added a bit more details to the previously created understanding of the whole settings of the milieu of the movement; however, the time factor appears to have less focus (as all other phases of the UEM).

The participants recalled their memories about the protest they involved in [in Beirut downtown] and sketched them on the previously printed maps. Using different symbols, the participants allocated their axes of movement, their safe zones, the hot zones and police barriers. The discussions were recorded and reviewed after the workshop to pay attention to any comment we missed during the exercise. In parallel, some side casual discussions were conducted, along with the collective main discussions, with a direct recording of the main featured notes immediately after the end of the conversation.

The activists' discussions supported the set research community divisions of this methodology. Clear differences of the core ideas that were raised by the initial context-based community of You Stink and the more developed and politically oriented community of We Want Accountability (Bedna Nhaseb). This fed into the design of the interviews sample to ensure including both subgroups. Also, targeted buildings and spaces were classified due to the protestors' category (14^{th}, 8^{th}, You Stink, Palestinians, parties-oriented …etc.). Some participants stated direct links with shaping the practices and thus the space layout. This point stands as an interesting point of investigation to support the discussion of the previous examples which the practices of the 2015 movement will be compared with.



Figure 4-6: Shots from the mapping workshop

4. On site Walking Tours:

This tool had two shapes of conducting. First, the group walking tour of the mapping workshop participants from BAU. Due to the large size of the group, careful listening to the different discussions was paid and quick notes were written down immediately and briefly. The importance of this came from being within the context we were discussing. The participants ability to initiate the discussion was much higher than any other used approach. Along with information, they were engaging their memories and emotions about the place and the buildings. Additionally, paying attention to the behavioural representation of the participants' relationship with the place added several notes that were very useful to support the spoken narratives. I used a recorder to, immediately, record my own voice notes about the traced behaviours.

Although this discussion was not manageable, it provided several points of discussions to be conducted later in similar settings of on-site discussion, but for a longer time with one or two persons per visit. This allowed a proper management of the conversation and the focus on a specific question to collect the maximum possible responses that form an analysable/comparable material.

Apart from the main first visit, 4 visits were arranged with 5 people; where the discussion focused on visual, functional and memorable consistency of the different zones of the district [the Souk, Nijmeh Square, Bank street – Riyadh Alsolh street and the Ottoman palace].




Figure 4-7: Urban observation of the main streets, building and urban features from the study area

4.3 Building up the narrative: reconstruction the scattered archive

Through converting the huge archive of scattered resources into concrete verbal and visual narratives, this methodology provides this research [and other researchers] with a reliable document to build different opportunities of analysis.

It was mentioned that several features of the analysed phenomenon (the spatial demonstration practices) allow applying the case study methodology. This included their uniqueness in terms of time-place definition, as they are very relevant to their context and not able to be manipulated. This resulted in a wide variety of the contextual properties of analysing the spatial practices – interlocked economic, social, religious, regional and urban factors which affect the political practices. Thus, any defined unit of the case entities (an individual, group, institution or community), along with their existence in the defined time and place, cannot be separated from their influential context. Therefore, sophisticated interlocked layers of data flowed through the traced reports, articles, videos, photos …etc.

First of all, it was essential to define a well-structured flow of the methodology that connects the various resources to the methods and outcomes (see figure 4-8). This flow helped in focusing the scope of exploration for each resource based on how the obtained data was intended to be used. The contribution to the creating the outcomes of the case study divided the resources in three overlapped categories – resources to provide data to: outline the protest events (people memory), add detailed layers of information (articles, newspapers, news reports, posts on social media and available photos and videos) and reflect on other urban scenes from the same district (newspapers, articles, people memory and routine flow traffic). The second level of structuring the data was the approach to be used to obtain them. The routine flow of traffic was directly observed in site, the memory of the people was approached through interviews, focus groups and mapping workshops,

while all other resources were considered as archived data. The last level was to categories the resources due to the expected narrative to be built. At this level: photos contributed to the building of the visual narrative; newspapers, articles and the memory of people contributed mainly to the verbal narrative; while the videos, social media posts and news reports engaged in both narratives.

To tie up the aligned visual and verbal resources of a defined space-actor-event correlation at specific time-lapse, it was essential to keep control upon the data flow to remain within the research scope. Data were transcribed from each resource in written notes, manual and digital sketches. Then all relevant data were categorised based on the type of practices and date they describe. The folders and subfolders were sorted as the following:

- Routine uses
  - Martyrs square
    - 05:30 – 06:30
    - 12:00 – 13:00
    - 13:00 – 14:00
  - Riyadh Alsolh
    - 05:30 – 06:30
    - 12:00 – 13:00
    - 13:00 – 14:00
  - Nijmeh square
    - November 1, 2017
    - November 7, 2017
    - November 8, 2017
  - Other observations

- Protest event
  - August 22 – 24
    - 22
    - 23
    - 24
  - September 19 – 21
    - 19
    - 20
    - 21

In each subfolder from the last level, the data were categorised in folders named with the exact resource from where they were obtained [e.g. the interviewee name, TV channel, article, video …etc.]. At this phase, the diversity of the used resources has enriched the narrative and enhanced its coherence; however, the use of verbal narratives restricts the possibility of applying quantitative analysis, even on the numerical dataset.

The final phase was to systematically include all these data in a united visual document thar eases reading and analysing them. GIS mapping was selected to utilise this phase. The next section will explain why and how GIS helped in the creation of the integrated visual narrative of the spatial allocation, population and densities of the occupiers' crowd of the defined protest events.




Figure 4-8: Building up the narrative – reconstruction the scattered archive

4.4 GIS mapping: visualizing a numerical time-series dataset of the spatial allocation, population and densities of the occupiers' crowd of the defined protest events

By developing an equation that converts the initial annotation of crowd's location and density and applying it on an equally divided time-lapse, the created visual document provides the researcher with several layers of data that are correlated to a specific spatiotemporal situation; therefore, wider opportunities of analysis purposes. However, the limitations of time and ability that applied to PhD research in comparison with other research projects (implemented by research teams) have resulted in neglecting irrelevant parts of the created narrative during the phase of visualizing. This has not affected the targeted evidence that the method aims at developing, but it indicated the opportunities to add more layers or even link to existing GIS layers to enrich the visualized scene of the district and its analysis opportunities.

Along with AutoCAD and Google Earth features, the Geographic Information Systems (GIS) stands for the main tool for mapping the spatial allocation, population and densities of the occupiers' crowd. GIS is the technology for capturing, managing, manipulating, and visualizing geographic information, whose ability to define a collection of facts linking some property (attribute) to a location at a certain point in time (Goodchild, 2010) and to understand the phenomena within realistic settings (Jacquez, 2003). It fits perfectly with the requirements of the spatiotemporal mapping of the crowd's movement. It facilitates the geospatial technology, which incorporates *"any technological application that utilizes spatial location in visualizing, measuring, storing, retrieving, mapping and analysing features or that occurs on, below or above the earth"* (Berry 2009, p.12). Maguire's statement (2008, p.3) *"Without GIS, it would not be possible to collect large volumes of information about observable events and build and test theories about geographic patterns and processes"* exactly stated the core contribution of the GIS

as the tool of tying up all verbal, visual and numerical narratives into a legible, analysable and publishable document.

In order to reconstruct the spatiotemporal data of the unrest historical event using GIS, a systematic process was followed to build on the developed GIS Base Maps. Various maps were needed in vector formats such as the Beirut district property map, the building footprints maps, and the road network map in GIS format. These maps, obtained from the GIS centre at the University of Balamand in Lebanon[8], dated back to the year 2010; thus, they needed to be updated to account for the changes that took place until the year 2015 when the revolts took place. Satellite images taken in 2015 with Accuracy 50 cm were used in order to update the base maps and provide a precise and realistic representation of the area under study at that particular point of time. The project used a Mercator based map projection combined with the WGS84 Geographic Coordinate System (GCS). This projection is selected since the data will be published to ArcGIS Online that uses the WGS 1984 Web Mercator (Auxiliary Sphere) which is a coordinate system as a default projection since it is a global platform. Given the fact that the majority of available base maps of Lebanon are stored using a double stereographic projection with Clarke 1880 spheroid-based datum. This projection is very specific to Lebanon. Hence, all the base maps should be re-projection to Web Mercator using a specific transformation before being published to ArcGIS Online. Additionally, the new datasets were automatically set up as Web Mercator services. Even though, ArcGIS Desktop and ArcGIS online re-project on the fly, this method puts a load on the system especially with large volumes of data. Finally, unifying the Spatial extent setting of the

---

[8] In collaboration with Revolt in Square project

spatiotemporal layers got the base map ready to fit the requirements of, spatially, mapping the population density in a temporal manner.




Figure 4-9: GIS base map – BCD




Figure 4-10: The spatial extent of the spatiotemporal layers

For the next layer, a reference grid is created with the pre-defined spatial extent with a cell size of 10 by 10 meters (Figure 4-11). The map resulted in being divided into 1973 polygons of various areas up to 100 m2 – drawn using AutoCAD 2018 and exported to ArcGIS 10.4.1 with all its annotation: point, polyline, polygon and multipatch files extensions. Spatially, each cell is given a unique ID (Table 4-1: The parameters of the GIS Cells FID {0 – 20}: ORIG_FID, OBJECTID, Id, Area, Perimeter, Code, FID to be used as a reference for its geographic location; and for each 10

minutes time span on all days of the defined eventual intervals, a new grid is created to host the actual number of population present within each cell during that time span. The cell ID and area (up to 100m2) are preserved in all generated grids.




Figure 4-11: the polygons of all voids in the study zone – each up to 100 m

Table 4-1: The parameters of the GIS Cells FID {0 – 20}: ORIG_FID, OBJECTID, Id, Area, Perimeter, Code, FID

ORIG_FID	OBJECTID	Id	Area	Perimeter	code
0	1	0	22.67213528	24.94623033	1
1	2	0	75.70958783	35.03608911	2
2	3	0	57.23590084	36.33321339	3
3	4	0	74.97	35.42595344	4
4	5	0	84.73598137	47.05914835	5
5	6	0	54.2094837	30.51242632	6
6	7	0	46.8965	30.30413779	7
7	8	0	90.24363976	37.76222949	8
8	9	0	1.65282123	7.177944554	9
9	10	0	10.83409772	19.98651892	10
10	11	0	40.226	28.47715344	11
11	12	0	69.934	34.41875344	12
12	13	0	94.36240294	37.8303344	13
13	14	0	98.33840199	39.74467319	14
14	15	0	1.27554534	6.832441895	15
15	16	0	49.6255	30.24226929	16
16	17	0	75.04885776	37.33183367	17
17	18	0	51.612934	30.56731297	18
18	19	0	69.45	34.04813237	19
19	20	0	81.03167457	36.25489102	20
20	21	0	75.01562609	38.26957391	21

In parallel, the spatial dataset was prepared in the form of a numerical narrative. 512 archived videos were collected from accessed resources and were categorised to shape up the temporal distribution of the archived narratives. First, the videos were categorised per eventual interval (each of three days), then, various time spots were identified as reference points: (1) the reported time of starting the event, (2) sunset time to refer to the light change in the videos' background, (3) news time of TV channels as they included a live recording of the events and finally (4) the reported time of the end of the event. In parallel, the videos were categorised into two groups based on their recourse. Group A, which are those videos taken from primetime news of the previously defined five TV channels. The videos of this group are limited in number but include most of the milestones of the day along with living reports of the peak time of the event (17:30-19:00 GMT). Videos from group B are shorter, may not include spoken narratives and taken from various resources.

Projecting from the visual database, crowd's situations per time-lapse were categorised into: **(D)** defined situations, where a unique situation is clearly described, **(S)** stable situation, where no significant change is recorded and **(T)** transitional situations, where the mediating movement between situations is recorded. Unrecorded time lags were defined using verbal narratives projection on distance, in relation to other recorded movements that took place in the same area. Each situation was described by its borders, zones of densities and practice (change location/movement direction). Borders and densities were allocated on the maps using the physical objects of the space as spatial references (e.g. building facades, road intersections, traffic signs …etc.).



Figure 4-12: Example of the temporal distribution of generated data from group A (black) and group B (grey) videos – 23.08.2015, 14:00 – 22:00 GMT




Figure 4-13: Example of the distribution of the spatial statement – Defined (black), transitional (grey) and Stable (blank), of each time-lapse – 23.08.2015, 14:00 – 22:00 GMT

At each situation, the visual records and their verbal content were used to:

1. Define the practice (change location/movement direction)
2. Define the time of the practice
    a. Live reported practices: by matching the described practices by the reporter with the time appears on the report screen.
    b. Recorded practices of primetime news: by matching the minute appear on the video track to the scheduled time of the primetime news at the related channel.
    c. Other videos: by matching to the practices mentioned in the main documented videos.
3. Allocate the crowd on the coordinated grid of the satellite map of Google earth, using several reference points (e.g. building facades, road intersections, traffic signs …etc.).
4. Estimate the percentage of occupation per polygon at a time into one of the pre-defined categories.

The population of each polygon (at the time) was calculated using the equation:

$$Population = (200 * percentage) * Area/100$$

Where: 200 is the standard capacity of 100 m^2, the percentage is either 10, 20, 40, 60, 80 or 100% of the polygon occupation and the “Area” is a numeric field in the file attributes – included in the exported data from the .dwg file.

Applying this equation, to all cells of the previously created grid, resulted in dot density spatial datasets of the change in crowd’s distribution per 10 minutes from 14:00 – 22:00 GMT, on each day.




Figure 4-14: Example of the distribution of crowd population per polygon – selected polygons attribute table

Finally, each grid is converted into a point of a spatial dataset. The points in the datasets represent the centre location of each grid cell. This step generated spatial datasets with attribute tables having the following information: Cell ID, Date and Time, and Population. Then, in order to map the crowd movement on a daily basis, all the point spatial datasets for a given day are appended. The generated spatial dataset for each day contains different information for the same location at different times. An important step is to enable the time field in the spatial datasets and specify the date/time format (YYY/MM/DD hh:mm:ss) in order to create a time series spatial dataset. Five-time series spatial datasets are generated in this step as the sixth day was found to have no recorded protest practices; however, it had to remain included within the analysed intervals due to a major physical change was applied to the protest area by the state.




Figure 4-15: (a) dot density point ArcGIS map and (b) crowd's layout (date-time)

In this methodology, human eye perspective visual records were used to allocate the distribution of the crowd's densities. This addition enhanced the used resources and expanded the opportunities to apply this methodology on similar urban events with limited aerial footage. However, careful

utilization of the fixed architectural and urban elements is required to minimize the impact of visual illusions that are linked to human eye perspectives. By dividing the crowd into small groups, using the created grid, referring their information to multiple fixed physical elements (traffic signs, building facades, the width of road intersections …etc.) and applying the same criteria to multiple visual records [where available], the numerical impact of the human eye perspective illusions was minimised. Additionally, the contribution of the verbal narratives, that are attached to the visual ones, helped to triangulate the generated data of each time-lapse and facilitate the equation with reliable data of both: the spatial expansion of the crowd and the density distribution.

4.5 Analysis parameters

Following the creation of the integrated visual narrative of the spatial allocation, population and densities of the occupiers' crowd of the defined protest events, a list of parameters was set to describe and categorise the different situations of the different time-lapse. This included: the defined situation of the time-lapse, the organising principle of the crowd's layout, population, median density, the dynamics of the crowd, the nature of the entity dominating the square, barriers' influence, spatial alignment of protestors and state's territories, and violent actions. Each was coded as shown in the following table:

Table 4-2: analysis parameters coding

Parameter	Description	Code
Crowd's layout	Clustered	Ccr
	Radial	Rcr
	Linear	Lcr
	Divided Radial	DRcr
Population	100-2600	LP
	2600-5200	MP
	5200-8000	HP
Median density per 100 sqm	1-65	LD
	65-135	MD
	135-200	HD
The dynamics of the crowd	Expansion	E
	Fluctuated Size	FSz
	Fluctuated position	FP
	Static	S
Who dominate the square	State	Ste
	Protestors	Prs
Barriers influence	Attraction	Att
	Evacuation	Evt
Spatial alignment of protestors and state's territories	Small bufferzone	SBfz
	Medium bufferzone	MBfz
	Large bufferzone	LBfz
Violence actions	None	N-VA
	Water gun	L-VA
	Tears gas	M-VA
	Fire Shoot	H-VA

Then, the independent analysis parameters were defined to include: (a) The crowd's population, spatial alignment and dynamics; (b) The dominance of the attached square; and (c) the Impact of the physical barriers on the crowd's spatial attitude. On the other side, engaging the sense of having the dominated territory threatened by the protestors' crowd, represented by the violent actions, was defined as the dependent parameter. The violence scale was coded due to three well-distinguished tools of expanding the state's territory [during the protest event]: the use of water guns, tear gas and rubber/live bullet shootings. The violence scale was attached to the coding table and the final correlation was set to link the violence scale to the organising principle of the crowd's layout.

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter we went through the factors that affected the selection and the design of the used methodology. The selection of the case study methodology was found to be efficient in translating the theoretical conceptions into observable elements and studying the explored entities within their context. To ensure a reliable understanding of the case study, the range of resources and approaching methods were designed to be as varied as possible. However, this scattered data base challenged the methodology to reconstruct them into a coherent, legible and analysable document. Therefore, designing a clear structure of the contribution of each resource/method and the selection of the mapping tool [GIS] were essential factors in achieving the targeted outcome.

In the following two chapters, the results of this methodology will be presented and analysed. First, we will start with defining the spatial conditions of the case study using the routine uses of the district; before we move into the protest events that represent the urban unrest condition of the same squares.

Chapter 5
THE ROUTINE URBAN SCENE OF BEIRUT DOWNTOWN: DEFINING THE SPATIAL CONDITION OF THE CASE STUDY

Understanding the routine functionality of the BCD establishes a referencing layer, with regard to which the eventual scenes of the district public spaces can be reflected on. This chapter introduces the spatial context of the three main squares of Beirut Central District: Riyadh Alsolh, Nijmeh and Martyrs squares, and their surroundings. It analyses two of the three theoretical entities of the case study, which are connected to the routine planned functionality in the central district of Beirut. It utilises multi-layered analysis of the contribution of both physical and social objects of the district to its planned routine functionality.

5.1 Introduction

The institutional contestation of occupying the central district of Beirut is an ongoing visual story of the political, economic, cultural and religious dynamics of the city. Successive authorities have shaped different urban scenes of the district to show their dominance on the city (see Figure 5-4).

Since prince Fakhr el-Dein II built his palace, the competition on the district's occupancy never stopped with the Ottomans, Russians, Egyptians, French and, finally, the independent Lebanese. A new phase of innovative commercial, cultural and religious regional role of the city was launched in early 1930s. Beirut remains a city of modernity and tolerance with a livelier centre that attracts people from whole Lebanon and neighbouring countries until the civil war (1975-1990) converts the city and its centre into a stage for the warring militias. The civil war was a cut phase of the history of the development of Beirut; however, it directly contributed to the shaping of the physical and emotional renovations of the image of the city.

When post-civil war reconstruction began, a new form of power, the mega economic power of the Solidere project, stood as a key player in forming and reshaping the district. There was the process of opening closed roads as a first indication or stage of reintroducing public spaces (streets and squares in this case). Some pre-war monuments were restored with the subtraction of the square itself, such as the clock tower in the Etoile or the Martyrs Square statue. Additionally, statues of national figures were brought into the region, along with the renaming of some streets with the names of Lebanese figures rather than the previous names of French colonizers. It took longer to re-insert other public spaces, such as parks and squares, together with a high degree of direct control mechanisms: short opening hours and limited permitted events, security patrols and CCTVs, or complete public closure (Nijmeh Square).

The current scene of the Beirut Central District (Figure 5-1), the geographical area encompassing the main scenes of protest (Riyadh Alsolh, Martyrs' Square, and inaccessible Nijmeh Square), is a mix of residential, commercial, administrative, cultural and religious uses with very limited green areas and two archaeological sites within the district which has no pedestrian streets. The very controlled district shows a shared dominance of the state – secured governmental buildings, UN buildings and embassies, military units – through tier fixed barriers and Solidere development project – through its spread re-built areas of luxurious consuming functions.

As such, the general environment of Beirut looks very crowded with cars, garbage and pollution, which converts the public spaces into "escapes" only afforded by the rich. On the other side, these escapes are also restricted with security and road blocking by state institutions.

This chapter analyses the elements that shape the urban scene of the BCD during the phases of routine uses. The routine uses of the BCD is a repetitive pattern that facilitates governmental, diplomatic, commercial, entertainment and religious uses, with a dense flow of traffic and high security measures. This scene records various rates during the day/week; and shapes the district except during eventual days [festivals, protest …etc]. Multi-layered factors will explain the role of the sectarian regime and their capital ally. The influence of the critical security condition of the country will appear clearly. Also, the civil war will be discussed as a defining point of three main phases of the history of the district [pre, during and post-civil war] that contributed to shaping the emotional engagement of the Beiruti people, their place-related memories and language. The flow of the analysis will be aligned to the contribution of the spatial objects [either physical or social] and will result in establishing a verbal and visual understanding of the first two entities of the case study, the institutional and individuals' routine occupation of the district (Figure 5-3).

Spatially, the analysis will highlight three main parts of the district: the spatial statement of the three squares, the ring that links Riyadh Alsolh down to Martyrs square and Beirut Municipality, then to Beirut Souks (marketplace) through Wagand street and back to Riyadh Alsolh through Banks street, and finally, the seven entrances from this ring to Nijmeh square.




Figure 5-1: Beirut Central District – Riyadh Alsolh, Nijmeh and Martyrs squares, with surroundings and connections

5.2 Approaching the analysed entities

The data, which contributed to the building of the urban scene of the district during the phases of routine uses, was as diverse as the active elements of shaping the district.

The majority of the visual evidence was built during observing the study area [defined in the previous page]. Through working on three main intervals, one hour each, a time-space movement patterns were constructed to describe the movement toward through and out of the district. Fixed rate of a photo per 15 seconds produced a series of 1440 photos that recorded the patterns, directions and densities in Martyrs and Riyadh Alsolh squares for once on the same weekday (with 7 days interval between the two observations) from the top roof of le Grey Hotel and Arab Bank Buildings respectively [240 photos per hour per space]. On the other side, the militarised restrictions in Nijmeh square forced towards applying a silent observation to fill a table of the number of the users of the square and quickly sketch to allocate the main patterns of movement within the square. Also, the mentioned restrictions shortened the observation time to only 1 hour (15:30 – 16:30) which represent the transitional time between during and after work movement patterns. The observation was triangulated on three mid-weekdays (Wednesday 01/11/17, Thursday 07/11/17 and Wednesday 08/11/17). As in the other two spaces, the patterns, directions and densities were targeted.

Maps and photos from different resources, as well as taking photos at different places/time, have expanded the visual evidence to maximise the covered area.

In parallel, verbal narratives of the Beiruti people were believed to be the best interpreter of the visual document. Literature, interviews, casual talks, and a few short walks within the city centre in October-November 2017, accompanied by some Beiruti people of different ages supported to complete the scene. The in-site discussions added another layer of the collected data. Along with

the people's narrative of their city centre and the language they use to describe the different places within the area, paying attention to their spatial behaviour indicated unspoken various levels of emotional engagement with the buildings and spaces.



Figure 5-2: Aerial photo of Beirut Central District




Figure 5-3: The embedded entities of the case study – (a) the institutional routine occupation of the BCD, and (b) the individuals' routine occupation of the BCD




Figure 5-4: a visual travel along the historical timeline of Beirut Central District – the leading dynamics[9]

[9] The old photos that are included in this figure are acknowledged to the Beirut Heritage association.

5.3 The contribution of the physical objects in setting the spatial conditions of the Public Square

The first entity to be analysed in this section describes the contribution of the physical objects and their routine function to the shaping of the district – its appearance, uses and accessibility. Upon multi-layered visual and verbal narrative, this section will focus on:

(1) The functionality of the district

This includes the role of the buildings in creating the uses of the district, defining the targeted slice of community that is invited to involve in these uses and display the quotas of space's domination among the different players of the Lebanese dynamics.

(2) The conceived image of the district

This includes the role of the architectural and urban features in building, connecting and disconnecting the image of the district from the collective memory of the Beiruti people. The main elements to be discussed here are the statues of Riyadh Alsolh and Martyrs as well as the clock tower in Nijmeh square and their role in identifying the political and functional value of the squares for both state and citizens; as well as, the conservation and construction work and their contribution to shaping the current condition of the district.

(3) The accessibility of the district

This includes the temporary urban elements, which are most related to the militarised representation of the state's dominance of the district. Most of these elements exist permanently and were captured or sketched, where possible, through the observation that took place. For the more sensitive areas, the available captures and resources were used to define and place these features.

5.3.1 The functionality of the district

Looking at the Solidere masterplan, a general understanding of the district can be set. First, we can define three main zones within the district:

Zone (A)

The very central part of the BCD, which is historically the most significant part of the district. This part hosts the main three squares of the district: Martyrs, Nijmeh and Riyadh Alsolh squares, most of the retained buildings along the entrances towards Nijmeh square and the majority of the institutional representation of the quotas of space's domination. At this zone, we can find several public/ diplomatic buildings of the highest sensitive and restrictive security measures, like the Governmental Palace, Parliament, ministries, UN institutions and embassies. Many spatial proximate religious buildings of the different sects of the Lebanese community are allocated at this zone. Additionally, the consumerism theme of Solidere commercial centre occupies a quite large area of the zone, including Beirut Souks, other retails, restaurants and cafes. Finally, other buildings represent other functions like Banks, hotels and press institutions.

Practically, all buildings and spaces to be analysed locate in this zone which contains the study area of this research.

Zone (B)

This zone was widely reconstructed in low – medium density. It contains the majority of the residential buildings within the district along with commercial, offices and mixed-use buildings. At this zone, most of the parking lots that serve the central zone (A) are found. On the proposed masterplan of the development project, they were proposed to be green areas with underground parking. Unfortunately, the execution did not serve this proposal and the areas turned to be huge solid pale parking spaces (Figure 5-5).



Figure 5-5: The actual execution of the parking lot at zone B (02.11.2017, a. 09:30, b. 14:30)

Zone (C)

This is the extended zone of the new constructions out of the historical boundaries of the BCD (old sea borders). As it locates out of the study area of this research and does not directly serve to its functions, this zone was neglected in this analysis.



Figure 5-6: the main three zones of the Solidere masterplan of the BCD

As mentioned before, the distribution of the buildings in the BCD delivers an image of the invited categories of people to get engaged with the area; as well as displays the quotas of the space's domination among the different players of the Lebanese dynamics

The distribution of the religious-political buildings attempts to occupy the space for the benefit of the presence of their representatives. The spatial proximate of the religious buildings sounded to make them loose their functional role in the interviewees' discussions. Repeatedly, the word "Symbols" was used to describe these buildings. Figure 5-7 shows the spatial proximity of the buildings that represents the institutional and religious axes of the sectarian regime in Zone A. The massive Al-Amine Mosque and St. George Orthodox Cathedral sitting next to each other (Figure 5-8), often presented as a symbol of "co-existence" and "tolerance" but more truthfully a representation of a contested space in which the different actors fight for dominance. In fact, both massive structures remain empty in this area that is very much commercial and almost devoid of residential areas. The structures act as symbols rather than needed utilities.





Figure 5-7: The spatial proximity of the buildings that represents the (a) institutional and (b) religious axes of the sectarian regime in Zone A – BCD. Edited photo of (a) published aerial photo of the zone, and (b) the design model of Solidere project



Figure 5-8: Maronite Cathedral of Saint George and Mohammed Al-Amin Mosque

Similarly, the authorities' heavy focus on dominating the space is highly apparent, especially following each successive wave of protests. Barricades and searching points have been placed all over the central district especially in spaces known for protests such as Martyrs' square and Riyadh Alsolh Square. Nijmeh square, due its proximity to the Parliament, has been generally closed off to the public. Following the You Stink protests of 2015, and up to years later, only foreigners (evidently not the often discriminated against Syrian or Palestinian refugees but rather rich foreigners such as Americans, Europeans, or visitors from the gulf) were allowed entry. "Even prior to the You Stink protests, the area had been a nuisance to enter: you had to be interrogated by army personnel, get your IDs checked out and sometimes even searched before they let you through the barricades" documents Elie Fares on his blog "A Separate State of Mind." Foreigners

and members of the diaspora have confirmed this documentation by sharing their own experiences, as did Annia Ciezadlo, a freelance foreign correspondent living in the Middle East, whose comment is pictured below (Figure 5-9).


Annia Ciezadlo *March 19, 2016 at 10:40 PM*

TRUE STORY:
My mother and a friend were visiting from Chicago. We're all American. I never go downtown so I didn't even know it was closed. But I thought it would be nice to show them as it's such an important part of Lebanon and world history.
When we got there, I told the security guard, Arabic, that I wanted to show them Sahat al-Nijmeh. He told us, more or less, to piss off.
Here's what happened next:
Me (turning to my mother, in English): He's telling us we can't go in. He said it's closed to the public.
My mother: Why?
Security guard (hearing us speak English): You are from what country?
Me: America.
Security guard (smiling and opening the gate): Ya hala!
The End.

★ Like

Figure 5-9: A published experience of the selective accessibility of foreigners to Nijmeh square

Another example of the impact of the buildings on the selectivity of the allowance to access the area is UN-ESCWA building – the regional headquarter of The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for West Asia. Despite the outrageous cost of the building – 15 billion LBP of annual rent, amounting to 165 million USD over a decade (from 2007 to 2017), it does not even provide the residents with a good quality of services. In fact, numerous roads leading to the building are frequently closed down for security measures, with a main adjacent tunnel being shut off every day until 5 PM leading to never-ending traffic jams.

As such, walking in the BCD, one immediately recognizes unlimited areas of consumption, notably Beirut Souks and numerous restaurants and shops as seen in the picture below (Figure 5-10). It is important to note that the area is host to countless more restaurants and shops than documented on good-maps and that despite this staggering number, all of them cater to Lebanon's upper-middle to high class, leaving the poor completely alienated from the city centre.




Figure 5-10: the consumerism of the BCD – zoom in to the dense distribution of the shops and restaurants in section of the district.

In the following two pages (Figure 5-11) shows the proposed Masterplan of Solidere project, with a chart of the facilities and uses created out of data published in Solidere annual reports; while the actual [constructed] institutional (functional) domination of the BCD is presented in the abstracted map of the land use, as projected from observation work, google earth and google maps data (Figure 5-12). The map shows a district that is filled with political, diplomatic and consuming functions, whom a wide category of the Beiruti people is completely alienated.




Figure 5-11: Masterplan of Solidere project – facilities and uses chart is created out of data published in Solidere annual reports




Figure 5-12: The institutional (functional) domination of the BCD, land use distribution in BCD as projected from observation work, google earth and google maps data.

5.3.2 The conceived image of the district

I hate the word 'downtown' and hate that I have my office located there.

A journalist and activist – interview 2017

During the civil war, the district that was located at the green line that divided Beirut into two warred parts. The district buildings and public spaces were widely damaged; hereby, Solidere company proposed and executed a development project that included the previously defined zones of the district (A, B and C). Although Solidere masterplan presented preserving heritage buildings, the preserved buildings did not exceed 12% of the district area. The wide development area provided the centre of Beirut with a new face that seemed to be perceived differently at several layers.




Figure 5-13: Land areas distribution in Solidere masterplan – Data from Solidere annual reports

During the conducted in-site discussions, a careful attention was paid to the verbal and behavioural messages that were deliver by the participants[10].

At several points along El-Shouhada street towards An-Nahar Headquarters, an interesting orientation that neglects the area towards Nijmeh square was very common. Young people focused on their inability to get involved in the super expensive commercial facilities provided within the development project. Along with the militarised restrictions at several spots all around the district, the feeling of belonging has dwindled. Older attendees were more focused on their memories of buildings that used to shape parts of either their daily life or the collective memory of the city identity. A statement said by a Beiruti man in his 60s summarised most of our conversations then. Referring to Nijmeh square, the demolished historical Ottoman Palace *'Saray Alsagheer'* and Beirut Souks, he said: *"it is either space that is arrested behind the gates, memories that were demolished or an existence of no memories."*

Some interviewees supported these notes through their discussions. The increase of the people's need for public spaces and the change of their role after the war were raised by some interviewees. They discussed that public spaces that used to be an essential part of the citizens daily life activities (gatherings, discussions and celebrations) in cities and towns, turned to act more like decorative elements of the city in the post-war era. Regarding the development project in the BCD, Beiruti people started to perceive it as a fake placeless space (an interviewee added). *"Hariri's vision of Solidere was a kind of a district which attracts the non-Lebanese tourists […] who would arrive in a few minutes from the airport, enjoy high-quality facilities, within the centre and on the seaside.*

[10] Research participants selection was explained in ch4 (see 4.2.2)

[…] In Summary, I would say, a 5 stars tourism that is detached from the complexities of the city" (an interviewee added).

Additionally, the conducted discussions highlighted the reshaping of the spatial significance of the main squares of the BCD within the collective memory of Beiruti people. Specifically talking about Nijmeh and Martyrs squares, it was agreed that the squares which occupied a very essential and solid part of the memory of Beirut, before and during the war, were destroyed [cognitively]. A very placeless description was attached to the square with repetitive use of the word *"Highway"* to describe the current perception of Martyrs square, while Nijmeh square maintained its hopeful value that recognised the current less public statement of the square. *"It is nothing more than a planter to be used in photos to promote the city for foreigners' tourists"* (an interviewee said). *"It is not public anymore"*, a statement that was used to describe the security measures around the square. Other statements highlighted that even when Lebanese people arrive at Nijmeh square, their activities there are limited to taking some photos and giving the kids a few minutes to play around. *"Once we arrive at Nijmeh square, we act like tourists"* (an interviewee stated).



Figure 5-14: Modes of citizens' engagement with public spaces in: (a) Waygand street 1958, (b) Solidere – Beirut Souks 2008 and (c) Riyadh Alsolh square 2015



Figure 5-15: Almost empty day-shot of Parliament street towards Nijmeh square, 01.11.2017 – 13:56

5.3.3 The accessibility of the district

The last dimension of the contribution of the physical objects in shaping the spaces of the BCD is the restriction on the accessibility of the district. The wide militarised presence in the district obviously affected the shaping of the district in appearance and functionality. As previously discussed, it enhances the spatial perception of the district to be less public, presenting it as a state's property where selective invitation of a well-controlled people, time and activities are sent for the users of the space (see Figure 5-14 and Figure 5-15 for the impact of the militarised barriers on the streetscape of the Nijmeh square entrances). My own experience of restricted observation work[11]

[11] As described previously in [Chapter 4]

in both Nijmeh and Riyadh Alsolh squares can set an example of the limitations that pedestrians can face there. Additionally, a personal note was written, during one of silent observations conducted in Nijmeh square, of a scene of a professional model photo shooting at one of the square entrances, where the security man was in control of the photo scene, directions and background rather than the photographer himself.

Functionally, Figure 5-16 shows the impact of these barriers on the usability and appearance of the streets within the district. Within two minutes, two photos were taken around the corner between El Omari mosque street and Waygand street (01 November 2017, 16:42 and16:44 (show the difference between the surveillanced evacuated El Omari mosque street that does not serve any ratio of the dense traffic at the adjacent Waygand street.



Figure 5-16: multi-layered militarised barriers at El Ma’rad street towards Nijmeh square, 08.11.2017 – 15:14



Figure 5-17: The impact of the barriers on the streetscape of the street linking between Riyadh Alsolh and Nijmeh squares. a- design model, b- real shot 08 *November* 2017, *15:52*



Figure 5-18: The impact of the military monitored barriers on the traffic in BCD, a- evacuated street from Waygand st. (AKA municipality st.) towards Nijmeh square (01 *November* 2017, *16:42(, b- heavy traffic on Waygand st. toward Beirut Souks(01*November *2017 ,16:44)*

As the analysis of the police barriers cannot be separated from the distribution of the buildings [discussed in 5.3.1], the following map (Figure 5-19: the impact of the institutional occupation and police barriers on the accessibility of the BCD. summarises the impact of both: the institutional domination and the militarised control on the appearance and the accessibility of the BCD. The map categorises the main buildings of the district into attractive and restrictive nodes of accessibility. The map shows that Zone (A) has the highest level of proximate contradicted buildings. Beirut Souks, hotels, restaurants, retail shops and religious buildings act [usually] as attractive functions; but the neighbouring parliament, governmental palace, ministries, diplomatic buildings and army camp changed the whole expected image of the heart of the city. The contradicted adjacent functions, along with the widely spread metal gates and concrete barriers, emphasised separating the zone (A) into two areas. The first is the Nijmeh square, its entrances, the governmental palace and the ESCWA building surroundings. This is the area with the highest security measures. It will well-controlled by the state and has the least density of traffic. The other area is the outer part where most accessible attractive buildings are oriented to. In this area, the majority of the traffic flow take place, giving an advantage to the consuming functions that are located there [a case that does not apply to the less-lucky shops and restaurants in the first area].




Figure 5-19: the impact of the institutional occupation and police barriers on the accessibility of the BCD.

5.4 The contribution of the social objects in setting the spatial statement of the BCD

The second entity that shapes the spatial statement of the BCD is the social object that flows through the spaces of the district. Mainly, observation contributed to the data collection of this entity. The study area was divided into several zones[12] based on the following criteria:

First, Martyrs Square area that was divided into 7 spatially distinguished zones. All of them were within the camera lens range, except Mrt03 which is the car parking located between Al Nahar building and Kataeb Party headquarters. The other 6 zones can be defined either as (1) roads and intersections [Mrt01: the intersection of Al Shohada, Beshara EL Khouri and Waygand streets; Mrt04: Beshara EL Khouri street; and Mrt05: Al Shohada street], (2) car parking lots [Mrt06: Car parking located between Al Shohada, Damascus and Kadisha streets; and Mrt07: Car parking located adjacent to the square] and (3) pedestrian pathways [Mrt02: pedestrian pathway adjacent to the archaeological site].

Second, Riyadh Alsolh square which is spatially divided into the green area around Riyadh Alsolh statue [Rslh01] and the adjacent road intersections [Rslh02]. The limited open area around the square, the proximate buildings and the security limitation on the camera direction and angle were all visual obstacles that resulted in a much smaller observed area in comparison with Martyrs square.

Third, Nijmeh square is the most sensitive and restricted part of the district to be visited, observed or photographed. The restrictions to photograph the square affected the length and documentation of the observation intervals; however, the silent observation of the square was repeated on three

---

[12] The full definition and observation status of each zone is presented in Appendix I

different days to triangulate the count of people and vehicles passing through the area. The square was divided into two zones due to the location of the Parliament building which clearly affected the surveillance of the square and the movement through it. The first zone [Njh01] covered almost two thirds of the square area that was bordered by El Omari mosque street and El Maarad Street; while the other third [Njh02] is bordered by the Parliament, the MPs' offices buildings and the clock tower.

Finally, other main streets and intersections within the study zone [Nijmeh square entrances, Riyadh Alsolh street (Banks Street), Waygand street (Municipality street) and the intersection of El Amir Bashir and Bsharah El Khouri streets (opposite to Mohammed El Amin mosque)were all observed through scattered photos (where possible) at different times and days.




Figure 5-20: the spatial allocation of the defined zones of observation in (Table 5-1)

Table 5-1: The zones of observation

Zone		Observation Statement: Location	Elevation	Angle from horizon	Range*	Technique
Mrt01	Martyrs Square - the intersection of Al Shohada, Beshara EL Khouri and Waygand streets.	Le Grey hotel roof	21.5 m	30'	100 m	AM: manual notes of in and out flow PM: Photo recording of 15 seconds time interval
Mrt02	Martyrs Square - pedestrian pathway adjacent to the archaeological site					Photo recording of 15 seconds time interval
Mrt03	Martyrs Square - Car parking that locates between Al Nahar building and Kataeb Party headquarters	Out of record range				
Mrt04	Martyrs Square - Beshara EL Khouri street	Le Grey hotel roof	21.5 m	30'	100 m	Photo recording of 15 seconds time interval
Mrt05	Martyrs Square - Al Shohada street					
Mrt06	Martyrs Square - Car parking that locates between Al Shohada, Damascus and Kadisha streets					
Mrt07	Martyrs Square - Car parking that locates adjacent to the square					
Rslh01	Riyadh Alsolh square	Arab Bank roof	34 m		50 m	
Rslh02	The streets intersection adjacent to Riyadh Alsolh square					
Njh01	Nijmeh Square - almost two thirds of the square area that bordered by El Omari mosque street and El Maarad Street	The intersection of El Maarad street and Nijmeh square	0 m	0'	68 m	Silent Observation with manual notes and sketches
Njh02	Nijmeh Square - almost one third of the square area that bordered by the Parliament, the MPs offices buildings and the clock tower.					

Notes	
Police numbers	Out of photo range - numbers were observed at different times during the day on different spots within the district
Record range	Range varies according to visual obstacles (buildings and streets direction)
Mrt03	This zone located out of the camera range. Manual record was unachievable due to the huge flow of cars. Expanding the photo range with mobile recording of lower angle from the horizon was unallowed. The recording procedure was monitored by a soldier.

For all the zones of the three squares, the records were turned into a numerical dataset (Table 5-1) of all vehicles and pedestrian movement [both types of movement: stay in and pass through]. Figure 5-21 illustrates an example of the recorded photos of Martyrs square for 5 minutes. On the full-size photos, vehicles and pedestrians' modes of traffic were observed and translated into numerical count per 5 minutes. Table 5-2 shows numerical representation of the recorded sample in Martyrs square between 14:05 – 15:30 GMT. The highlighted column [in red] contains the count of the vehicles and pedestrians flowing through the different zones [Mrt01 – Mrt02, Mrt04 – Mrt07] that are illustrated in Figure 5-21.



Figure 5-21: A selected sample of the photo-recorded observation, Martyrs square 02.11.2017 14:00:15 – 14:05:00

Table 5-2: numerical representation of the recorded sample, Martyrs square 02.11.2017 14:00:15 – 14:05:00

Date	Zone	Type	08:30	**14:05**	14:10	14:15	14:20	14:25	14:30	14:35	14:40	14:45	14:50	14:55	15:00	15:05	15:10
02/11/2017	**Mrt01**	vehicles	290	**515**	317	320	312	340	346	376	421	360	275	268	300	312	307
		pedistrians	0	**0**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Mrt02	vehicles	0	**0**	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		pedistrians	1	**4**	6	7	12	12	8	11	10	12	14	13	6	9	10
	Mrt03																
	Mrt04	vehicles	20	**84**	60	66	74	52	49	44	49	51	63	59	54	64	87
		pedistrians	0	**14**	9	11	18	24	22	21	8	11	8	6	7	4	13
	Mrt05	vehicles	317	**148**	149	164	189	180	147	143	148	147	166	164	169	137	124
		pedistrians	0	**9**	9	11	20	17	10	14	10	9	20	13	9	6	12
	Mrt06	vehicles	111	**480**	480	480	480	480	480	480	458	458	458	458	458	447	447
		pedistrians	7	**2**	2	2	2	2	2	35	2	2	2	2	18	2	51
	Mrt07	vehicles	20	**43**	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	41	41	41	41	41	40
		pedistrians	6	**2**	2	2	2	2	2	2	4	2	2	2	2	3	2

However, understanding the movement patterns within the district required unifying the temporal and area factors of all observed zones. The following tables summarise the observed routine movement patterns in the main three squares of the BCD. Tables 5-2 shows the average count of the traffic flow per hour per 100 sqm in each zone; while Table 5-3 summarises them into total average count of the traffic flow per hour per 100 sqm per square. Then a percentage representation of the flow out of the total movement per each zone and per defined movement type are presented in tables 5-4 and 5-5. Finally, percentages are visualised in Figures 5-20 and 5-21 respectively.

First, analysing the data due to the type of movement. Here it was noticed that passing through the previously defined zones dominate the zone with 93.6% of the total movement within the observed area, 78% of them were in Martyrs square. This included all transit uses that takes less than 5 minutes per zone. A huge percentage that is compatible with what we have previously discussed

about the impact of the development project in the BCD in detaching the centre from the Beiruti people, spatially, functionally and conceptually. It is also notable that there were 0 pedestrians in Mrt01 throughout the entire observation period. While this might be partially attributed to the lack of sidewalks and pedestrian streets, this cannot be the only cause. In fact, most Lebanese roads, including inner city roads, lack sidewalks and were never constructed with a pedestrian focus, so it is a common sight and occurrence for residents to walk through streets lacking sidewalks. As such, this observation is most likely due to a deeper phenomenon, the purposeful alienation of the general public from Martyr’s square. This explanation is further justified by the observation of Mrt02, a pedestrian pathway adjacent to the archaeological site. Despite it being a pedestrian site, the number of pedestrians remains scarce and negligible compared to the number of cars passing through the area at the same time. Overall, the whole observation period, a total of a mere 117 pedestrians had been present at the square, in comparison to 551 vehicles.

Riyadh Alsolh shows a similar pattern with the majority of movement passing through rather than staying in (49 and 3 respectively) and a similar (although higher) pedestrian to vehicle ratio (16 and 36 respectively). No vehicles were allowed into the heavily militarized area of Nijmeh Square, noting that civilian vehicles are completely restricted from access and the only vehicles that would visit the area are government and affiliates’ vehicles. As such, 42 pedestrians were observed in Nijmeh square of which all except 1 were passing through. The numbers recorded on such “ordinary” days in BCD strongly contrast with days in which collective actions, which often take place in Beirut, occur. In fact, a total of 175 pedestrians in the whole area over the entire duration of the observation period strongly clashes with the numbers recorded on days of collective actions such as protests, marches, sit-ins, lectures and others in which thousands of people would gather.

In fact, in both 2015 and 2019, Martyr's square and Riyadh Alsolh were spaces heavily contested by protestors who aimed to regain those spaces from which they have been alienated[13].

Table 5-3: Average count of the traffic flow in each zone per hour per 100 sqm

	pass through	**stay in**	**Pedestrians**	**Vehicles**
Mrt01	228	0	0	228
Mrt02	87	2	89	0
Mrt03				
Mrt04	79	2	12	62
Mrt05	207	8	10	205
Mrt06	2	17	1	17
Mrt07	4	39	5	38
Rslh01	2	0	2	0
Rslh02	47	3	14	36
Njh01	30	1	31	0
Njh02	11	0	11	0

Table 5-4: Average count of the traffic flow in each square per hour per 100 sqm

	pass through	**stay in**		**Pedestrians**	**Vehicles**	
Martyrs	606	68	**674**	117	551	**668**
R. Alsolh	49	3	**52**	16	36	**52**
Nijmeh	41	1	**42**	42	0	**42**
	696	**72**		**175**	**587**	

[13] This non-routine occupancy of the squares will be analysed thoroughly in [chapter 6]

Table 5-5: Percentage of the flow out of the total movement in each zone per hour per 100sqm

	pass through	stay in	Pedestrians	Vehicles
Martyrs	90%	10%	18%	82%
R. Alsolh	94%	6%	31%	69%
Nijmeh	97%	3%	99%	1%




Figure 5-22: Percentage of the flow out of the total movement in each zone per hour per 100sqm

Table 5-6: Percentage of the flow out of the defined movement in the district per hour per 100sqm

	pass through	stay in	Pedestrians	Vehicles
Martyrs	87%	94%	67%	94%
R. Alsolh	7%	4%	9%	6%
Nijmeh	6%	1%	24%	0%




Figure 5-23: Percentage of the flow out of the defined movement in the district per hour per 100sqm

The last phase of this observation was of the other main streets and intersections within the study zone [Nijmeh square entrances, Riyadh Alsolh street, Waygand street and the intersection opposite to Mohammed El Amin mosque]. Photos (Figure 5-24) were taken on several walks in the site on different days/times. Although they are less in number [in comparison to the previous phase], this observation helped to complete the scene through understanding not only the main three squares, but also the connections between them. A transitional movement were found to dominate all these streets and intersections; supporting the observed transitional flow of the three squares. However, two contradicted densities were observed in the empty entrances of Nijmeh square and the heavy traffic of the nearby roads.




Figure 5-24: Traffic density at Nijmeh square entrances, space and surroundings (day and evening time)

5.5 Conclusion

The urban scene of the BCD during the phases of routine uses shows a multi-layered ongoing story of daily contestation of the district. The internal and external players [reviewed in chapter 2] that contribute to the shaping of the dynamics of Lebanon are getting physically represented in the district with buildings that serves not only their function, rather a symbolic representation of the existence for the different players. The civil war was a cut phase of the history of the development of Beirut; however, it directly contributed to the shaping of the physical and emotional renovations of the image of the city. The Beiruti people seem to maintain an image of the city into which the post-war era [of the foreigners-targeted district] is detached. In conclusion, the spatial description of the district that is correlated to the contribution of its physical objects can be summarised in the following words: **'the perceived concept of public space in downtown Beirut is over'**.

The development project in downtown Beirut has isolated the city from its centre – spatially, functionally and conceptually. Spatially, turning Martyrs' square into a highway emphasizes the pass-through usability of the space. Along with Shehab bridge to the south, linking the downtown to the seaside in the north and the sensitive security measures of the Governmental palace, the centre is fully bordered from the city. Functionally, the targeted consumable level of the facilities within the district is much more than what most Lebanese can afford. Several discussions, interviews and archival materials raised this point as an undisputed issue. *"It was not ours"* an old lady spoke to a TV reporter. *"It used to be, but they took it. I do not come here usually but this activity*[14] *made me feel I can do"* she continued. Conceptually, several interviews and the on-site

[14] Referring to Abo-Rakhousah flee market – a protesting activity that appeared first in September 2015 and will be discussed in the next chapter.

discussions has highlighted many struggles of understanding the public spaces in Lebanon. They are not spaces for discussions anymore, none of the citizen-like activities take place there. It is a space of the state, of the political parties activities, of the religious buildings that represent the sectarian regime or, in its best use, a garden for the kids to play, which could be *"simply privatized by a political leader or a politically supported investor."* (an interviewee discussed).

Analysing the spatial statement of the Beirut Central District shows vehicles' domination on most of the district's spaces. This domination, along with the spread of consumerism through the district, entitled the district with transitional functionality and detached it from the other quarters of the city and from its citizens. Adding to the high security measures at several spots in the district, the whole area failed to facilitate any pedestrians or citizens-like activities. Finally, looking at the three main squares in reference to their historical significance, it was states that:

(1) The **evacuated** Nijmeh square is not perceived as public anymore by Beiruti people.

(2) The **neglected** Riyadh Alsolh acts not more like any other road intersection.

(3) The **misused** Martyrs square area is turned to serve as car parking.

In the following chapter, the eventual urban scene of the contestation of the district, during the phases of urban unrests, will be mapped with a focus on selected protest events from You Stink movement of 2015.

Chapter 6
THE EVENTUAL URBAN SCENE OF BEIRUT DOWNTOWN: THE POLITICS OF THE DISTRICT

This chapter will analyse the third entity of the case study, which is connected to the eventual occupation of the district. presents the numerical results of the created equation that used the collected verbal and visual narratives to calculate the population and distribution of the occupiers’ crowd. Then, this spatial dataset is visualised through a sequence of GIS layers that show the physical features of the occupiers’ crowd and correlate to the identifying of the state’s and protestors’ territories at each spatial situation. After that, through making use of the physical features of the crowd’s territory, the speed of the spatiotemporal changes and the identified verbal narratives of the used tools of marking the field of both occupiers’ crowd and state, the tendency to the violent actions of the militarized presence is used to measure the effectiveness of each featured crowd’s field to threaten the borders/expansion of the state’s field. Finally, the chapter will conclude by reflecting the analysed event to the continuous contest of the institutional ascendancy, capital exploitation, and protestors' occupation of the district

6.1 Introduction

As discussed previously in the second part of this thesis, Lebanon has been ruled by a sectarian consociational that is characterised by corruption and public services deterioration.

Contemporary Lebanon hosts a wide diversity of non-sectarian movements (Nagle, 2018) who have repeatedly tried to occupy the public spaces within the district and reclaim their dominance over it. Although these movements have a limited impact on the consociational status of the institutions, they pointed to the dysfunction of the 'pie-sharing' system. This includes awarding private companies with close ties to sectarian elites (Leenders 2012), the delay of elections and appointments for important positions (Nakhoul 2015) and the failure in managing public services, which became the source of a major protest movement in 2015 when the social protest movement You Stink started castigating the administration for its inability to collect rubbish in Beirut and its surroundings. Lebanon is most often represented as a passive recipient of the ramifications of the 2010/11 Arab Uprisings, particularly the refugee crisis triggered by the War in Syria. Though Lebanon's socio-political forces were still not at the frontline of the Arab uprisings, some social movements have used the region-wide politicization of Lebanon's greatest concerns, such as sectarianism and corruption, for mass engagement to tackle the vulnerabilities of the political structure in Lebanon. "The current chapter analyses the spatiality of the movements of 2015: "You Stink.

In 1994, the government contracted a private company – Sukleen – to manage Lebanon's garbage collection and disposal (Kingston 2013). While Sukleen's contracts were renewed in 1999 and 2010 as a result of elite trade-offs (Zbeeb 2012), in July 2015 the power-sharing government, stuck in fierce political deadlock over the election of the president, refused to extend the contract. This resulted in more than 20,000 tonnes of uncollected rubbish in Beirut (Nagle, 2018). Waste stacked

up in the streets of Beirut and Mount Lebanon in the summer of 2015, marking the beginning of a worsening garbage crisis. The direct cause of this crisis was the demonstrations of people living near the Na'ameh dump site that was, until then, operational. This landfill was established by the government as part of an emergency response to a waste crisis that engulfed the nation in 1997. It was originally planned that the site would only be in service for six years, until 2003. Nonetheless, its closing was progressively delayed until its new proposed closure date set on July 17, 2015. Once again, on that day, the landfill did not shut down. Therefore, a sit-in was coordinated by about 40 demonstrators composed of local residents, which eventually led to the closing of the notorious landfill. No alternative has, however, been given for the processing of Beirut and Mount Lebanon’s garbage. The Lebanese authorities' contract with the firm Sukleen expired on the same day. Activists and advocacy groups have repeatedly denounced Sukleen for being overpaid and aligned with the corrupt elite authorities' interests. Nevertheless, until its disposal facilities became overwhelmed and it was forced to suspend its services, the corporation continued to carry out its waste collection services. As the dumpsites became overwhelmed, the streets of Beirut and Mount Lebanon saw the culmination of the garbage crisis with an unprecedented large volume of garbage building up. As a result, demonstrations in the capital and across the nation accompanied the sit-ins of the people living next to the Na'ameh landfill. First of all, the protests centred on the garbage problem as the people required a permanent sustainable response to the unsanitary and environmentally disastrous situation. The slogan "You Stink" (tol3it ri7etkom) quickly became a focal point of the demonstrations. Because of the government's failure and refusal to deal with the situation, Lebanese people have had to wait a long time for a merely temporary solution to be developed.

With its hashtag #You_Stink, the social resistance campaign in Lebanon, which began in late August, hit international media headlines. However, the agitation was not limited to condemning the government's failure to gather waste in Beirut and its surroundings. Instead, as Al-Jamal Jazeera's Elshayyal put it, from the very start, the social revolution objected to *"inherent corruption within the establishment."* The social movement grew into a full-fledged movement against government corruption in September. *"It's not the trash that stinks, you stink."* As protester Assaad Thebian pronounced these words in a brief video posted on his Facebook account confronting the ruling class (Thebian, 2015), it is doubtful that he anticipated them to become the motto of one of the biggest anti-establishment opposition movements in Lebanon. The goals and the tone of the demonstrations shifted and became more political over time, and the group, You Stink, separated into several smaller entities as the protests continued to be joined and reinforced by other groups and activists. Later, in September, the social movement developed into one against political corruption. For You Stink's activists, the failure of the state to deliver key public goods is an outcome of the power-sharing system that incentivizes corruption and sectarian conflict (Geha, 2018). The pluralist character of the Lebanese political system which succeeded to pass through the Arab Spring revolutions, 2011, has failed with its sectarian theme. Instead of the famous slogan "The people want the fall of the regime", Lebanese activists raised the slogan "The people want the fall of the confessional regime".

Lebanon's mobilizations were mapped and analysed by Lebanon Support from the launch of the Conflict Mapping & Analysis project in June 2014 until its end on 30 May 2015. They classified these collective actions according to the district, the mode of action, or type of collective action adopted. It demonstrates how mobilizations are steering away from clichés of confessionalism and tackling wider social concerns. Forty-one of collective actions mapped during this period have

occurred in five areas: Beirut Central District, Corniche el-Nahr, Qalamoun, Saida, and Tripoli, with the BCD taking the biggest part with 14% of the total number of collective actions.

In fact, throughout the war, the BCD was nothing more than a space of death with empty buildings and the constant threat of snipers and explosions. Throughout the reconstruction, the interests of most stakeholders - citizens, refugees, owners and tenants were completely disregarded and subordinated to the interests of war-profiteers, aiming to gain off of the reconstruction process. A post-war amnesia approach was adopted in which all signs of the war were eradicated, leading to amnesia rather than healing; and the reconstruction was aimed at rich foreigners - catering to visitors from the gulf and aiming to become a financial hub. As such, the Lebanese (and refugee) communities did not feel represented in Beirut, creating a space of alienation at the core of the capital. “People do not feel welcome in downtown Beirut,” said Joseph Kamel, a 34-year-old salesperson from Ashrafieh, as he walked past the crumbling edifice of an old French art-deco apartment in Gemmayzeh. “They feel it does not represent them and reflects the political classes’ disinterest in public demands,” he told Al Jazeera. As the largely peaceful demonstrations were taking place, conversations and interactions between people from diverse cultures and social strata took place as massive numbers of demonstrators assembled at Martyr's Square, which inspired nostalgia for the pre-war cosmopolitan city centre, as portrayed in old sepia photos shown in several old bookshops in the capital. And on social media, notably Facebook, Lebanese people have protested Beirut's destruction of its architectural heritage during the reconstruction.

Protesters gathered in downtown Beirut’s Riyadh Alsolh Square to set up a flea market after Nicholas Chammas, head of the Beirut Traders Association, said the presence of regular protests in the BCD was “cheapening” the area. As the assembled crowds browsed stalls selling irons, books, clothes, Polaroid photographs, snacks, movie posters, and satirical screen-prints criticising

the country's established political elite, security forces looked on. Bilal Abboud, a journalist and one of the organisers of the market, said the remarks by Chammas served to reinforce the perception that the general public was not welcome in downtown Beirut. *"This was the first time since the end of the [civil] war we have seen an impromptu, popular, grassroots market in the area,"* said Khatib, a woman who set up a clothes stall at the market to Aljazeera. *"During the war, the area was out of bounds because of conflict, and in the post-war era, it has remained out of bounds because of its exclusivity. In the same way, the protests bring people together regardless of social backgrounds, so did the market."*

It was not long until the authorities set up concrete blocks and other barricades and security apparatuses around the area, aiming to regain dominance.

This chapter reviews the analysis of the third entity of the case study, which is connected to the eventual occupation of the district. The practical parameters[15] that will be mapped to inform the theoretical explanations will be presented as a collective action (demonstration) of a massive non-homogenised group of creators (a crowd of occupiers) in a significant space (square) of competition for dominance (production) within a set of time intervals through the annotation of maps, plans, videos and photographs.

[15] As it was justified in the fourth chapter




Figure 6-1: The embedded entities of the case study – the individuals' eventual occupation of the BCD

6.2 Approaching the analysed entities

This chapter presents the numerical results of the created equation that used the collected verbal and visual narratives to calculate the population and distribution of the occupiers' crowd. Then, this spatial dataset is visualised through a sequence of GIS layers that show the physical features of the occupiers' crowd and correlate to the identifying of the state's and protestors' territories at each spatial situation. As the created dataset is a time series spatial dataset, the physical features of the crowd's territory (field) are linked to the speed of the spatiotemporal changes. In conjunction with the identified verbal narratives obtained from the used tools to mark the field of both occupiers' crowd and state, the tendency to resort to violent actions of the militarized presence is used to measure the effectiveness of each featured crowd's field to threaten the borders/expansion of the state's field. Finally, the identified spatial features of the mapped crowd are reflected to an approximately similar previous crowd of occupiers of the same spaces (Cedar revolution, 2005). Since the available data about the spatial allocation of the crowds during the Cedar revolution is

limited, the presented analysis does not apply the same time series identification. Instead, it uses the analysed spatial features of the crowd to reflect and discuss.

To manage a controlled path of exploring and analysing the wide variety of resources, establishing the initial spatial dataset of the daily distribution of protest event within the district contributed to a series of benefits. It provided a concrete base to build up a systematic narrative that initiates its scope, parameters and tools from the case itself. Outlining the scene of the protest events that took place in the BCD district between July 28th and September 30th involved most of the research resources to initiate some schematic layers of the targeted visual documentation of the events. This included the primetime news reports of 2 independent TV channels, articles and newspapers reports, social media uploads that belong to the same timeline, and primary material obtained directly from people in Beirut – Interviews, workshops, on-site conversations and focus group discussions. The outcomes of this layer serve on three main levels:




Figure 6-2: Weight of the resource involvement in initiating and detailing the maps of the protest events took place in the BCD July 28th – September 30th, 2015, Beirut, Lebanon

(1) Identifying and classifying the places of protest within the district

At this level, a spatial understanding of the distribution of the protest event is established with identifying the study zone of the places with highest repetitive events.

Initially, a linear series was established of all protests and related governmental actions that was mentioned between 28.07 – 30.09.2015. Notes were distributed per day for the main three squares and any other mentioned places. Thus, the readout data resulted in setting the initial spatiotemporal perception of the protests took place. The distribution of crowd flow shows that Nijmeh Square was significantly the lowest. The square's shape and narrow entrances make it easily controlled by the police/army's permanent barriers. The square's accessibility has been controlled for years, even in routine days of no protest. Accessing this square became the main target of many protests, as most clashes took place on its entrances which were always under the dominance of the state. On the other side, Riyadh Alsolh Square has the highest frequency of protesting events. The location of the square, which is adjacent to the governmental palace and on short distance connection with the parliament in Nijmeh Square convert it to an alternative targeted space (instead of the Nijmeh square) according to the protestors. It was also noticed that Riyadh Alsolh was a safe target for protesters to gather and occupy without serious clashes with the police - unless trying to move toward the governmental palace or Nijmeh Square. Martyrs' Square saved its significance as the main gathering area, which is connected to the collective perception of public liberty and dominance. However, it was not targeted by protestors, either the state as it is spatially less connected to the core of spatial competition in Nijmeh square (Error! Reference source not found.).




Figure 6-3: Total Protesting days of 01.08 – 30.09.2015 per square

(2) Identifying the patterns of protest events within the protest timeline

The second level aimed at establishing a temporal understanding of the distribution of the protest event.

The daily distribution of the protest events shows that August had the highest frequency of protesting events with 15 protest events, before the movement started losing its momentum (Figure 6-4). Along the timeline, two main intervals of successive events: 22-29/08 and 16-22/09 appeared (Figure 6-5, Figure 6-6). These two intervals have the features of having major protesting events, serious clashes and a significant reshaping of the space through setting barriers. Those barriers have, in turn, reshaped the spaces of protesting by putting restrictions on the protesters' movement and excluding some areas. Out of the defined intervals of successive protest events, I selected the intervals of 22-24. 08 and 19-22. 09 to be analysed. Each event was characterised as an action connected with societal and/or political demands. It has a public character, initiated by collective effort and motivation, and determined by taking place in the square or its surroundings, within the timeline of the movement. The beginning and the end of each interval was defined by a major protest practice and a major spatial change.




Figure 6-4: Monthly distribution of protesting events (01.08-30.09.15)




Figure 6-5: Intervals of major protest events, a. 22-24.08.2015 and b. 19.21.09.2015




Figure 6-6: Protest events timeline – defining major intervals

(3) Identifying the spatial definition of the practical observation parameters

The last layer contextualised the practical observation parameters [Square, protestors and demonstration] within the specific protest events of the case study.

It defined the main crowds of the events, their territories and the spatial features of each territory. It was revealed the buildings and police barriers that contributed to the definition of the state's territory, the direction of its expansion and the main access of protestors movement within the study zone. The area along the road from Martyrs to Riyadh Alsolh Squares was not an area of conflict between protesters and police. But, when trying to move on the roads which connect: (1) Martyrs to Nijmeh through the municipality road, (2) Riyadh Alsolh to Nijmeh through parliament street or (3) Riyadh Alsolh to the governmental palace; then the possibility of clashes raises crucially – even led, in some instances, to the success of ending the protest on that day. Giving an explanation of the previously mentioned spatial distribution of the protests, Riyadh Alsolh square provided the protestors with a chance of face to face creation of their democratic narrative, as well as dignified and symbolically rich space to make their claim more obvious for other citizens. The location of the square, which is adjacent to the governmental palace and on short distance connection with the parliament in Nijmeh Square convert it to an alternative targeted space, as some activists have stated (personal interviews). This let the square to host the highest number of protesting practices along the movement timeline and all the selected intervals.

In result, approaching the case study through these three layers established for an initial understanding of the general elements and features of the protest movement of 2015, Beirut. It contributed to define the spatial and temporal markers of the events to be analysed; and paved the way for building up the numerical dataset of the selected events and mapping them [as explained in the following section].



Figure 6-7: Initial understanding of the spatial features of protestors vs. state's territories during the protests – a. Initial setting, b. expansion of state's territory, c. shrinkage of state's territory

6.3 Visualizing the numerical narrative of the protest movement of 2015: mapping the spatiotemporal changes of the crowd's population, distribution and placement

At this section of the thesis, the numerical narrative protest movement of 2015 is built and mapped using GIS. It mapped the spatiotemporal changes of the population, distribution and placement of the crowds among two protest events [22-24.08.2015 and 19-21.09.2015]. In the following few pages, we will go through the procedure of building up the detailed layering of information. Using the example of the day 22.08.2015, this section will present the correlation of the resources, the spreadsheets of the data and the GIS cells. Then, an example of the maps [with major spatial changes] will show the abstracted crowds along one day of protest[16]. After that, the two protest events provides two eventual urban scenes of the occupation of space and the reshaping of its function.



Figure 6-8: Protestors in Martyrs square, 2015

[16] The full list of dot density mapping of the protestors crowd in all mapped events are included in [Appendix III]

"We want to hold accountable everyone who robbed this country…and we want to reclaim Downtown Beirut for the people."

You Stink activists (Nagle, 2018)

All public spaces of BCD have been historically an urban space of continuous process of shaping and being shaped by the mosaic of powers that try to popularize their dominance on the district. The presence of several institutional buildings, markets, offices and military barriers have dominated the texture of the district for the last 3 decades. In 2015, the civil movement of You Stink brought the citizens back to the district as a player in shaping its spaces.

Defining the crowd by using their physical representation of the gathering of individuals with common concern has eased mapping the texture of the square/surroundings by tracking their changes in location and direction of movement. The process of mapping a scattered archive of visual, written and spoken narratives using GIS produced several layers of the real situations of the square at certain points of time. Using GIS as a mapping tool has improved the capability of combining different types of data into one readable document. It enables the data to be managed in a spatiotemporal dataset, visualised and published.

The analysed events at this case show two homogenised crowds who were continuously changing and responding to the changed situation of the square:

1. **The police crowd:**

   A highly regulated and well defended proactive group whose territory is more stable, created and expanded in relation to some fixed points (physical objects of the space: square, barriers, streets intersections and significant buildings).

2. The protestors' crowd:

A more spontaneous reactive crowd whose territory was changing frequently in relation to their population, the physical objects of the space and the expansion of the territory of the police crowd.

These definitions of the active crowds along with the accurate placement of the selected events within the district, provided the research with the observable elements of its narrative to be visually built.

At this phase, direct verbal narratives given from the memory of the research sample were excluded. This is since the temporal sequence of their narrative was found to be not as strong as the spatial one. Thus, archives facilitated a more accurate detailing of the eventual maps of the crowds' movement. Through reports on TV channels and newspapers, published articles, and uploaded posts, photos and videos in social media platforms, a coherent verbal and visual narrative was created for the analysed days, before aligning the narrative to the time-lapse of each day. It was explained previously in [chapter 4] that the change of the availability of data along the day resulted in defining different statements of information for each time-lapse.

The variety of the amount of the available data resulted in categorising the time lapse into three types: the defined lapse [D], stable lapse [S] and transitional lapse [T] (see detailed definition in Page 150). Table 6-1 represents an example of the distribution of the [D] defined, [S] stable and [T] transitional statements of each time lapse on 22.08.2015, 14:00 – 21:50 GMT. Defined and stable time-lapses were the easiest to state, as a satisfying amount of information was attached to their related archives. They established the key maps of each day, which supported filling the gaps in the transitional time-lapses. It is important here to mention that not all transitional statements lacked data. The defined statement is the only data-based definition. Both stable and transitional

statements are spatial-based definitions of either a full 10 minutes of no significant change or a notable amount of changes that happened to the crowd placement or size, respectively.

Table 6-1: Sample – the distribution of defined, stable and transitional statement of each time lapse, 22.08.2015, 14:00 – 21:50 GMT

	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21
:00	D	D	D	D	T	T	T	S
:10	T	S	S	S	S	D	S	S
:20	T	S	D	T	S	S	S	S
:30	T	S	S	T	S	S	S	S
:40	T	S	S	S	S	T	S	S
:50	T	S	T	S	S	T	T	S

To allocate the data on the maps, the study area was divided into 1974 cells, each with a unique ID and defined features – sequential number, area and perimeters. Table 6-2 illustrates an example of defining the cells 0 – 10 and 1963 – 1973. The field ID column (FID) was used to match the base GIS layer of the empty fields (cells) to the spatiotemporal data of the crowd distribution per cell. To fulfil the temporal dimension of the mapped spatial changes, the population of the protestor in each cell was aligned to the exact date/time using the format yyyy/mm/dd hh:mm:ss. Table 6-3 resembles an example of aligning the FID, date/time coding and the crowd population for the cells 0 - 3 and 279 – 300. Filling the population number, every 10 minutes, in all cells for all analysed days resulted in creating a sequence of 240 annotated maps that revealed a dynamic space which is specific to creators, location, and time.

Table 6-2: Fields 0 – 10 and 1963 – 1973, Example of the fields definition, parameters and coding sequence

ORIG_FID	OBJECTID	Area	Perimeter	code
0	1	22.67213528	24.94623033	1
1	2	75.70958783	35.03608911	2
2	3	57.23590084	36.33321339	3
3	4	74.97	35.42595344	4
4	5	84.73598137	47.05914835	5
5	6	54.2094837	30.51242632	6
6	7	46.8965	30.30413779	7
7	8	90.24363976	37.76222949	8
8	9	1.65282123	7.177944554	9
9	10	10.83409772	19.98651892	10
10	11	40.226	28.47715344	11
⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮	⋮
1963	1964	58.96347683	38.76182229	1964
1964	1965	63.57070047	37.83536915	1965
1965	1966	70.0245	34.15503125	1966
1966	1967	51.7775	30.50563125	1967
1967	1968	81.30037214	36.5383632	1968
1968	1969	99.06731267	39.01990159	1969
1969	1970	14.55359705	20.73067157	1970
1970	1971	48.4805	30.60337455	1971
1971	1972	82.20574425	36.88314144	1972
1972	1973	11.3895	22.39656266	1973
1973	1974	217.6250952	98.82419972	1974

Table 6-3: Sample – the .xls table format of the crowd population per filed per time laps (22.08.2015, 17:30 GMT)

FID	Crowd	Time
0	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00
1	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00
2	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00
3	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00
⋮	⋮	⋮
279	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00
280	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00
281	43	2015/08/22 17:30:00
282	50	2015/08/22 17:30:00
283	52	2015/08/22 17:30:00
284	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00
285	55	2015/08/22 17:30:00
286	57	2015/08/22 17:30:00
287	60	2015/08/22 17:30:00
288	51	2015/08/22 17:30:00
289	31	2015/08/22 17:30:00
290	65	2015/08/22 17:30:00
291	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00
292	34	2015/08/22 17:30:00
293	104	2015/08/22 17:30:00
294	36	2015/08/22 17:30:00
295	75	2015/08/22 17:30:00
296	52	2015/08/22 17:30:00
297	77	2015/08/22 17:30:00
298	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00
299	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00
300	0	2015/08/22 17:30:00


What were your tools to define your space? I asked, ***"Ourselves!"*** *an activist answered*

Some fixed features were found to be static along all the mapped days. This applies to the police barriers, then to the main layout of the police presence. The police barriers were distributed according to the accessibility of mainly targeted buildings: Governmental Palace, Parliament, Ministry of Environment and Beirut Municipality – as the shortest connection between Martyrs and Nijmeh squares. The entrances to Nijmeh square are permanently controlled with multi-layered gates with army guards. While metal wires were added to connection between the parliament and El Amir Bachir streets, as well as at the end of El Amir Bachir Street connected to Chiekh Toufiq Khalid Street (adjacent to ESCWA building), Evangelical church and Ahmad Daouk (heading to the Governmental Palace) and later Riyadh Alsolh Street (known as Banks Street). As the protest frequency and population increased, these wires were replaced with heavy cement barriers at these points.

All these barriers and personal presence of both protestors and police were used to mark a dynamic property of both. The borders of these properties were stable at Riyadh Alsolh Street entrances towards Nijmeh square, the connection of El Amir Bachir, Chiekh Toufiq Khalid and Ahmad Daouk streets, as well as all entrances from El Amir Bachir Street towards Nijmeh square; however, the other end of El Amir Bachir Street towards Bechara El Khoury, the Waygand (known as Municipality Street) and Hussein El Ahdab streets were all dynamic due to the crowd flow. Those barriers have reshaped the spaces of protesting through restricting the protesters' movement and excluding some gathering nodes and movement routes.

The maps in (Figure 6-9) represents an example of the main changes in the protestors' crowd during the period 14:00:00 – 22:00:00 GMT on the 22nd of August 2015. Aligning such maps of reduced scale, allowed to marginalise the details and focus on defining and featuring the organising principle of the crowd's layout to link it to the rest of parameters. Some maps will be presented through the flow of analysing the protest events in the next few pages; however, all maps [of major changes] are included in Appendix III.

Figure 6-9: The movement of the protestors' crowd 22.08.2015, 14:00 – 21:50 GMT



6.3.1 Event I: Occupying the district, 22 – 24, August 2015



Figure 6-10: photos of the main features of the event 22-24.08.2015

This is our parliament; this is our square[17]

The crowd chanted, recorded video, daytime 22.08.2015

The period of Saturday 22 – Monday 24.08.2015 is a protest event, identified with major protest practices and clashes which led to a dramatic change in the functionality and the connectivity of Riyadh Alsolh square through setting new military barriers opposite to the Governmental palace.

The 22nd of August was the biggest protest to date over uncollected rubbish as BBC reported in its reports. Thousands turned out near parliament in central Beirut, chanting slogans against the government and politicians. Some threw water bottles and firecrackers. The crowd was concentrated in Riyadh Alsolh and tents were distributed in the square. Imad Bazzi, one of You stink movement organisers, stated to Ibrahim Dasouqi – Live interview on New TV, that the protestors insist to stay in Riyadh Alsolh until the release of detainees. *“We are staying here until the government meets on Tuesday”*, an activist added in an interrogation by Nawal Berri, a news

[17] Referring to Nijmeh square

reporter. However, the clashes that occupied the majority of the protest evening changed the whole scene. Police fired tear gas, rubber bullets and water cannons after some protestors attempted to break through a security cordon. Later in the night, the number of protestors were reduced to less than 100 (Alzein, 2015). In his book, “What You Did Not Know About the Herak”, Alzein referred to the 22nd of August as the first day of the direct conflict between the people and the corrupt regime. In the same chapter, several interesting discussions were brought to surface regarding the conflictual actions. It was clear that even during the very early clashes in the 19th, it was an imbalanced conflict; however, approaching police cordon and trying to shake off the wired barrier seemed more like a representation of shaking off the boundaries of the state’s territory. As protestors raised their will to move towards the governmental palace and the parliament, the main two nodes of restrictive accessibility within the district, they were aiming at reclaiming their institutions – and the public spaces that are attached to them.

August 23, on day two of the sit-in, the prime minister spoke to people in an attempt to fill up the gap between the government and its people. Some of the Herak ‘leaders’ met in the afternoon near an old tree to the south of Riyadh Alsolh. Representors from You Stink, The Lebanese Environmental Movement, Campaign to close the Naameh landfill, Democratic Youth Union, Civic Campaign, Legal Agenda, We Want Accountability, Youth against the regime, Lebanese Association for Democratic Elections, The Secular Club of the American University of Beirut and independent activist met to shape up a unified statement against the violence and the prime minister’s speech; and it was agreed to call for protesting at 6:00 PM of the local time zone (16:00 GMT). Hassan Alzein, an independent attendee of this meeting, described this meeting as a very promising potential start of creating a shared organised platform for the Herak. In his book, he stated that the complexity of the scene is much more than any of the involved movements can hold,

independently. This included the violence that occurs in the squares, the regime heading towards finishing the garbage agreements, and the increase and variety of the protestors. For his estimations, at 16:00 GMT on the 23rd of August, 10 thousand protestors were in the BCD. The increased violence that night – when dozens of police and citizens were hurt in the clashes (The Atlantic, 2015), in addition to the disagreement of the different groups of the Herak on the "infiltrators" issue, contributed not only to ending of the protest on that day, but to start damaging the call for ending the sectarian regime. You Stink organisers called their people to withdraw from the square (Alzein, 2015), and to postpone the arranged demonstration of the following day (The Atlantic, 2015).

On the 24th, the civil movement groups tried their best during the day to exceed the shock of the violence that occurred in the previous night; however, the impact on ground was obvious with less than four hours of active protesting (Table 6-4). The protestors were surprised with the high concrete wall constructed on the edge of Riyadh Alsolh– opposite to the Governmentalpalace in what looked like a symbolic demonstration. The group that gathered in Riyad Alsolh met with another march that arrived from **outside the district**; before they all left the place, peacefully.




Figure 6-11: The graffiti on the concrete barrier placed opposite to the Governmental palace



wires and metal barriers at Riyadh Alsolh square opposite to the Governmental palace



A tweet of Karim Mustafa – a photographer who posted several scenes from the You Stink demonstration



The expansion of the buffer zone between police and protestors due to the use of water hoses – consecutive shots from BBC news report



Police forced protestors back with water hoses.



Setting the tents in Riyadh Alsolh (AFP)

Figure 6-12: Scenes from 22.08.2015





Figure 6-13: The mapped story of 22.08.2015









a. Lebanese protesters at Riyadh Alsolh square and Al Amir Basheer street (AP); b. wires and metal barriers between protestors and police at Riyadh Alsolh square opposite to the Governmental palace (AFP); and c. mapped crowd 16:00 GMT





a. A shot of starting using water hose against the protestors; and b. the mapped situation 17:00 GMT



Lebanese activists hold up a makeshift shield as they are sprayed by riot police using water cannons during a protest against the Lebanese government and an ongoing trash crisis in downtown Beirut (AP)

Figure 6-14: Scenes from 23.08.2015




Figure 6-15: The mapped story of 23.08.2015



Figure 6-16: Scenes from 24.08.2015

Table 6-4: Example of protestors population in cells FID {240 – 274}, 24.08.2015 shows that the active protesting hours was only between 14:30 – 18:00 GMT

	24/08/2015																									
	14:						15:						16:						17:						18:	
FID	:00:00	:10:00	:20:00	:30:00	:40:00	:50:00	:00:00	:10:00	:20:00	:30:00	:40:00	:50:00	:00:00	:10:00	:20:00	:30:00	:40:00	:50:00	:00:00	:10:00	:20:00	:30:00	:40:00	:50:00	:00:00	:10:00
240				0	0	0	0	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
241				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
242				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	5	0	1	0	0	
243				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	10	10	0	6	0	0	
244				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	36	18	9	0	0	
245				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	27	27	7	0	0	
246				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	6	13	6	0	0	
247				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	6	24	6	0	0	
248				0	0	6	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	6	23	23	6	0	0	
249				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	44	5	0	0	
250				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	62	62	0	0	0	
251				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	58	58	5	0	0	
252				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	55	55	0	0	0	
253				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	17	34	0	0	0	
254				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	31	0	0	0	
255				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	43	0	7	4	0	
256				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	48	12	6	0	
257				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	49	12	0	0	
258				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	35	6	6	0	
259				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	36	3	0	6	6	6	
260				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	37	3	0	6	0	0	
261				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	41	0	0	7	0	0	
262				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	109	0	73	18	9	9	
263				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	39	39	0	39	79	0	0	
264				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	5	0	
265				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	4	4	
266				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	27	0	0	
267				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	40	0	0	
268				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	20	0	0	
269				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	19	10	10	
270				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	0	0	
271				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	40	0	0	
272				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	9	9	0	
273				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0	
274				0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	



Figure 6-17: The mapped story of 24.08.2015

6.3.2 Event II: Reshaping the functionalism of the district, 19 – 21, September 2015



Figure 6-18: photos of the main features of the event 19 – 21.08.2015

We came to a space that used to be ours. We want it back

An activist said about 'Abu Rakhousah' – News report

As previously discussed in chapter 5, Solidere project has widely changed the appearance of Beirut Downtown with a luxurious consumerism that is beyond the capabilities of a wide slice of the Beiruti community. During the Herak, simple commercial functions appeared in the form of street vendors who sell simple requirements – like water and biscuits. This trend was rejected by Nicola Al-Shammas, the chair of the Beirut Traders Association, who in his famous speech said that the commercial centre of Beirut is not allowed to be converted into 'Abu Rakhousah' – a local slang expression to represent a low-income market. In their reaction towards his words, the Herak considered that Al-Shammas stressed the division of the Lebanese community. "We were offended by his expression" an activist said during an interview; "he considered wealthy people who can afford the prices in the downtown as first class citizens, then what about us? Are we the second, third or even lower class for him?" he added. Here from, the idea of Abu Rakhousah flea market existed. "It was a challenge" an organiser of the market said while interviewed; "we wanted to show his that we belong to here, and that we have the right to interact with the centre of our city"

he added “and to inconvenience them with reminding people every month of the expression he used to describe the Herak”.

The market that started with 2 tents of people who brought their own stuff to sell – food, drinks, sweets, second-hand clothes …etc, expanded for four months to consist of 20 tents built in Riyadh Alsolh square – just next to the statue. Then it was moved to the Martyrs’ square. The transmission of the market happened due to several reasons: First, it was the lack of area in Riyadh Alsolh. The market that expanded quickly and attracted more and more people every month required a larger area to host these people. Second, the market organisers started to establish a collective awareness campaign against Solidere, who from their point of view, has stolen the city centre and damaged the memory of the place. Third, was to rebuild the collective Beiruti memory of the place. Martyrs’ square, also known as Al-Borj square before the civil war, was one of the most crowded places of Beirut centre as it was a permanent market to which people used to come not only from Beirut, but from all over Lebanon. Older people reclaimed their memories about the area before the war, and this flea market was reviving these memories for old generations and contributing to shaping a new one for the youth – away from the fake identity of Solidere (an interviewee stated). Spatially, the contest for the area was obvious between the market organisers and Solidere. From the Solidere side, they tried to disturb the market by preventing the people from using any of the empty lands around Martyrs’ square – which are usually used as car parking, pushing the market to main street which the state closed down every time the market launched from 10:00 – 22:00 in the local time zone. On the other hand, the market organisers continuously focused on re-inviting the terminologies belonging to the pre-Solidere era. The market organisers used photos and videos to revive people’s memory about the place. They interviewed celebrities who can recall their memory of old Beirut and continuously referred to the city centre with the word ‘Albalad’ instead of

‘downtown’, and ‘Al-Borj’ square instead of Martyr’s, or even their slogan “Beirut, the live right of her people”. The organisers and attendees of the flea market in ‘Abu Rakhousah”, who started to come from all over Lebanon (an organiser said), reclaimed the place, the memory and the terminology away from the distorted emptied version of Solidere.

On the 20th of September, the protest appeared to take place in Martyr’s square – specifically on its intersection with Waygand street (municipality street). Protestors who tried to reach Al-Nijmeh square were in a continuous fore and back movement with the police forces along Al Shohada street – next to Martyrs’ and Waygand street until the intersection with Al Omari Mosque street – one of the Nijmeh square’s entrances, where they marched for a while before leaving the whole area.

The 21st did not host protest events, but another spatial change was made to the district in parallel with launching the national dialogue. Martyr’s square was disconnected from Waygand street using concrete barriers, where the widest approach to the Nijmeh square was totally closed and the area was exclusively used by the politicians.



Figure 6-19: Abu0Rakhousah souk – occupying the BCD with lower-income oriented economic function. “Here is Al-Balad (city centre) not Solidere.”




Figure 6-20: The mapped story of 20.09.2015



Figure 6-21: Theme of 19.09.2015, gathering at the flea market located in Riyadh Alsolh surroundings, 14:40 – 18:00 GMT

6.4 A review of the established spatial relationship between the protestors and the square during the demonstration events

"This space is all that I achieved. I either keep it or lose it"

(An activist – interview 2017)

After 2005, all demonstrations were prevented from accessing the Nijmeh square. This space that was historically the heart of Beirut, turned now to be arrested by parliament security who started to consider it as a part of the parliament building rather than a public square. *"The main square of the BCD was taken from us"* an activist said, *"hereby, we turned our focus to Riyadh Alsolh as a temporary alternative milieu for our protest"* he added. On the other side, *"we cannot stay in Riyadh Alsolh permanently"* an interviewee stated. Although it is the nearest to the Governmental Palace and to the Parliament and Nijmeh square, he highlighted that the correlation of Riyadh Alsolh and Martyr's square to the images of the 8th and 14th campaign in 2005 can point to some sectarian accusations to the Herak. Thus, the movement organisers were alert to the fact that in the case of Beirut, the public space is not a passive space, neither an independent one. Public space in Beirut has its own political and sectarian determinants and meanings, even worse, identity. This identification of the sectarian space goes even beyond the central district of the city. Several spaces in different quarters of the city are directly correlated in the collective memory of the Beiruti people to either specific political party, sectarian group or conflictual event – especially during the civil war. The perception of the spatial ownership dominated the competition between the protestors and the state. At some points, the protestors were focusing on establishing a conceptual ownership through the trials of arriving at Nijmeh square. For the statement of Riyadh Alsolh, their peaceful arrival to the square on the 29th of August gave them a feeling of their belonging to the space, the

feeling that was immediately contested by a political party who called their supporters to march in Martyrs' square.

Additionally, the bordering of the district [analysed in chapter 5] affected the protestors' perception of the space and their attachment to it. Some activists during the interviews highlighted the risks created by the area limitations especially in case of "infiltrators" sneaking within the crowd. Others pointed to the threats that were predicted from Shehab bridge, which borders the downtown and separates it from 'Khandag Al-Ghamiq' – an area of Amal's supporters to which the police were pushing the protestors to leave the district. In such cases, the feeling of being attached to the squares reduced and the space turned to be perceived as a collective presence of the protestors themselves. An interviewee and a leader of the Herak stated this clearly when she said: *"in normal situations, we insisted on attaching ourselves to the space. In the Environment Ministry, they tried to pull us out and we were trying again and again to remain in our places. It is mine. That is what we wanted to tell them. However, at the risky moments, we lost our feeling of the place, and our focus was on our presence. The crowd turned to be our place."* Another activist insisted that his memory of space was all about his personal space and how peaceful/violent was the message that they wanted to deliver to the police –the most peaceful choice of Martyr's, the most threatening one of Nijmeh and the most uncertain situation of Riyadh Alsolh.

Previously, in the first part of this thesis, the sectarian nature of the Lebanese community was presented as the main source of conflict - creating the multiple contesting groups [competitors for domination]. Despite that, in 2015, You Stink failed to form a well-established political statement (Alzein, 2015); this *Herak* was the point during which the distribution of the competition platform in Lebanon was rearranged. Nonetheless, the civil state campaign appeared as a new content from outside the traditional sectarian regime. The movement that lost its momentum after few months,

established a trend of competition for domination in the universities, syndicates, and even in the parliament elections in 2018. It has recategorized the whole political sectarian parties in one campaign, regardless of their internal conflicts. For all the involved parties, this new campaign turned into a source of inconvenience. According to some points of view, the concurrence of the violent actions in the squares with the politicians' meetings and the decisions taken at that time, explained the level of inconvenience caused to the ruling parties with the new competitor. This competitor appeared clearly on the 29th of August, when they created an image of a diverse sit-in in Martyr's square. Although it was numerically less than the images of the 14th and 8th of March campaigns from 2005, this sit-in added a third campaign of those who left the images of the 14th and 8th.

Spatially, the constructed barriers created an additional dimension of the spatial competition. The state set them up to defend their territory, while the protestors used them as an extra space for visually expressing their thoughts. The main concrete barrier that was put opposite to the Governmental Palace was turned into a huge urban piece of art. The created graffiti served not only as an area for speaking up, rather than a tool to contest the state for the ownership of these barriers. This wall appeared to have its position in the memory of the activists. In the interviews I conducted in 2017, many activists mentioned it positively; wondering where it is now, and how firm was the regime in hiding it. On the other hand, I have personally observed some leftovers of the protestors' graffiti at several concrete and metal elements in the Riyadh Alsolh surroundings: phrases that question the militarized presence in the city centre, others that remind of famous statements from the national anthem and some Lebanese songs, some related to social justice, and others.



Figure 6-22: Lebanese activists tweet on the (a) the vitality of the space during the demonstration and (b) the placed new gates on the entrances of the Nijmeh square



Figure 6-23: observed leftovers of the protestors graffiti from the protest movement 2015 – Riyadh Alsolh square, opposite to the Nijmeh square entrance, photographed on 01.11.2017. “for whom is the militarized presence?”



Figure 6-24: observed leftovers of the protestors graffiti from the protest movement 2015 along Al-Amir Bashir Street – photographed on 08.11.2017. a. "Revolution", b. a sentence from a famous Lebanese song about the sectarianism "Take care of your ID, hold it firmly", c. scattered sentences "is there any other place more beautiful than Lebanon" "You stink" and the first sentence of the national anthem of Lebanon "We are all for the country"

6.5 The spatial features of the protestors' crowd

The created maps defined a homogenised crowd's territory of all groups of protestors which have been identified through literature and interviews. This includes You Stink Activist, civil society (non-sectarian) campaigns, previous or existing leftist and communist parties and 'We Want Accountability'. The repetitive characteristics of the crowd's layout have figured out 4 main patterns in relation to crowd's population, the physical objects of the space and the expansion of the territory of the police crowd:

a. Clustered crowd: A static territory of a small population of protestors which reacts towards a stable police territory. For this pattern, the barriers act as a node of attraction for protestors who are occupying the square. This pattern shows the lowest probability of clashes between police and protestors.
b. Radial crowd: A static territory of a large population of protestors which reacts towards a stable dense police territory. For this pattern, the barriers act as a node of attraction for protestors who are occupying the square. This pattern shows a low probability of clashes, even though it has the nearest spatial proximity of police and protestors.
c. Linear crowd: A transitional territory of a small population of protestors which reacts towards a police territory whose size is changed quickly, defined and expanded with the use of tear gas and fire shooting. For this pattern, the barriers act like an attraction point for protestors who have been evacuated from the square and an evicting point for the police who occupy it. Although this pattern has the largest buffer zone between the two territories, it shows the highest probability of clashes.

d. Divided radial crowd: A dynamic territory of a large population of protestors which reacts towards an expanding police territory with the minimum movement of their personnel and the use of water shooting. For this pattern, barriers act like an evicting node of protestors and a shared occupation of the square.

By connecting the physical features of all territories to the probability of clashes to happen, it has been found that the conflictual sense of the different groups within the space can be used as a tool of identifying the status of their competition for dominating the space. The produced maps have, surprisingly, indicated some disconnectivity between the size and spatial proximity of the crowds and the emergence of their conflictual sense; even the centrality of the crowd within the square (the protestors' domination of the square) was found to be disconnected from enacting threat upon the state's territory. On the other hand, they showed that the dynamics and density of the crowd's territory may have a direct impact on the conflictual sense of the creators of space; however, due to the activists' narratives, it seems that the crowd's density was more of a result of the violent actions rather than a cause. In result, the mapping of the crowd's distribution and movement during the protest event in Beirut Central District shows a high probability of correlation between the dynamics of the crowd and the emergence of a sense of being threatened [which is translated into violent actions]. The theoretical discussion of these results will take place in the following chapter.




Figure 6-25: the patterns of crowd's layout

Table 6-5: the spatial features of the defined patterns

	Clustered Ccr	Radial Rcr	Linear Lcr	Divided radial CRcr
Population	LP	HP	LP	HP
Protestors - Median Density per 100sqm	LD - MD	MD	HD	MD
State - Median Density per 100sqm	LD	MD	HD	MD
Protestors - Dynamics	S	S	FP	FP
State - Dynamics	S	S	FSz	E
Who dominate the square	Prs	Prs	Ste	Shared*
Barriers influence	Att	Att	Att	Evt
Spatial alignment	SBfz	SBfz	LBfz	MBfz
Violent actions	N-VA	L-VA	H-VA	L-VA

* shared dominance did not conflict with the existence of the buffer zone as the state's dominance is more correlated to their tools rather than presence

6.6 Dominating Downtown Beirut: The changes of the spatial features of the protestors' crowd between 2005 and 2015

One of the most turbulent times in Lebanon's political history began in August of 2004 with the Syrian effort to extend Lebanese President Emile Lahoud's term. The Lebanese Parliament passed a constitutional amendment under extreme pressure, the specifics of which were not clear or acknowledged, which would allow Lahoud, a close associate of Syria, to remain in office for an extended three years. Though, unlike previous Syrian movements in Lebanon, the initiative faced strong resistance both in Lebanon and globally. On September the 2nd, 2004, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1559 ordered all remaining forces of foreign origin to exit Lebanon and the demobilization and disarmament of all non-Lebanese and Lebanese militias and most notably, declared their support for a free and fair election in the ensuing Lebanese presidential

election held in compliance with Lebanese constitutional rules without foreign influence or intervention. A major shift in this development occurred when on the 14th of February 2005, the day in which former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, whose relationship with the Syrian regime had worsened during the previous year, was assassinated by a truck bomb. The following developments are well documented: the Syrian troops' withdrawal at the end of April 2005, the formation of the International Independent Investigation Commission of into the assassination of Rafiq Hariri, and the sweeping victory of the anti-Syrian forces in the parliamentary elections of May-June 2005, all taking place against the background of protests and counter-protests in which hundreds of thousands of Lebanese carrying flags were involved. The Western media and U.S. officials were eager to name what was happening in Lebanon "the Cedar Revolution" following the developments in other post-Soviet republics that were happening at the same time, such as the Orange Revolution' in Ukraine,' the Velvet Revolution' in Georgia and the Tulip Revolution' in Kyrgyzstan (Al-Nahar Newspaper archives point to this reality in its section: "Lebanon and The Middle East in Israeli Media" - "Haaretz citing the Herald Tribune: The Cedar Revolution in Lebanon: Is it a continuation of the orange revolution in Ukraine?"). The opposition groups existing in Lebanon, seemingly motivated by what was happening in the occupied Palestinian territories, favoured another label: "the intifada of independence."

This popular movement's political demands were rather clear. The opposition called for a detailed timeline for the full withdrawal of Syrian armed forces and intelligence services (an estimated 14,000 armed forces), the expulsion of Lebanese intelligence chiefs, the appointment of a 'neutral' government to prepare for the May 2005 parliamentary elections, and an international investigation into the death of Hariri. The events in Lebanon, however, undermined the Cedar Revolution's

presumed unity and cohesion. On the one hand, on 10 March 2005, Karami was re-appointed with the impossible mission of forging a comprehensive government of national unity.




Figure 6-26: Caricature from Al-Nahar Newspaper Archives with the caption “formation of the new government” and representing a hand, implied to be that of the Syrian Government, giving half the government seat to Prime Minister Omar Karame.

On the other hand, in downtown Beirut, the Hasan Nasrallah, the leader of Hizballah, successfully organized a major pro-Syrian rally. The demands of the two common movements partly overlap. However, though both agree to seek an international investigation into the assassination of Hariri and the withdrawal of the Syrian military presence in Lebanon, Nasrallah reiterated the statement that the 1989 Ta'if Agreement, and not Resolution UNSC 1559 of the United Nations Security Council, remains the foundation of any future substantive national debate in Lebanon. In other

terms, the party strongly opposed the anti-Syrian rhetoric and urged the opposition to reinforce the Lebanese-Syrian nexus by defending the "resistance" of the Hizballah military against Israel.

It may be argued in the aftermath of these developments that the slogan of national unity proclaimed by the opposition is clearly baseless. It is obvious that the "old/new" sectarian cleavage that characterizes Lebanese politics is omnipresent, with the Muslim Shi'ite sect clearly throwing its weight behind Syria, while a new form of sectarian alliance that unexpectedly includes the Christian Maronites, the Druze and the Sunni Muslims is noticed at the other end. In other terms, their positions have been reformulated and redefined by sectarian actors, but the sectarian system in which they are embedded remains intact. This sectarian divide materialized in the division of protest spaces.



Figure 6-27: the division of protest spaces – (a) the protestors from the 14th of March campaign in Martyrs square, and (b) the protestors from the 8th of March campaign in Riyadh Alsolh square


7 AN-NAHAR Mardi 8 Mars 2005

محليات سياسية

النهار

المتظاهرون تدفقوا في "نهر الحرية" من ساحة الشهداء الى السان جورج: صوِّروا Zoom in و Zoom out ولن نستسلم قبل تحقيق النصر

دقيقة صمت وتحركات طالبية في صيدا وزحلة

تدابير سير لمواكبة تظاهرة اليوم

مجهولان يحرقان منظاهرا

Figure 6-28: “The demonstrators poured into the "Freedom River" from Martyrs Square to St. George: Take pictures, zoom in and zoom out, and we will not surrender before victory is achieved.”

Headline from Al-Nahar newspaper referring to the large number of anti-Syrian protestors that took over Beirut's central district.

Though, behind this arbitrary and short-term distinction between an anti-Syrian and a pro-Syrian camp exists a clash between a multitude of various national Lebanese initiatives, tailored in regards to the needs of each sect. While the reaction of Hizballah can be analysed in light of maintaining its influence and the privileges gained from preserving the status quo, the language used by the opposition sectarian leaders can hardly be seen as consensual. Well beyond agreement on the full withdrawal of Syria, the language revolved essentially around Hizballah's position and future in the future political configuration of Lebanon. In this context, the debate moved between the focus on the use of the Ta'if Agreement and the resolution of UNSC 1559 as legal benchmarks for any possible future political action.The representatives of the Druze and Sunni sects had repeatedly maintained that they abide by the Ta'if agreement, while the Christian opposition supported the UNSC 1559 resolution in general and sought to dilute the distinction between the two. The fragility, or maybe in a more critical tone, the lack of a shared Lebanese identity is underlined by this complex divergence. While arguing that a Lebanese identity can but in actuality does not exist, is very popular in Lebanon, nothing has been done to resolve the real problems that divide the Lebanese society. The contentious relationship between the identities of "Arabic" and "Lebanese" has been extensively debated in the past, but is still clearly superfluous.

While the withdrawal of Syrian troops under foreign pressure and major public protests mark a significant landmark in Lebanon's history, the Lebanese political structure has critical elements of continuity: In the context of Lebanon's external relations, the confessional nature of Lebanese politics, the pervasive presence of transnational alliances, the confrontational nature of political discourse and persistent foreign interference in Lebanese politics. These aspects of continuity bear

witness to the presence of a cleavage of independence-integration in Lebanon, in which Lebanese society is divided, both at the grassroots level and elite level, between two almost equally strong groups supporting contradictory positions on the essence, identity and spatial aspects of Lebanese society: An anti-Syrian faction advocating political and military independence from Syria and a pro-Syrian faction supporting close links with the same country, or special relations. As a result of this split into two camps, it was not feasible to conceive of the Lebanese people as a collective actor in the context of being a sufficiently united body that transcends its constituent confessional components and is capable of exercising collective self-determination either by choosing independence as a whole or by choosing merger, union or special relations with Syria as an entirety. Therefore if what we mean by "Cedar Revolution" is a fight for freedom by the Lebanese' instead of the Maronites, the Sunnis and the Druze, then the term is highly misleading. It would be probable, at best, to talk of an effort by an alliance of the Maronites, the Sunnis and the Druze to establish an equivalent of the 1943 National Pact.

Though, given the degree of political and social mobilization amongst these Shi 'as, and the fact that compliance with or tacit approval of the Shi 'as was a vital prerequisite for the implementation of the National Pact in 1943, it was unlikely that this new coalition would be able to reconstitute the Lebanese alliance. The political and social condition in Lebanon at the beginning of the 21st century is very distant in this respect from what it was in 1943. Ultimately, it should be noted that contemporary period which is defined by extensive integration and disintegration processes like for instance the European Union project and numerous secessionist movements - the fragmentation of the collective, independence-integration cleavage, and the issue of collective self-determination can arise in any politically active collective where there exists a consistent and durable controversy about the identity of it, the nature of it, and spatial bound.

6.7 New chapters of dominating the city: the endless contest of the institutional ascendancy, capital exploitation, and protestors' occupation[18]

There are universal rights that residents in Lebanon are not particularly attuned to or aware of one of, one of which is the primordial right to public space, notably in the sense of being open, free and accessible to all. Public spaces in Lebanon are diversified but few, namely beaches, corniches, bridges, and roads. But most importantly, the country lacks major social and cultural public spaces designed for assembly purposes or for pedestrians in a broader manner. This is partly due to an accelerated capitalist urban development that benefited the private sector, namely the real estate industry, over public interests.

Inevitably, the first public domain seized by protestors was the street. Hundreds of thousands, with their banners raised high and proud, occupied and subsequently colonized the roads unapologetically. Pedestrians took over entire streets and displaced the traditionally prevalent vehicles instead of being restricted to tiny sidewalks. A sense of security has been instilled. Although significantly less numerous, even the vehicles that were still circulating accepted a highly decreased speed, unwilling (or in some instances, willingly) safeguarding the marching demonstrators. Finally, civilians began to feel accepted and welcome on the streets of their capital, and within them a feeling of identity and reclaiming was steadily cultivated.

[18] Most data in this section are collected by Lebanon Support, unless mentioned.




Figure 6-29: The increase of the collective actions took place in Lebanon (2017 – 2020)




Figure 6-30: Collective actions by mode of action, Lebanon 2017 – 2020

There were multiple and clearly observable consequences of this newly established pedestrian monopoly. A once extinct practice was first and foremost rediscovered: walking. Prior to the protests, the very notion of walking around Beirut was nearly inconceivable, and even more so was the idea that one could go by foot from one destination to another. This was mainly due to the lack of security which in turn is due to the inadequate and deficient infrastructure in Beirut, an inherent general structure targeted at vehicles rather than pedestrians. Roads are known for insufficient lighting, pollution, inadequate sidewalks in addition to a general lack of regulation. As such, Beirut continuously suffers from shrinking sidewalks, added highways, and enlarged roads. When all previously mentioned factors combine with an alarming lack of accessible and efficient public transportation, the result is inevitably an individualistic automobile culture.

For the duration of the October 17 protests, a period of months, people were walking everywhere: through roads, lanes, alleyways, boulevards, bridges, highways and tunnels. Even fast lanes had to slow down or become completely still as protesters took over. Additionally, hitchhiking became a common occurrence as people felt safer with each other: the Lebanese flag or Palestinian Kouffiye was a sign of confidence. People would even hitchhike on motorcycles and protesters would form WhatsApp groups and coordinate rides.

Ironically, contested spaces have become spaces for contesting. Highways were well-suited for activists' purposes due to their ability to host the ever-increasing number of activists and their primary function as connections between spaces. Quickly, the intersection of General Fouad Chehab Avenue and George Haddad Road, commonly referred to as ‘The Ring’ highway, joining the BCD to the rest of Beirut, was closed down by activists. Furniture and tents were placed on the highway which was labelled “Beit Al Sha’b” (the house of the people). In this situation, a transgression took place through the reappropriation of the space: the intended function of the

highway was transgressed and converted into another. Nonetheless, this change occurs by merely inserting portable furniture for a transient window of time, causing the transition from dynamic to static space. Nothing was changed nor damaged physically. As a result, a multitude of collective actions and activities flourished, and allowed for an unprecedented typology of ephemeral space to be conceived and experienced.



Figure 6-31: Lebanese people reclaim downtown Beirut, 20.10.2019

The formerly forgotten squares of BCD also acquired span as a result of the revolution, and reclaimed meaning and life. They are now flourishing. And although marches prompted the first step to the reappropriation of public space, what followed became much more symbolic of this occurrence. A monumental forum for trade (of ideas, cultures, knowledge and even life necessities such as food and water) was created in the occupied areas.

Throughout the protests, the BCD became more of a destination and less of a transitional space. Prior to October 17, emptiness and parking spaces strongly prevailed upon arrival in Downtown. The city-centre, as presented in chapter 5, was for the most part a transitional space rather than a destination; with flow occurring in vehicles rather than human movement. During the protests, the BCD became a destination that also links one place to another. Parking lots that had already exceeded tremendous proportions served enormously in the expansion of squares for human gatherings after October 17. In people's eyes, the arrows on the floor demarcating car parking spaces have ceased to exist. Parking lots have become part of public space and have become a venue for individuals rather than cars. The expansion extended to a point where Martyr's Square, Riyadh Alsolh, and the Ring were almost encompassed as one. People realized that they had to put in the effort to reclaim abandoned places for this movement to last. And they were willing to do so and hence initiated uncountable social and cultural events.

The singing, the banners, and the resolve came first. Bonds between individuals from different backgrounds and of all ages were directly tied. At incredibly low prices, street vendors and local retailers, formerly unwelcome, confidently established their stands and supplied demonstrators with a variety of food, drinks, and Lebanese engraved trinkets (It is important to note that small businesses also took advantage of this souk, supplying kiosks selling waffles, hotdogs and other Lebanese fast-food.).

An almost carnival-like scene arose. Stages have been installed. Consequently, a medium was created, either by words, or poetry, or music, for people to express themselves and their identities. Arabic songs were constantly performed, and new artists appeared, especially from the underground rap scene.



Figure 6-32: scenes from Martyrs square on (a) 27.10.2019 and (b) 06.11.2019

The activities have been organized and coordinated. For the people who were staying the evenings and nights, tents were placed either on grass or asphalt in order to encourage their stay. As described above, a furnished wall-less apartment with a dining room serving fresh free food, mattresses, and even carpets, "Beit el Sha'b," was built on the Ring and available to everyone. In addition to the political nature of the protests and marches, leisure events also emerged: many played cards and board games, some took their equipment and played tennis and yoga and other favourite sports. Some protesters even mounted a slackline. On the Ring, a football field was traced and games were conducted. One person also set up an inflatable pool. Live free gigs and raves have taken place. The techno scene has resurfaced as well. People lit up the place as it got dark and streetlights were non-existent or fading, and kept it secure with the flashlights on their phones, their car headlights, or even stage lights.



Figure 6-33: Setting a living space at Ring road, near Borj Alghazal, 27.10.2019

There have been major personal activities as well: marriages, proposals, and birthday parties. On the highways and in the squares, everything could be done. Additionally, a human chain of 170,000 persons, linking the north and south of Lebanon, was successfully completed. People realized what was occurring was greater than what had been their most ambitious expectations.

People were smiling, chanting, crying, laughing, playing, sitting, walking, talking for the first time in years in a public space and in such proportions. The stairs of El Amin-Mosque were chosen for sitting, resting, and observing, as were the slopes of the Rafic el Hariri Monument, the lawn of Martyr's Square and Charles Debbas Park, or even the benches of Samir Kassir Square. People were sleeping on the asphalt or using whatever resources were available.

In the moment, several programs were developed. The revolution brought people a sense of ownership of their reclaimed spaces, resulting in the sincerest gratitude and respect for them and the need to take care of them and protect them.

Every morning, routine cleanups were scheduled and copious quantities of garbage were recycled. There were affordable first aid supplies. Moreover, psychiatric help was provided, as marches are emotionally exhausting, rightfully so. To those in need, people donated free food and clothes.

Water was installed in reservoirs in an environmentally conscious way to minimize the use of plastic bottles, solar panels were set up, and greenery was introduced in the form of plants to compensate for the lack of green spaces in Beirut.

But those who offered the hope of providing solutions to the impending situation were among the most influential initiatives that emerged. Regular seminars, ideas, activities, teachings... all free to the public, to discuss and address the situation were arranged by students, scholars, professors, specialists and activist groups. In the open air, talks were arranged in kiosks, parks, vacant

buildings, and in parks. For instance, numerous meetings, conferences and discussions occurred in the Gebran Khalil Gebran Garden, a landscaped public area that hardly anyone knew existed prior to the protests.

Nonetheless, protestors knew when to halt the more implicit attempts of the authorities to infiltrate and overtake the reclaimed spaces as was the case with The Hub. The hub was a tent placed by the Civic Influence Hub Lebanon, a group of businessmen close to (or participating in) the corrupt Lebanese regime. When it organized extremely problematic seminars and talks, essentially furthering the neoliberal agenda that had been put in place since Lebanon's reconstruction, attempting to normalize the idea of privatizing Lebanon's water by calling it "blue gold," and refusing fundamental political messages such "kellon ya3ne kellon," the hub outed itself as an outlet for the political and economic elite attempting to disguise itself as part of the "opposition." After numerous non-violent attempts by protestors to force the Hub to leave, and with the latter reinforcing their tent with state agents (ie. police and bodyguards), the protesters resorted to burning the tent. Similarly, when the MPs decided to host their first session post-October 17, with no trust from the people and law proposals that still contradict public interests on their agenda, protesters took it upon themselves to close down all roads leading to the parliament, calling this successful initiative "the human shield".

For once, protesters negated the heavily militarised control the authorities exerted over the area. The parliament and Nijmeh square which had been made inaccessible to the public, were now reclaimed in the sense that they were made inaccessible to the authorities by the very protesters they attempted to keep out of them. Although several attempts were made, the protesters were not able to enter the parliament which was heavily guarded. Nonetheless, the success of the protests sparked uncontrolled retaliation from the authorities which used "legal" and illegal means to

unsuccessfully force the protesters out. One MP attempted to fade in the crowd and enter the parliament by riding on a motorcycle, but he was recognized and kept out. Another MP's bodyguards fired live bullets on protestors from inside the MP's car for being denied entry. On numerous occasions, MP's vehicles threatened to drive over protestors to force them out of the way, often resorting to the Police forces to break the "human shield."



Figure 6-34: The promoting poster of "the human shield"

Most of the aforementioned initiatives were undertaken by the younger generations, paying due to the pro-activeness of youth. The famous Egg, once known as the "Beirut City Centre," became a very popular previously-unused space that was also re-appropriated. It is part of a multi-use complex conceived in the 60s by Joseph Philippe Karam, often remembered as an old cinema; the form of which derived for it its "egg" appellation. It was worn down by age and conflict, notably due to its location in the centre of Downtown. During the protests, it opened its “doors" and hosted hundreds of events, ranging from screenings and conventions to raves and celebrations. As an emblem of the revolt, the Egg has also been climbed on and decorated. In particular, the rave held raised a lot of critical concerns about the building's structural capacities and the possibility of deterioration of its situation. Other abandoned structures, such as the "Grand Theatre des Milles et Une Nuits," constructed in the 30s by the renowned architect Youssef Aftimos, who also designed the Barakat complex, the future Beit Beirut, have been re-accessed and repurposed.

During the civil war, the legendary landmark of the Teatro al-Kabir was deserted and closed to the public by Solidere. Debates on its future have been raging since 1990. It was most likely destined to become yet another, publicly unavailable, luxury hotel. In the meantime, it held several gatherings and sit-ins, and hosted Michel Roger, an opera singer, who expressed himself in the middle of the ruins and resurrected the former glory of the structure for a moment before it was re-closed for security reasons.

Deserted Landmarks then became symbols of the Revolution. In fact, the first act performed is the reactivation of space in those areas where the greatest and most flexible reclamation has occurred. This means that a city's unused, outdated spaces are typically where it is fully rebirthed. It's when real investment sparks and a genuine turnaround beginsIt is important to keep in mind that not only physical space, but also virtual spaces, have been regained. Politics used to represent a taboo

subject of debate. Post-protests, the only subject that people seem to be concerned about has to do with political affairs. In addition to posting art, jokes, and "memes," Facebook, WhatsApp and Instagram have become forums for revealing truths surrounding recent revolutionary developments. Articles, photos, sketches, and most notably, images, and videos are continuously communicated all over the country and serve as a way of domestically and globally conveying the truth. Some media were born out of the Protests such as “Akhbar Al-Sa7a” (News from the Square), a feminist initiative documenting all political abuses and violence. Another example is that of Thawra Map or Daleel Thawra, a platform to document all events occurring each day all over the country, in addition to providing aid (such as food, clothes and blood donations). Previously existing alternative media channels such as Megaphone gained in popularity. All over the Lebanese cyberspace, the protests dominated.



Figure 6-35: an overview of the key protest sites in Beirut which have been reclaimed by protestors Beirut 2019 (The Civil Society Knowledge Centre – Lebanon Support 2019)

Conclusion of Part II

"When participating in events, experiencing their atmosphere, observing other people and sounding my own feelings, I realised that events not only take place in public urban space but partake in its production."

(Lehtovuori, 2016)

This part of the thesis traced the modes of popularising the dominance in one of the most important and influential quarters of the city – Beirut Central District (BCD). Mapping the scattered archive of visual, written and spoken narratives using GIS has visualised different types of data of the real situations of the square at certain points of time.

Through mapping the routine and eventual urban scenes of Beirut downtown, an ongoing story of the contestation of the spaces was revealed. The contestation of the district has a direct impact on the function, conceived image and accessibility of its spaces. The presence of several institutional buildings, markets, offices and military barriers have dominated the texture of the district for the last 3 decades. The analysis of the spatial condition of the district showed a deterioration in the conception of public space in downtown Beirut. Physical and emotional detachment of the district from the rest of the city and its citizens were traced.

On the eventual scene of the district, a long timeline of several protest movement that took place in the district was represented by selected events from 2005, 2015 and 2019. In these movements, protestors claimed the public spaces of the city centre. The civil movement of You Stink, 2015, brought the citizens back to the district as a player in shaping its spaces. A new arrangement of the contesting forces appeared with two main territories: the state's [and its partners] and the

protestors'. Two analysed protest events revealed the state's and protestors' trials to reshape their relationship with the public spaces of the district. On the state's side, new barriers were added to enhance the defining of their territory and prevent/delay the protestors movement towards it; while the protestors were trying to bring their citizens-like functions back to the squares. Both had led to a dramatic change in the functionality and the connectivity of the squares.

The created maps highlighted the importance of paying attention to the situation-to-be as well as we do with analysing the current situation of the urban condition. Surprising results indicated some disconnectivity between the protestors' population, their occupation of the square and spatial proximate to the police presence from engaging violent actions. On the other hand, higher probability of correlation between the dynamics of the crowd and the occurrence of the violent actions was highlighted.

Reflecting the mapped events to similar protest movements supported a graduate change of the protestors-space relationship between 2005 and 2019. The stable division of the protest spaces between the contesting campaigns in 2005 was turned into moving the main protest practices out of the traditionally contested spaces. Further than the mapped superiority of occupying the roads that connects the squares together [in 2015] rather than the squares themselves, in 2019 squares remained their symbolic role of popularising the protestors dominance, where some symbols were places and events were planned, but the majority of the contestation between the protestors and the police was moved to occur in the roads that connects the district to the other quarters of the city.

The next chapter will try to, theoretically, explain and justify the results of the maps. It will, also, try to seek for the roots of the traced changes on the spatial practices while demonstrating that were revealed between the protest events in 2005, 2015 and 2019.


PART III
RE-DEFINING THE DOMINANCE OF SPACE: ACTUAL VS POTENTIAL OCCUPATION

This part consists of one chapter [chapter 7] that reflects on the previously stated theoretical conceptions of attaching the space to its social objects. Using the analysed plural patterns of crowds contribution to the hosting space, as well as the other counter crowds, this chapter will discuss the change of the collective understanding of popularising the dominance on space to be detached from the actual position of the actor (creator) for the benefit of the unoccupied absolute space. The found results will be linked back to its theoretical context in order to move the explanation of the mapped change of the experiential production of space from the plural back to the individual scale. In result, the chapter will try to seek for the theoretical justification of the actual vs potential occupation and their role in popularising the spatial dominance.

Chapter 7
THE IMPACT OF POTENTIAL DOMINATION ON MEDIATING THE PRODUCTION OF UNOCCUPIED SPACES

7.1 Introduction

This chapter travels along with the thesis development with the space-object-action model. It explains how the case study has interpreted the theoretical entities of the experiential production of space into contextualised and defined elements that are observable and analysable. The square, protestors and the spatial practices of demonstration stood for implementing [and eased the understanding] of the relationship between the space and objects in the process of the spatial-temporal production of public space. This chapter reflects and explains the previously analysed parameters of the fields size, centrality, and dynamics on the actual and potential dominance of the space. During, the chapter will move between plural and individual scales to reflect the explanation



of the changes of the crowd's field on the formation of the immediate [temporary] personal space of the individual within this crowd.

The analysis highlights and explains the modification in the theoretical model of the experiential production of space, using the setting of public spaces in Beirut Central District. The case that represents excellently the theoretical entities of the space [squares], objects [occupiers] and action [dominance] indicated a correlation between the social objects of the space and its spatial condition. An interesting example was shown in a short drone footage video[19] recorded on the 23rd of August 2015. Three consecutive photos were printed from the video at the seconds 26", 39" and 47" for Riyadh Alsolh, Nijmeh and Martyrs' squares. The photos show three different concurrent spatial conditions of the three squares. The video takes the Travelling your eye in a mere few seconds from the vibrant Riyadh Alsolh and its surrounding, through the evacuated Nijmeh square, to arriving at the Martyrs' square whose current use ignores all the historical value of the square, converting it to a highway that is surrounded by car parking lots. Recording the three squares at the same time unifies the parameters of time, context, weather …etc; and reveals the impact of the square occupiers (protestors, armed forces, and capitalists) on the appearance, uses, and accessibility of the square. More focused mapping of changes of the squares' occupation, revealed a high probability of correlation between **the dynamics of the crowd and triggered arousing the sense of threat [which is translated into violent actions].**

[19] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=upYDoI8ldMQ

The influence of the occupiers of the square was clearly summarised in the mentioned video. The concurrent photos eliminate the impact of other factors, such as date, weather, context …etc; thus, provide with the comparable condition of the three squares:

(1) Riyadh Alsolh:



Figure 7-2: screen number 1 of a drone footage video 00:00:26 – Occupied Riyadh Alsolh square, 23.08.2015, Beirut

Out of the three squares, Riyad Alsolh had the most vital scene. This photo (Figure 7-2) hosted (based on our GIS dataset) more than 7000 protestors. Considering that this scene is representative of similar scenes from other days/time, zooming into the crowd will show a wide variety of activities that were generated [or inherited] by the people. This includes and not limited to sitting in groups, conducting discussions, chanting, dancing 'dabkeh' [Lebanese traditional collective dance], street vending, and weddings. At the more violent

moments, clashes between the protestors and police reduced the possible activities/functions to be conducted in the square and quickly [and continuously] changed the location of the protestors’ crowd. The presence of media broadcasting cars and reporters was also directly correlated to the presence of the protestors themselves.

The protestors perception of the square’s occupation was a direct representation of their attempt to reclaim the ownership of the square itself and beyond - the whole district. People in the interviews, tv reports, and social media posts were reclaiming their right - the “everlasting right of people” - to own their city centre – one of such examples is that of the Abo Rakhousah market logo. Other people were talking to reporters about their feeling of belonging to a space that was “taken from them” (different video records). Additionally, a very precise and clear statement came from the crowds chanting at the background of many videos “The square is ours”. In parallel, several interviewees agreed that Riyadh Alsolh was an alternative, accessible square when compared to Nijmeh square, making it the main target of occupying and acts as a bridge for occupying Nijmeh square, the taken or even arrested space behind the militarised barriers (as the interviewees described).

On the other hand, the police distribution focused on disconnecting the square from its surrounding through allocating metal and concrete barriers, water cars, and police personnel on the entrances of the square opposite to the governmental palace and towards Nijmeh square and the Banks’ street.

In result, even in its most peaceful condition, the square turned to become a vital pedestrian-oriented space/community which is spatially [and functionally] isolated from its surrounding; however, connected to a wider variety of similar places around the world that represent the image of the iconic square of the citizens' success in contesting public

spaces from the state. Connecting all these squares together created a new mediated space/community of common interest; squares that stand for symbolising the democratisation of contested spaces.

(2) Nijmeh square:



Figure 7-3: screen number 2 of a drone footage video 00:00:39 – Evacuated Nijmeh square, 23.08.2015, Beirut

Nijmeh square in this video (Figure 7-3) looks similar to its routine condition; however, a more extreme evacuation was applied. As it was shown in chapter 5, the existence of the parliament next to the square and the distribution of the militarised barriers on its entrances have restricted the accessibility of the square. The state emphasized its ownership of the square with continuous surveillance (Cornwall and Coelho 2007) and directly impacted the actual and the perceived accessibility to the square. Clear examples of images, maps, and

articles demonstrated in chapter 5 the impact of the direct control that the state applies to the square on its appearance and accessibility. Another dimension of contradicted interest between the state and its partner in the development project of Solidere appeared with the negative impact of the limited accessibility of the Nijmeh square on the efficiency of the consumerist functions that are distributed around it.

On the perceived level of identifying the space, the interviews pointed to a deep gap between the Beiruti citizens and the Nijmeh square. Words like “taken”, “arrested”, “closed planter” and “marketing photo to export to foreigners” have been widely repeated during the interviews. The observed behaviour of the pedestrians who were walking through the square never contradicted the expressed thoughts prevalent in the interviews and focus groups as well as the literature. The state applied their strict security measures, and people reacted with entitling the square with a quick transit function. People who spent more time next to the clock tower, at the middle of the square, seemed to cover their existence with tourist-like activities. I was driven to the same feeling and was melted to the pot of providing a consuming justifying to the presumption of being asked a question which may sound strange in most places of the world “why are you sitting here?”; where the word ‘here’ refers to a public space which is promoted to be an attraction for tourist, or even worse, a restaurant.

“I walked several times around the corner. Never dared to go through these roads! The narrow long entrances that were filled with metal and concrete barriers were not welcoming at all. Even when you choose the widest and the most commercial entrance, you might be asked for your destination and purpose for entering the road. I walked several times around the ring that goes around Nijmeh square, walking next to Riyadh Alsolh and Martyrs’

squares and passing through the Municipality and Banks streets instead of just passing through the nearest entrance of Nijmeh square. …. I have been coming here almost every day. It is now the third time I have come to the downtown and have been walking [in total] through 3 of the 8 entrances of the square. …. Today, I am observing Riyadh Alsolh square, a soldier accompanied me to monitor the photo recording. While walking from the army camp on the eastern edge of the square, I passed for the first time through the square entrance next to the parliament building before turning left on the Banks street. Forth entrance out of eight is now [without a single photo] checked" (My notes of the fieldwork experience).

(3) Martyrs' square




Figure 7-4: screen number 3 of a drone footage video 00:00:47 – Misused Martyrs' square, 23.08.2015, Beirut

The image of Martyrs' square in this video (Figure 7-4) is a typical representation of its routine condition; an abandoned statue, surrounded with cars. The square which was proposed to be surrounded by green areas with underground car parking in the Solidere masterplan ended up becoming a totally different image. The pale area around the platform of the Martyrs' statue and the hundreds of cars scattered around it sounded to be disconnected from the citizens' memory and, unfortunately, to lose gradually its significance in their cognition. Clear indicators were included in the interviews that rarely mentioned the square, the others who responded to my question about it with: "Oh! Yes, the place which we can consider as public once a year on the Beirut Marathon day." (an activist said), or "it hosts some public activities; when the prime minister wants to run in the Marathon" (another interviewee, irony, said). Even when Abu Rakhousah market was moved there, the organisers' justification was only a geographical reasoning. Another interesting indicator was the wide use of the name Alborj square – the old name that belongs to the pre-war era. It is well understood that Beiruti people avoid remembering the spaces of the war [which the BCD was very central to], which makes this phenomenon quite intricate. It is a way of questioning the status-quo that they refuse to employ the newest image of the square, or as described in some interviews as "Solidere's version of the downtown" in replacing the war image. The questioning increased when discussing Nijmeh square. Although the Beirutis describe it as taken space, Nijmeh square retains its significance in their discussions. Surprisingly, Martyrs' square does not.

The importance of this video came from its ability to eliminate the impact of several factors and focus the scope on the influence of the crowd of occupiers on shaping the features of the space. In this video, the spatial approximate squares unified the features of the surrounding physical elements. Buildings, functions, and infrastructures do not widely vary for the three squares. Additionally, the chronological synchronization of recording the squares unified the eventual context of the scene. All three squares were captured during a day of protest where reclaiming the whole central district of Beirut was the main title of the protest movement against the deformation of its architecture, functions, and memorised features by the development project, and against the restriction of their ability to access its spaces by the state. Finally, the historical background is almost similar for the three squares. They are all located in the collective memory of Lebanese people [specifically, the Beirutis] with a high significance that is directly connected to a wide variety of daily functions and eventual memories. In short, the aligned scene of the three helped to highlight an effective element which is the occupier of the square [the social object of the space]. Therefore, this research focused on mapping and analysing the influence of the occupiers themselves and produced very abstract maps where the only figure was the field of the crowd of the occupiers on a background of the voids of the three squares and connections between them.

7.2 Research interpretations: What do our maps mean?

Delivering the abstracted maps into the analysis phase helped to define and correlate the spatial features of the crowd.

First, it is important to re-summarise the most influencing spatial elements [buildings / spaces]. Figure 7-5 illustrates the main buildings and spaces that affected the production of the protestors and state's territories, during the protest event. This includes their location, borders, orientation, and spatial dynamics [changes in area, density, location …etc]. In the first map some buildings/spaces are recognised due to their role and classified into three groups:

a. Spaces of protest: (3) Riyadh Alsolh, (5) Nijmeh and (9) Martyrs squares that hosted 54%, 14% and 32% of the protestors time during the mapped events. Considering that the percentage of the spent time in Martyrs' square was mainly for the purpose of gathering or leaving; and that the protestors failed to reach at Nijmeh square, and their presence was only at its entrances, then Riyadh Alsolh square was found to be the main space of protest in the mapped events. That was previously discussed [referring to the conducted interviews] that this square was considered as an alternative space of the targeted Nijmeh square. The distribution of the buildings within the analysed area helped to explain the given roles of the three squares [Nijmeh square as a target, Riyadh Alsolh as an alternative square and the Martyrs' square as a transitional space to and from the space of protest.
b. Influencing buildings: (1) Governmental Saray, (2) ESCWA (4) Parliament and (6) Ministry of Environment. These buildings represent the nodes around which the distribution of protestors was affected. The Parliament had always represented the unreachable target in Nijmeh square, while the Governmental Saray was the main node towards which most of the crowd orientation was directed into in Riyadh Alsolh square. The security measures of the

ESCWA building set a fixed bordering of the protestors in Riyadh Alsolh; and, finally, some other protest events took place inside the Ministry of Environment building.

c. Landmark buildings that help to define the location and changes in the protestors' territory. This includes (7) Saint George Cathedral, (8) Mohammed Alamin Mosque, (10) Le Grey Hotel, (11) Al-Nahar newspaper and (12) Beirut Municipality. These buildings have no significant role in orienting the protesters' crowd; however, they were widely used in the resources that described the movement of the crowd.



Figure 7-5: the main buildings and spaces that affected the production of the protestors and state's territories, during the protest event, Beirut, 2015.

On the next level of reading the produced maps, the mapped crowds were categorised into familiar spatial distribution orders. Hundreds of maps dropped into three main categories: linear, cluster and radial; however, the radial crowds were found to split into either physically or visually connected to their focal point, thus, a fourth category of the divided radial crowd was added. The drop in the number of maps was paralleled with a drop in the included details to approach a more focused representation of the measurable features of the crowd. This included the population,

median density, and dynamics for the protestors crowd; the median density and dynamics for the state's presence; the spatial relation to the square and barriers; and finally, the spatial alignment between the protestors and state's territories. Approaching this layer moved the maps from the dot density detailed representation of the crowd, through its abstracted layout, into [finally] representing the shape and properties of the protestors and state's territories during the protest event. This applies to the territories that were shaped by either the presence of the protestors/police or by their tools of marking the space (Figure 7-6). Finally, the dependent variable was selected to represent the feeling of threatening the domination of territory. This was found to be translated into violent actions that forced to expand the borders of the territories of either state or protestors.

The layout of the protestors and state's territories (Figure 7-6-c) was applied to the four recognised crowd's patterns (as shown in Figure 7-7). In the following maps a colour code is used to represent the median density of the mapped territories, while the mentioned symbols represent the spatial dynamics of the territories and barriers.



Figure 7-6: an example of (a) the dot density distribution, (b) the abstracted layout of the crowd of protestors and (c) the protestors and state's territories – 23.08.2015, 16:00:00 GMT




Figure 7-7: the spatial features of the recognised layouts of the protestors' territory and their impact on the state's territory during the protest events in Beirut 2015

The first map [Pattern 1] represent the cluster layout. The colour code here shows the low median density for both protestors and state's territories per 100 sqm. The state territory was stable and spread over Nijmeh square [and its entrances] and on the borders of Riyadh Alsolh square [towards the Governmental Saray and the ESCWA building]. On the other side, a stable protestors' territory was dominating the square.

On the second and forth maps [Patterns 2 and 4], the radial and divided radial layouts are represented. The colour code at these maps shows a medium median density for both protestors and state's territories per 100 sqm. In Pattern 2 [Radial], the state remained its initial territory [similarly as the first pattern], while the protestors dominated the square and spread along the two main [unoccupied from the state] streets. In this pattern, both territories were stable. This feature changed in Pattern 4 [Divided radial layout] when the state expanded their territory forcing the protestors' one to fluctuate its position frequently [away from the barrier opposite to the Governmental Saray], with a shared dominance upon the square.

The highest median density was shown in the third map [Pattern 3], which represents the linear layout. The protestors' fluctuant movement along the main street that connect Riyadh Alsolh and Martyrs square caused a repetitive expansion and shrinkage of the state's territory [who dominated the square].

All layouts were illustrated in Riyadh Alsolh square as it hosted the majority of the mapped protest events (see page 271). Other locations [with the same features] were mapped on some of Nijmeh square entrances and on the connection between Martyrs and Nijmeh squares [through the Municipality Road].

Understanding the collective territory of the crowd was built on Bourdieu's fundamental framework of the three equally significant notions: the habitus [of the individual], practice, and the field [of the crowd]. The crowd in this relationship stood for the observable spatial pattern that is shaped with the repetition of the practices of the individuals and provide the homogenised individuals with contextualised structure. In parallel, actions are the visible element that takes place in time and is positioned in space; it creates the spatial patterns and locational logic, with direct relation to their context of forces [both motivational and struggling]. This analysis was also informed by Simmel's understanding of spatiality, noting that aspects of social experiences that take place within a space define the space and are defined by it, reciprocally, which is the case with the occupiers of the squares and the squares themselves. Therefore, we theoretically concluded that the individual position is a product of the structures of the crowd, a producer of the practices and a reproducer of the structures. The equality of the significance and the reciprocal relationship between the three notions enabled us not only to move from the individual to the plural scale to trace the practices but also to move the other direction to analyse and understand the ground of the correlated parameters. The notion of the field that provided us with the platform and the tool of interactions enabled us to move from individual to plural to achieve recognisable elements, and from the plural to the individual to achieve analysable parameters.

As mentioned before, on the plural scale, we have traced the features of the crowd and its relation to the opposite territory and the main influential physical features (square and barriers); However, the use of violent actions, to represent the defending actions against invading or threatening of dominating the territory, was derived from the notion of the individual's personal space – its definition, marking, and defending.

Starting from the understanding of the territory as a unit of space defined for a time by some kind of human behaviour (Scheflen, 1976); and as a dominance regulator factor against the situational factors, the probability of using defence mechanisms increases with the territorial encroachment – when the newcomers ignored or did not recognize the spatial marking. This notion affirmed that space is already owned and occupied, with a perceived control of the accessibility and functionality of the space. In parallel, we understand that personal space is a portable territory (Sommer, 1969) that radiates from the body. This definition can clarify the basic features of the personal space: it is a defined territory of invisible boundaries, with the body at the centre. Most discussions describe the empowerment of this centralised bubble to happen either by expanding its size or enhancing the location of its centre [behaving unit]. Thus, the defending mechanisms have a higher probability to apply in the cases of invading a valuable space (Taylor & Brooks, 1980).

Considering the crowd as a gathering of a huge number of homogenised personal spaces, the effective factors of empowering the field of the crowd or threatening the state's territory were expected to match what applies to the personal space [as the building unit of the crowd]. Therefore, the first parameters to look at during our analysis were the crowd's population and their occupation of the contested square itself. Additionally, we were aware that the size of the field [as a repetition of personal spaces] aims at maintaining proper spacing between the different behaving units [protestors and police]. Thus, the spatial alignment between the territories of the protestors and the state was considered.

Surprisingly, the analysed maps disconnected all these three factors from increasing the probability of the occurrence of violent [defensive] actions. Starting with the spatial size of the crowd [represented with their population], it was found that the radial layouts, both spatially and visually connected, were correlated to lower probabilities of violent actions. Similar contradiction to the

theoretical assumptions applies to the occupation of the square and the spatial alignment between the two analysed behaving units.

On the other side, the linear layout of the crowd showed the highest probability of violent actions happening, although it had a low population of the protestors crowd, a large buffer zone between the protestors and the police, and had the square occupied by the state's presence. The main features that was found to be attached to this spatial layout were the dynamics of the crowd and its density. Regarding the density, the activists' narratives described it as a result of the violent actions rather than a cause. Our interviewees described this situation and linked the police attack to their decision of gathering and moving in groups with decreased spacing between themselves. This point was repeated during several interviews with activists. Additionally, a review of some videos of similar violent situations provided support to their statement. It was visually notable that the protestors tend to defend their presence within dense groups. The maps also showed that at the most violent situations, the total area that is covered with the protestors crowd shrank with a high density of population per 100 sqm.



Figure 7-8: the creation of the defending space of a group of protestors

The last factor to justify was the dynamics of the crowd's territory – a reference to the frequent changes in the size or location of the territory. The linear distribution with the highest probability of violent actions had the quickest change of the location of the protestors' territory and a frequent change of the state's territory size [expanding and shrinkage]. Compared to the other analysed layouts, the stability of the different territories was correlated with the lowest occurrence of violence, even with a relatively dense crowd of a high population like the radial crowd. In another example of the divided radial crowds, the spatial dynamics of the territories slightly increased the violence when it took a more defined expansion shape instead of the frequent change of size for the state and a one-direction-change of location instead of the frequent location of the protestors.

In conclusion, it was found that both state and protestors were using their tools to define and defend their territories within the district. Although the state was the more equipped part with clear and well defined spatial markers that they display to prevent the occupation of the most valuable spaces for them, the presence of the protestors themselves and their actual occupation of the space was their tool to regulate their dominance on the space and to delay invading it from the police. However, it was a surprising result to find that the actual occupation of the square [the crowd's centrality to the valuable space] had less impact on inducing the defensive mechanisms on the state's side. Actually, the more dynamic crowd was found to be considered as a trouble-making crowd that can connect to several spaces and force the police to deal with a network of dense subgroups of the crowd that can connect to different places in the area and move between the squares and the roads between them.

7.3 Research implications: How has the collective perception of the spatial dominance changed?

The understanding of the reciprocal representation of the individual and crowd scales, regarding their territoriality as a dominance regulation tool, revealed two types of dominating public space: the actual and the potential dominance. The actual domination was represented with the field's size and occupation of the contested space; however, the potential domination was more correlated to the dynamics of the field and the crowd's ability to use their quick movement to connect to more than one space. It was also found that, in the analysed event, the potential dominance was more influential in promoting the perception of the spatial contestation. In comparison to other two similar events in 2005 and 2019, which took place in the same spatial context, allocating the 2015 movement on this timeline shows a transformation of the way the protestors contribute to the occupation of the squares.

During the Cedar revolution, a sectarian division of the political campaign in Lebanon regarding the Syrian occupation has created a new form of sectarian alliance in the country. In fact, as per Weber, the formation of a practical system of production states that all spatial structure is presupposed by the system of production as well as the state, its economic model, and bureaucracy. In Beirut's context, state bureaucracy, institutions and power, despite playing a major role in the formation of spatial structure, are superseded by sectarian actors' that circumvent the state and take control over the space for their own interests. The private, sect and religion, is merged with the public (civic identity and socio-economic and political realities). As such, this sectarian division of the political parties into the 8th and the 14th of March campaigns [the pro-Syrian and the anti-Syrian camps] was materialized in the division of protest spaces. The protest of the 14th of March was focused in the Martyrs' square; while the 8th of March occupied Riyadh Alsolh where a famous recorded speech of Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah, was

streamed. On the other side of the timeline, in 2019, even some protest practices took place in Martyrs' and Riyadh Alsolh square, the main theme of the movement was connected to the roads: entrances to cities, connecting bridges between quarters and entrances to squares. During this movement, the traditionally non-contested spaces have become spaces for contesting, leading to what is referred to by Foucault as "Counter-sites" (sites in which predominant social and spatial structures are identified, disputed and reversed). The most distinguished example was of the intersection of General Fouad Chehab Avenue and George Haddad Road, commonly referred to as 'The Ring' highway, which connects the BCD to the rest of the city. The furnished and labelled "Beit Al Sha'b" (the house of the people) converted 'The Ring' highway to be one of the most important contested space of the 2019 movement in Beirut.

The previously interpreted results of the analysed dominating tools and features of the event of the 2015 movement can be placed on the development line between 2005 and 2019. Starting from the centralised crowds of 2005, which are placed within the stable milieu of the squares themselves. The expanded fields of the steady crowds converted the surroundings of the squares, that were filled with the protestors, into an extension of the squares themselves. In 2015, a variety of occupying the squares and the connections between them resulted in a lead influence of the dynamic occupation of the roads, with a fluctuational change of size and position, rather than the stable [even the dense] occupation of the squares. Finally, in 2019, the squares were facilitated with a symbolic role of hosting the movement, whose main effective occupation milieu was in the [traditionally] non-contested highways.

Seeking for the roots of this change in perceiving and experiencing the territoriality entered us again into the loop of the reciprocal influence of the individual's personal space and the crowd's field; along with their marking, regulating and defending mechanisms. This research wondered

how have the social objects of the space dominated its physicals and were able to create a new space of contestation and flourish them with new temporary unprecedented typology? Also, how have they been able to reshape the traditional squares of contestation with a symbolic function that still feed into confirming their occupation? In short, the research is seeking for the roots of the change of the perception of spatial dominance from being correlated to the contestation of the, actually, occupied squares into the contestation of the unoccupied spaces with potentials to be.




Figure 7-9: The proposed transformation of towards the potential action to mediate the objects-space relationship.

7.3.1 The roots of the transition towards the potential occupation and its role in dominating the space.

This section is looking for the theoretical conceptions of space that match the analysed practices. The conceptions that:

1. Defines the space through its community and connect the production of space to their practices.
2. Explains the notion of territoriality on the individual and plural scales.

3. Establish for a theoretical understanding of the role of the potential actions in symbolising the occupation of the unoccupied space.

As space is attached to several physical, mathematical, economic, political, ideological, religious and social variables, no clear, unified definition/description is agreed for space. However, it has been discussed thoroughly and developed into an active component of the socio-cultural phenomena, where a mutual relationship between shaping and being shaped is set between space and community. Therefore, space is a subjective social factor – participant, rather than a passive backdrop of time objects and place. The definition of space can be classified as being attached (e.g. Aristotle and Descartes) or detached (e.g. Plato and Kant) form its objects. For those who detached the space from its objects, space has a reality of its own, independent of and precedes the existence of a place, time and objects; while connecting it to the objects raises through considering it either a possibility of or an expansion of being occupied. The social dimension was strengthened when Lefebvre added the spatial dimension to Marx community, where the dominance of an ideology is attached to the creation of the community/space and the competition stands for the continuous movement within the community/space; therefore, the production of space becomes an instrument for popularising a dominance. In the 1980s, the narratives of the individual's everyday thoughts and practices started to be considered as actions [and actors] produce and being produced by the space - and its social structure and relationships.

Similarly, a parallel spatial experience of the cyber platform, as a new medium of communication, defined and described the cyberspace in relation to either its objects or communities. Cyberspace replaces physical objects with cyber alternatives. The most essential cyber object is media - videos, music, photos, writing, etc; as it is used to construct, articulate, view and traverse the connections – therefore, their networks (Boyd, 2007). These objects are spatially described through location,

size and time value – in relation to distance and movement within the space (Bryant 2001) [place, distance, size and route]. However, the existence of cyberspace is detached from its objects and is more represented by their potential to occupy an absolute position – free bites.

The social definition of cyberspace does not represent it as such absolute space rather than being a prior schema of the human experience of constructing and maintaining the space; which aims in its role at the ***interaction*** of people and information through manipulating the information and facilitating the communication. Therefore, the ***physical layer*** of Clark's model (2010) supports the ***logical elements*** which serve the platform through which the ***information*** is stored and transmitted, and finally, ***people*** who interact in the cyber-experience. This social dimension of cyberspace has connected its definitions to its communities – in comparison with their physical counterparts, using the electronic ***communication medium based*** community of mind of Ferdinand Tönnies (Rothaermel & Sugiyima 2001) which contrasted the ***proximal*** offline communities (Scott et al. 2005, Park 2009, Bagozzi & Dholakia 2002, Digital Future Project 2007). Since then, space has been represented by its community which is created and maintained over a bottom-up repeated ***interaction*** of ***individuals*** – the independent creators of the community/space through their interpretation of subjective view (Carter et. al. 2015). This leads to micro-focus on the ***subjective meaning*** [repeated meaningful interaction] to define the production of the community.

Looking back at our results indicates a matching of the regulating tools of the territories for behaving units of the analysed case study [protestors and state] and the users of the cyber platforms. The increased daily usage of the cyber platform, where one can type oneself into being, appeared to enable the collective mentality of its users to perceive, define and react towards the symbolic dominance of the unoccupied space. The mapped protest event indicates a similar

attitude regarding the sense of territoriality, through the impact of the crowd's dynamics on threatening the state's dominance on the squares without, actually, occupying them [by the protestors].

But, is the cyber experience strong enough and widely spread to affect the way we perceive our relationship towards our space?

Owing to the horizontally distributed power, more and more people are joining the cyber platform. According to several statistical data on Statista, the number of social network users worldwide raised from 0.79 to 4.66 billion between 2010 and 2020, encompassing 59% of the global population as of October 2020 statistics. The rapid increase of the use of cyberspace as an online stage for interaction affects not only the platform users but also those who are not connected with. With the development of numerous apps and devices, the number of virtual communities has increased steadily over the years. The world now has new forms of networks and communities called social networks. These represent a rich source with several dimensions, mobilising the flow of resources between countless individuals distributed along with variable patterns.

The cyber experience succeeded in enhancing the role of the community to represent their space, and the role of individuals to improve their inputs to shape community/space. Such participation affects the patterns of practices within physical spaces (offline communities), social activism, social links and daily activities.

The cyber experience contributed to the rejection of the negative, marginalised role of people in producing public spaces – which are usually perceived as belonging to the authorities. Within the huge, planned spaces of the cities, people used to act like a *flâneur*, who is satisfied with their observation with the minimum possible input. The notion of Baudelaire's anonymous man

appeared in the streets of 19th-century cities, where he was exploring the surrounding context, drifting through the urban crowd and strolling through arcades as a detached observer. For the very first examples of internet websites, this notion has been successfully incarnated and re-imagined in the 'cyberflâneur' who roams the arcades of the cyber world with no specific place to go or mission when logging in (McGarrigle, 2013). However, with the development and spread of user-generated websites, this concept became no longer fit for purpose in the cyber experience.

Such rejection of the negative role is reflected in the growing use made of digital media by political communication, as well as in the contribution of the mass population in public spaces. Parkinson (2012) argued for the key role of physical public spaces in reflecting democratic cyber contributions. According to Parkinson, such spaces are the key to strengthening democratic practices, with a collective influence to ensure decision making is detected and defended. Even for daily practices, public spaces have become the stage for continuous sets of governmental surveillance and public challenge. Governments use development projects to enforce a transit or consuming theme of activities, while people try to re-occupy the space with more citizen-like acts. However, for the more radical performance of dominance vs. democratic competition, social and political movements set examples of protesting that rely on a dramatic change in the use of space in parallel with serious governmental reaction to retrieve it. Some of these examples were old enough to stand independently from the impact of the cyber experience, while many significant examples were inspired by it.

The impact of cyberspace has inspired the incidence of protest around the world. People are seen interacting with virtual communities and contributing and voicing their opinions. Social media was the driving force behind the swift spread of revolution throughout the world over the last six years, as new protests appear in response to success stories shared from those taking place in other

countries (Skinner, 2011). Through social media, protesters create communities to organise their movements, share insights, news and support, and, finally, learn from the experience of others, which is essential for activists' success. Social media played an important role in articulating not only a new model of protest based on virtual communications but also a spatial model of mass demonstration (AlSayyad & Guvenc, 2013).

The other question that appears here is about the **ability of the cyberspace theories to support and justify the relationship between the crowd's field and its building unit [individual's personal space].**

The symbolic interactionism explanation of producing a community states that the initial interaction is created between social and physical objects [***individuals*** and ***situation***] based on the perceived meaning of the physical object – which is continuously interpreted and recreated among interaction (Blumer, 1969). Interaction, thus, is defined as a mindful action through which symbols are manipulated and meanings are continuously developed and attached to the situation; while repeated interaction forms the ***experience***. Shortly, the unit creates the whole: the chain independent interaction of individuals – who can regulate their contribution, regarding a situation creates the collective experience of the community. Therefore, the understanding of the collective experience requires an understanding of how individuals contribute to physical and other social objects, through their ***position*** [as a multi-dimensional system of coordinates (Bourdieu, 1985)] within the mutual patterns of interaction within the ***network*** (Stryker, 2008; Wellman, 2001). Through this position [spatial alignment], individuals identify their identity and role and their interaction can be analysed, described, explained and expected in relation to the ***plural*** pattern [***social space:*** the multidimensional space of positions].

Therefore, The research concluded that the change of the perception of the dominance of the field can be, theoretically, reflected on describing the active features of the personal space that enhances the territoriality of the individuals within public spaces. Traditionally, the actual occupation of the valuable space and the size of the territory are directly proportional to the domination of the space. However, our case study showed a kind of a linear transition towards the tendency of giving symbolic definitions of squares and contesting their connectivity with surrounding areas. In other words, the perception of the dominance of any portable territory [that is directly connected to the social objects] can be enhanced, for the same occupied area, through a spatial layout with better connectivity to the surroundings. What we went through, in this thesis, was an eventual representation of the experience that we live daily through our devices. An established believe of our minds that, regardless our location, if we are in a small room at the furthest town or in the most prestigious office in the country, what really matters is to be connected: type yourself into existence, and type your actions into higher potentials of occupying the space.




Figure 7-10: for the same spatial areas, more connection ports lead to more potential dominance.

Conclusion of part III
Research recommendations

Recent examples around the world have shown an acceleration in contestation over public spaces, both in authoritarian and democratic contexts, whereby people have tried to claim them for civic and political formation. Historically, such claim-making was limited to physical occupation of space. However, with the advent of technology, there is now a cyber-platform for this process, adding a new dimension to contestation. This phenomenon has reinterpreted the role people can play and the power they now hold in public spaces to influence any political or democratic movement. It has been created and enhanced using the opportunities provided by cyberspace. Cyberspace appeared as an attractive platform for many marginalised groups, who are now able to engage easily, freely and remotely. Hence, they take part in cyberactivism, continually influencing the intentions of participants through discussions and information sharing. The spatial actors [social objects] were enabled to, through the repeated meaningful interaction, produce a flexible, horizontal and liberal space. Together, the collective power of this virtual community influences the physical space and various activities in the public space.

Within the social space, a homogenised network of similar position and situation can be separated under a specific practice group of a family, a club, an association or a ***political movement***. This introduces the understanding of their space of relationships, where individuals continuously – and intentionally – move [change their position] over the ***fuzzy boundaries*** of the different networks, where homogeneity is objective rather than condition-based. Reflecting on the social representation of space, and as space breaks down into territories, this movement attaches ***personal territories*** to individuals to describe the management of ownership control and human practices

and ensures the continuous production of space due to the continuous movement of individuals and their personal spaces.

This research provided practical evidence that the collective perception of spatial dominance has changed. It succeeded with building up a concrete visual narrative through a series of GIS maps that show the spatial distribution of the crowd of protestors and their relation to the territory of the state's dominance in the contested squares of Beirut, 2015. Through analysing the regulating tools and defence mechanisms of the mapped territories, as well as reflecting them to a wider timeline of similar events between 2005 – 2019, a tendency towards the contestation of the connectivity of the valuable spaces rather than the static occupation of the spaces themselves. This change was theoretically justified as a repetition of the individual's experience of increasing their potential dominance through regulating [dominating] more connection ports.

Along with this thesis, dominance and all related entities, elements, features and tools were discussed as an observable spatial representation of the experiential production of space. It was the action that connects the space to its elements, both physical and social.

However, the present findings need to be interpreted with some caution. The study was limited to mapping the entities of producing the contested spaces of Beirut Central District during the socio-political movement of 2015, with a limited reflection to similar events. Although the focus on the abstracted field of the social objects enabled us to distinguish the repetitious patterns, it has eliminated the details of the host milieu and merged them all into the background. Thus, the more recorded objects (both physical and social) in time will help to figure out the more characteristics of the space which has been produced with the experience of its occupiers. Additionally, as in most studies, only one case study was investigated; therefore, utilising the same method to events in different cities with a similar context of contestation can support the criticism of our findings.

The user's contribution to the production of space is an essential notion that is promoted due to a wide range of reasoning – starting form improving the management of resources and not ending with responding to abnormal situations like pandemics. Space should be flexible enough to be personalized by different occupants, and the best way to achieve this in today's complex environments is more participation, cooperation and understanding among designers and environmental psychologists. However, the dynamic shaping and regulating of spaces, studied so far, were correlated to the eventual uses of these space. Then, the raised question here is: How far can the individual contribution to regulate the space get aroused within the routine setting? And to what extent can the architectural/urban design establish for the schema of the human experience of constructing and maintain the space?

Chapter 8
CONCLUSION

Public spaces serve a fundamental role in the formation of economic activity, political life, social being, public health and biodiversity sustainability of cities. It defines the urban character, gathers the different actors and influences and plays an important role in displaying the distribution of power relations in the city. This includes all publicly owned and managed open spaces as well as the unfocused interactions between anonymous strangers that it hosts. The support or restriction of public engagement is delineated by public space and varies according to the type of space. Because space is connected to many physical, mathematical, technological, political, ideological, religious and social variables, space does not enjoy a clear unified definition/description. It has, however, been extensively explored and evolved into an active component of the socio-cultural phenomenon, where space and culture create a reciprocal connection between shaping and being shaped.

Space is also a contextual social factor - participant, rather than passive background for objects and places in time. It is possible to define the concept of space as attached (e.g. Aristotle and Descartes) or detached (e.g. Plato and Kant) from its objects. According to the thinkers claiming that space is detached from its objects, space has a meaning of its own, independent of and preceding the existence of place, time and objects; while or those for whom it is attached, space is considered either an occupation or a possibility of being occupied. As Lefebvre applied the spatial dimension to the Marxian framework, the social dimension was reinforced. In this understanding, space production becomes an instrument for popularizing dominance.

In Beirut's case, not only is it vital to address current spatial dynamics, but also historical narratives of conflicting powers and struggle for control that led to the production of such spaces and the patterns of domination. Lebanon is seen in this perspective as a geopolitical area and a lived space as a forged negotiation between local elites and imperial, colonial powers; a playground for the wealthy; a cosmopolitan commerce power-sharing enclave; a battleground for religious and political ideologies; an union and collision of the Arab East and the Christian West; As perceived by the Lebanese themselves, the dichotomies and interpretations appear as pervasive and conflicting.

The advent of capitalism has deeply impacted the production of the spaces in Beirut. Following the war, the cityscape is transformed from one of devastation, desolation, alienation and death to one of "rebranding" and changing the sense of place of these spaces' residents. This process took place in an exclusionary manner, completely disregarding tenants, refugees and owners' rights and interests in favour of the unhinged neoliberal interests of the rich war-profiteers. The identity of Beirut and its relatability to the country's residents was majorly overlooked in the reconstruction process which favoured a "post-war amnesia" approach that aimed to annihilate any remembrance of the lived reality of the war. This change took place at the hands of Rafic Hariri and his colleagues in the DRC's newly created private company: Solidere. Due to the peculiar nature of the city and its post-war realities, it is difficult to cleanly categorize Beirut theoretically. The dual city model fails profoundly while Marcuse's more nuanced quartered city model, despite severe limitations, provides useful analytical insight. Due to the mixture of classes in any single area as a function primarily of confessional membership, outdated rent control, and the lack of single-use zoning, Beirut's areas do not cleanly conform to any given homogeneous identity.

The control of necessary services (water, electricity, …) and governmental institutions was a major manifestation of the conflicting factions' attempts to assert their dominance over the city. As such, in the process of reconstruction, as the state was weakened, the utilities were left divided amongst private parties meaning that even though reconstruction was underway, crucial aspects were left dependent on secret meetings and under-the-table deals at the whim of the different confessional political parties. Sukleen is one such example in which the garbage disposal services, despite legally falling within the jurisdiction of municipalities in a decentralized manner, was given to an inefficient and highly expensive private company to the interest of businessmen close to the Hariri family and the Future movement. Given that these institutes were meant to generate profit and attract more foreign loans, public interests were buried. When the proof of such projects' inability to serve citizens' needs became evident (piling of garbage around pickup points, the overflowing of dumps with unmanaged waste), public outcry became one of the few ways people could refute such conditions and plans.

In this perspective, the different factions' attempts to dominate Beirut had very tangible and observable consequences. Political activists began campaigning over the internet - what can be considered Beirut's cyberspace - using the hashtag #YouStink, which culminated in numerous manifestations in Downtown Beirut's public squares. The protests themselves raised questions of identity and sectarianism as protesters were divided on national and regional issues (most prominently the role of Hezbollah and the position on the Syrian regime) in addition to issues of class as most protesters, predominantly middle-class highly educated beirutis, attempted to distance themselves from lower-class protesters willing to use force and violence turning the peaceful protests into potential riots. Meanwhile, the government and its informal militias attempted to dominate both of the physical and virtual space of those protests - using

disproportionately violent measures to tackle mostly peaceful protests (water cannons, tear gas and rubber bullets) - they also summoned civilian activists to military courts and heavily monitored online activity, often bringing activists (or ordinary citizens) to court for sharing anti-government rhetoric. Informally, the use of threats and violence including beatings was predominant.

The case of the 2015 manifestations in Beirut was selected case due to its ability to put into context the abstract theoretical frameworks related to the space-object relationship and help visualize them as observable parameters. In fact, it allowed the research to detect three chains of evidence: The institutional continuous occupation of the squares' surroundings, the daily occupation of individuals with routine functionalities, and the individuals' eventual occupation.

Beirut, whether during the civil war, the reconstruction, or in its present state is a paradigm for a "contested space." The Lebanese civil war strengthened and/ or added a further layer of forceful stakeholders - sectarian militias - to basic governmental institutions which substantially led to an erosion of the central state that had lost its monopoly on violence. In Beirut's chaotic and unpredictable political sphere, militias transformed sectarian "autonomy" into sectarian "control" (including sectarian cleansing as was the case in East and West Beirut), substantially reconfigured economic space and developing predatory behaviour (e.g. collection of protection money).

Throughout and after the civil war, Lebanon has seen an alarming increase in authoritarian state apparatuses' strategies, as well as an increase in the state's involvement in these aspects of public planning that are created either to generate immediate private profits or to improve the infrastructural environment for private benefit generation rather than advancement of vital sectors such as health. This phenomenon does not actually entail the overlap of public and private interests,

contrary to popular belief. It is rather the latter's total dominance over the former. It is no longer possible to see where state projects end and private ventures begin since capital has become the state. This is not because the Lebanese State is a powerful state that regulates a planned economy. State and capital have combined into one, becoming a force or process of the same framework (Harirism). This is what Negri refers to, following Marx's teachings, as the "total subsumption of the state and society into capital."

Post civil-war and during the reconstruction, the previously in-war parties continued contesting the space, through more implicit control. The overwhelming number of sect Leaders' pictures and posters, the quartered city segregated by classes and sects, the unnecessarily monumental places of worship, and other facets are all bearing witness to this reality. Moreover, the privatization and reconstruction process, via Solidere's take-over, completely erased any sense of place and alienated the residents of the city center, quite literally, by expropriating the residents and refugees, and creating a "fake" memory with monuments that hold no connection to the people, and a space of consumerism geared towards gulf and European tourists. On several levels, the hiatus separating Beirut from the average resident in Lebanon is felt and understood. The spatial dislocation of the Downtown and the urban planning choices deliberately disconnected and alienated the centre from its surroundings. The Central district of Beirut hence represents Foucault's heterotopias: meaning locations "away from anywhere" – places that are completely different from all the places people represent and think about.

In order to visualize urban dominance through mapping spatial practices, the research mainly relied on a protest event method – which enabled the tracking of spatiotemporal events. To complement this approach, the user experience method enriched the methodology with the

perspective of the occupiers. The two methods together achieved the research outcomes while remaining aligned to the theoretical base and its elements: space, object, and action. The dataset used to create a narrative, both visual and informational, consisted of several layers. The first layer included 2015 entities of archived primetime news records that were reviewed along a timeline from July to October 2015. This data specified the theoretical parameters of the research model: (1) the spaces of protest within the district: the three main squares of the district (Martyrs, Riyadh Alsolh and Nijmeh squares); (2) the protest events with the most significant impact on the properties of space: 22-24.08.2015 and 20-22.09.2015. and (3) the direct actors of the targeted events and their main categories: protestors and state groups. Additionally, semi-structured interviews were conducted in a linear sequence with individuals who were significantly active during the events of the research timeline. The questions were categorised into three main sections: (a) the protesters' motivation and determinants of major moving in the squares; (b) the used tools/techniques to remark the space and show their dominance (immediate ownership); and (c) their perception, memory and identifications of the spaces of the district and its impact on their movement. Moreover, a focus group discussion was conducted with a group of 15 participants from the Abu Rakhousah flea market preparation, consisting of 12 organisers and 3 sellers. The discussion revealed the following points: (1) challenges of weather, infrastructure and related financial issues, the density of activity on space and political updates, (2) The assessment of three alternatives of spaces to place the market (within and around Martyrs' square), (3) the uses of visual and vocal elements to define and emphasise spaces within the market and (4) the users' engagement as a component of the market's existence and activities.

Two manual mapping workshops were conducted in the Lebanese University and Beirut Arab University, entitled "Politics and Spaces of Protest in Lebanon and the Middle East" and

"Mapping Urban Unrest in Beirut Public Squares". The workshops aimed at visualizing and mapping activists' memories in connection to the space-action relationship. As such, visual material was used to engage the participants.

The final phase was to systematically include all the collected data, from different types, in a united visual document that allows for proper analysis. For this reason, various maps were obtained in vector formats such as the Beirut district property map, the building footprints maps, and the road network map in GIS format. Additionally, satellite images taken in 2015 with accuracy 50 cm were used in order to update the base maps and provide a precise and realistic representation of the area under study at that particular point of time. This exercise allowed the research to map the population density in a temporal manner.

As for the temporal relations, 512 archived videos were collected from accessed resources and were categorised to shape up the temporal distribution of the archived narratives. Projecting from the visual database, the crowd's situations per time-lapse were categorised into: (D) defined situations, where a unique situation is clearly described, (S) stable situation, where no significant change is recorded and (T) transitional situations, where the mediating movement between situations is recorded.

Following the creation of the integrated visual narrative of the spatial allocation, population and densities of the occupiers' crowd of the defined protest events, a list of parameters was set to describe and categorise the different situations of the different time-lapse. This included: the defined situation of the time-lapse, the organising principle of the crowd's layout, population, median density, the dynamics of the crowd, the nature of the entity dominating the square, barriers' influence, spatial alignment of protestors and state's territories, and violent actions.

Then, the independent analysis parameters were defined to include: (a) The crowd's population, spatial alignment and dynamics; (b) The dominance of the attached square; and (c) the Impact of the physical barriers on the crowd's spatial attitude.

Moreover, time-space movement patterns were constructed by the researcher through working on three main intervals, one hour each, in order to describe the movement towards, through, and out of the Beirut Central District. A fixed rate of one photo every 15 seconds produced a series of 1440 photos that recorded the patterns, directions and densities in Martyrs' and Riyadh Alsolh squares on two different occasions on the same weekday (with 7 days interval between the two observations) from the top roof of le Grey Hotel and Arab Bank Buildings respectively [240 photos per hour per space]. As for Nijmeh square, the militarised restrictions prevented photographing the area. As a mitigation, the researcher applied a silent observation and filled a table with the number of users in the square in addition to quick sketches to map the main patterns of movement within the square.

Following the spatiotemporal mapping of the space and its occupiers, the contribution of the physical objects, the occupiers, and their routine functions that shape the district are analysed in terms of the district's appearance, uses and accessibility. To this end, the district was divided into Zone (A), the central part of the BCD, which is historically the most significant part of the district. This part hosts the main three squares of the district: Martyrs, Nijmeh and Riyadh Alsolh squares; Zone B which was generally reconstructed in low – medium density. It contains the majority of the residential buildings within the district along with commercial, offices and mixed-use buildings. At this zone, most of the parking lots that serve the central zone (A) are found; and Zone C which is not analysed. It is the extended zone of the new constructions out of the historical boundaries of the BCD (old sea borders).

When it comes to the conceived image of the district, the findings reinforced previous findings noted in the literature. The interviewed Youth focused on their inability to get involved in the super expensive commercial facilities provided within the development project. With the increase of the militarised restrictions at several spots all around the district, the feeling of belonging has dwindled. Older attendees were more focused on their memories of buildings that used to shape parts of either their daily life or the collective memory of the city identity. A statement said by a Beiruti man in his 60s summarised most of the conversations then. Referring to Nijmeh square, the demolished historical Ottoman Palace 'Saray Alsagheer' and Beirut Souks, he said: "it is either space that is arrested behind the gates, memories that were demolished or an existence of no memories."

In terms of accessibility, once again, the findings built upon the literature. With the widely spread metal gates and concrete barriers, separating Nijmeh square, its entrances, the governmental palace and the ESCWA building from the surroundings, the area (Zone A) was seen with the highest security measures. It is well-controlled by the state and has the least density of traffic. The more accessible area (Zone B) is the outer part in which the most attractive buildings belong. The majority of the traffic flow take place in this area, but it is mostly transient (passing through). Nonetheless, it is a space of consumption, albeit inaccessible to the vast majority of the residents of Lebanon due to the inflated prices and its luxurious character.

Additionally, the analysis focused on the social objects that flow through the spaces of the district. Analysing the spatial dimensions of the Beirut Central District shows vehicles' domination over most of the district's spaces. This domination, along with the spread of consumerism through the district, entitled the district with transitional functionality and detached it from the other quarters of the city and from its citizens. Adding to the high security measures at several spots in the

district, the whole area failed to facilitate any pedestrians or citizens-like activities. Finally, looking at the three main squares in reference to their historical significance, it was notable that: (1) The evacuated Nijmeh square is not perceived as public anymore by Beiruti people, (2) The neglected Riyadh Alsolh is used as a mere road intersection; (3) The misused Martyrs square area is turned to serve as car parking.

However, in contrast to the routine uses of the space described above, the use of space differs fundamentally in the time of protests. The mapped visualization showed the distribution of crowd flow which indicates that the lowest remains in Nijmeh Square. The square's shape and narrow entrances make it easily controlled by the police/army's permanent barriers. In fact, the square's accessibility had been controlled for years, even in routine days of no protest. Accessing this square became the main target of many protests, as most clashes took place on its entrances which were always under the dominance of the state. On the other hand, Riyadh Alsolh Square had witnessed the highest frequency of protesting events. The location of the square, which is adjacent to the governmental palace and to the parliament in Nijmeh Square, transform it to an alternative targeted space (a substitute for the inaccessible Nijmeh square) according to the protestors. It was also noticed that Riyadh Alsolh was a safe target for protesters to gather and occupy without serious clashes with the police - unless trying to move toward the governmental palace or Nijmeh Square. Martyrs' Square maintained its significance as the main gathering area, which is connected to the collective perception of public liberty and dominance. However, it was not targeted by protestors nor the state as it is spatially less connected to the core of spatial competition in Nijmeh square. In times of clashes, a completely different image is born: two homogenised crowds who were continuously changing and responding to the evolving situations in the squares. The first is the police crowd, which is a highly regulated and well defended proactive group whose

territory is more stable, created, and expanded in relation to some fixed points (physical objects of the space: square, barriers, streets intersections and significant buildings). The second is the protestors' crowd, which is a more spontaneous reactive crowd whose territory was changing frequently in relation to their population, the physical objects of the space and the expansion of the territory of the police crowd. All these barriers and personal presence of both protestors and police were used to mark a dynamic property of both. The borders of these properties were stable at Riyadh Alsolh Street entrances towards Nijmeh square, the connection of El Amir Bachir, Chiekh Toufiq Khalid and Ahmad Daoud streets, as well as all entrances from El Amir Bachir Street towards Nijmeh square; however, the other end of El Amir Bachir Street towards Bechara El Khoury, the Waygand (known as Municipality Street) and Hussein El Ahdab streets were all dynamic due to the crowd flow. Those barriers have reshaped the spaces of protesting through restricting the protesters' movement and excluding some gathering nodes and movement routes.

In addition, it is possible to draw parallels with the more recent October 17 uprising. It is found that in both 2015 and 2019. Prior to the uprising, as noted earlier, in routine use, the BCD, notably Martyr's square and Riyadh Alsolh, were dominated by the state and its institutions served more as a transitional area rather than a destination and was dominated by cars rather than pedestrians which were very scarce. However, they were spaces heavily contested by protestors who aimed to regain those spaces from which they have been alienated.

All in all, Beirut is a divided city with a complex history and fragmented identity which defies most conventional reductionist classifications. It has been shaped by capitalism and neoliberalism's transformation and production of space to suit its needs as well as those of sectarian interests, with conflicting actors fighting over the domination of space with tangible outcomes that shape residents' everyday lives and sense of place and identity.

References

AbiYaghi MN., Catusse M., Younes M. (2017) From *isqat an-nizam at-ta'ifi* to the Garbage Crisis Movement: Political Identities and Antisectarian Movements. In: Di Peri R., Meier D. (eds) Lebanon Facing The Arab Uprisings. Palgrave Pivot, London

Ādil Ismā'īl (1976). "Diplomatic and consular documents relating to the history of Lebanon: and the countries of the Middle East from the seventeenth century to the present day". 7. Editions of Political and Historical Works: 402.

Aghacy, S. (2015). Writing Beirut: Mappings of the City in the Modern Arabic Novel. Edinburgh University Press.

Al Jazeera, Protester dies during demonstrations in Beirut. One dead and scores injured as "You Stink" protests over corruption and uncollected rubbish continue into second day, (August 24, 2015), available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/08/injuries-protests-lebanon-beirut-intensify-150823183908444.html.

Alaily-Mattar, N. (2010). Segregation for aggregation? The pattern and logic of spatial segregation practices of young affluent heads of households in the post-war city of Beirut. http://dx.doi.org/

Al-Ani, B., Mark, G., Chung, J., & Jones, J. (2012, February). The Egyptian blogosphere: a counter-narrative of the revolution. In *Proceedings of the ACM 2012 conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work* (pp. 17-26).

Alsayyad, N. (2012). The Virtual Square: Urban Space, Media, and the Egyptian Uprising. *Harvard International Review*, *34*(1), 58.

AlSayyad, N., & Guvenc, M. (2015). Virtual uprisings: On the interaction of new social media, traditional media coverage and urban space during the 'Arab Spring'. *Urban Studies*, *52*(11), 2018-2034.

Alzein, H. (2015). What You Did Not Know About the Herak. Riad El-Rayyes Books. Beirut. Lebanon.

Arnold, Tom. "Breaking Lebanon's FX Peg Could Be Ruinous for Hugely Indebted Country." *Reuters*, Reuters, 30 Oct. 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-markets-currency-analysis-idUSKBN1X925Q.

Ashkar, H. (2018). The role of laws and regulations in shaping gentrification. *Cityscape* , *22*(3), 341–357.

Bagozzi, R. P., & Dholakia, U. M. (2002). Intentional social action in virtual communities. *Journal of interactive marketing*, *16*(2), 2-21.

Baiocchi, G. (2001). Participation, activism, and politics: the Porto Alegre experiment and deliberative democratic theory. *Politics & Society*, *29*(1), 43-72.

Bakri, Nada (17 August 2010). Lebanon Gives Palestinians New Work Rights. The New York Times.

Banerjee, T. (2001). The future of public space: beyond invented streets and reinvented places. *Journal of the American planning association*, *67*(1), 9-24.

Bardici, M. V. (2012). A discourse analysis of the media representation of social media for social change-The case of Egyptian revolution and political change.

Bauman, Z. (2001). Consuming life. Journal of consumer culture, 1(1), 9-29.

Baxter, P., & Jack, S. (2008). Qualitative case study methodology: Study design and implementation for novice researchers. *The qualitative report*, *13*(4), 544-559.

BBC News - Lebanon country profile. (24 August 2011). Archived from the original on 16 October 2018. Retrieved 21 June 2018 – via www.bbc.co.uk.

Beirut rubbish protesters clash with police, BBC, 22 August 2015, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34031208

Berry, J. K., (2009). What's in a name? *GeoWorld, Beyond Mapping Column*, *22*(3), 12–13.

Bou Akar, H. (2012). Contesting Beirut's frontiers. City & Society, 24(2), 150e172.

Boyd, D. M., & Ellison, N. B. (2007). Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship. *Journal of computer-mediated communication*, *13*(1), 210-230.

Bryant, R. (2001). What kind of space is cyberspace. *Minerva-An Internet Journal of Philosophy*, *5*, 138-155.

Cartalucci, T. (2015) Color Revolution 2.0 in Lebanon: From Piles of Trash to Piles of Rubble, http://journal-neo.org/2015/09/05/color-revolutions-2-0-in-lebanon-from-piles-of-trash-to-piles-of-rubble/

Center for the Digital Future Annenberg School for Communication (2007) Online World as Important to Internet Users as Real World, *The sixth annual survey of the impact of the Internet conducted by the USC-Annenberg School Center for the Digital Future,* http://www.digitalcenter.org/pdf/2007-Digital-Future-Report-Press-Release-112906.pdf

Chandoke, N., (2003). The Conceits of Civil Society, Delhi: Oxford University Press

Chehayeb, K. (2020). Controlling the Narrative: Lebanon Compromises Free Speech In Crisis. The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy. https://timep.org/commentary/analysis/controlling-the-narrative-lebanon-compromises-free-speech-in-crisis/

Cornwall, A. and Coelho, V.S. eds., (2007). Spaces for change?: the politics of citizen participation in new democratic arenas (Vol. 4). Zed Books.

Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002: Lebanon. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. 31 March 2003.

Dados, N. N. (2005). Balconies onto Beirut: Spatiality in the Travelling City. International Journal of Design & Nature and Ecodynamics: A Transdisciplinary Journal Relating to Nature, Science and the Humanities, 3. https://www.academia.edu/314280/Balconies_onto_Beirut_Spatiality_in_the_Travelling_City

Daou, M. (2019, October 25). Demonstrations in Lebanon are “a moment of truth for Hezbollah.” France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/20191025-demonstrations-in-lebanon-are-a-moment-of-truth-for-hezbollah

Dion, N., (2012). Spacing Freud: Space and Place in Psychoanalytic Theory (Doctoral dissertation).

Douai, A. (2013). " Seeds of Change" in Tahrir Square and Beyond: People Power or Technological Convergence?. *American Communication Journal*, *15*(1).

Dralonge, Richard N. (2008). Economics and Geopolitics of the Middle East. New York: Nova Science Publishers. p. 150. ISBN 978-1-60456-076-3.

El Samad, F., 2008. The Lebanese legal system and research. Nyulawglobal.org

El-Khatib, M. S. (2013). Tahrir Square as Spectacle: Some Exploratory Remarks on Place, Body and Power. *Theatre Research International*, *38*(2), 104-115.

El-Sharnouby, D. (2015). From State Exclusionary Politics to Youth Inclusionary Practices: The Tahrir Square Experience. *International Journal of Sociology*, *45*(3), 176-189.

Ezbawy, Y. A. (2012). The Role of the Youth's New Protest Movements in the January 25th Revolution. *IDs Bulletin*, *43*(1), 26-36.

Fawaz, Leila Tarazi (1995). Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860 (illustrated ed.). I.B.Tauris & Company. p. 320. ISBN 978-1-86064-028-5.

Fawaz, M. (2008), An Unusual Clique of City-Makers: Social Networks in the Production of a Neighborhood in Beirut (1950–75). International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32: 565-585. doi:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2008.00812.x

Fawaz, M., Harb, M., & Gharbieh, A. (2012). Living Beirut's security zones: An investigation of the modalities and practice of urban security: Living Beirut's security zones. City & Society, 24(2), 173e195.

Flusty, S. (1994). Building paranoia: the proliferation of interdictory space and the erosion of spatial justice. Los Angeles Forum for Architecture and Urban Design.

Fregonese, S. (2009). The urbicide of Beirut? Geopolitics and the built environment in the Lebanese civil war (1975–1976). Political Geography, 28(5), 309-318.

Fregonese, S. (2017). Affective atmospheres, urban geopolitics and conflict (de) escalation in Beirut. Political Geography, 61, 1-10.

Friedland, R., (2009). The endless fields of Pierre Bourdieu. Organization, 16(6), pp. 887-917.

Galal, O. (2013). El Thawra and El Balad: narratives of youth about protest participation and political subjectivity in the January 25 Revolution.

Giddens, Anthony. (1986). The Constitution of Society: An Outline of the Theory of Structuration. Reprint. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

Global Young Voices, Garbage crisis thrusts corruption into limelight, drives Lebanon to edge, (September 14, 2015), available at: http://www.globalyoungvoices.com/article/garbage-crisis-thrusts-corruption-limelight-drives-lebanon-edge.

Global Young Voices, Garbage crisis thrusts corruption into limelight, drives Lebanon to edge, (September 14, 2015), available at: http://www.globalyoungvoices.com/article/garbage-crisis-thrusts-corruption-limelight-drives-lebanon-edge.

Goodchild, M. F., (2010_. Twenty years of progress: GIScience in 2010. *Journal of Spatial Information Science*, *1*(1), 3–20. http://doi.org/10.5311/JOSIS.2010.1.2

Gordon, M.D. (1984) 'Capitalist development and the history of American cities', in W.T. Tabb and L. Sawers (eds) Marxism and the Metropolis, New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press. Harvey, D.W. (1985) The Urbanization of Capital, Oxford: Blackwell.

Graham, S., & Marvin, S. (2001). Splintering urbanism: networked infrastructures, technological mobilities and the urban condition. Psychology Press.

Gregory, D. (2013). Tahrir: Politics, publics and performances of space. *Middle East Critique*, *22*(3), 235-246.

Groth, J., & Corijn, E. (2005). Reclaiming urbanity: Indeterminate spaces, informal actors and urban agenda setting. *Urban studies*, *42*(3), 503-526.

Habermas, Jiirgen, (2001). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Haddad, S. (2009). Lebanon: from consociationalism to conciliation. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, *15*(3-4), 398-416.

Hafeda, M. (2011). This is how stories of conflict circulate and resonate. In M. Hafeda, & H. Bou Akar (Eds.), Narrating Beirut from its Borderlines – Statehood & participation (pp. 19e37).

Haghani, F. (2015). Egyptian women, revolution and the making of a visual public sphere. *Journal for Cultural Research*, *19*(2), 162-175.

Harris, W. and Harris, W.W., (2014). Lebanon: a history, 600-2011. Oxford University Press

Hazbun, W. (2016). Assembling security in a 'weak state:'the contentious politics of plural governance in Lebanon since 2005. *Third world quarterly*, *37*(6), 1053-1070.

Hillenbrand, Carole (2000). The Crusades: Islamic Perspectives. Psychology Press. pp. 20–21. ISBN 978-1-57958-354-5. Archived from the original on 5 September 2015. Retrieved 20 June 2015.

Holmes, A. (2012). There are weeks when decades happen: Structure and strategy in the Egyptian revolution. *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, *17*(4), 391-410.

Houtzager, P., (2003). 'Introduction: from polycentrism to the polity', in P. Houtzager and M. Moore, eds, Changing Paths: International Development and the New Politics of Inclusion, Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.

http://projectivecities.aaschool.ac.uk/portfolio/yasmina-el-chami-from-multipli-city-to-corporate-city/

http://projectivecities.aaschool.ac.uk/portfolio/yasmina-el-chami-from-multipli-city-to-corporate-city

http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/lebanon-population/cities/, retrieved on 07.07.2019

https://elections.lebanese-forces.com/electoral-districts/

https://hounaloubnan.com/

https://www.aljazeera.net/news/reportsandinterviews/2005/3/9/

https://www.anniaciezadlo.com/biography

https://www.civilsociety-centre.org/content/occupybeirut-re-imagining-city-october-2019-protests

https://www.facebook.com/BeirutHeritage/

https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/

https://www.statisticslebanonltd.com/

https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/mena/from-2005-to-2019-lebanese-activists-see-progress-in-protests-1.969300

Hutter, S. (2014). Protest event analysis and its offspring.

Hutter, S. (2019). Exploring the full conceptual potential of protest event analysis. Sociological Methodology, 49(1), 58-63.

International Religious Freedom Report – Lebanon". 2001 Report on International Religious Freedom. US Department of State. 26 October 2001.

International Religious Freedom Report for 2017". www.state.gov. United States Department of State

Iskander, E. (2011). Connecting the national and the virtual: Can Facebook activism remain relevant after Egypt's January 25 uprising?. *International journal of communication*, *5*, 13-15.

Jacquez, G., (2003). GIS as an enabling technology. In Gattrell A, Loytonen M, GIS and health: GIS Data 6 (pp. 17–29). CRC Press.

Jenkins, Richard. (2002). Pierre Bourdieu. Rev. ed. London: Routledge.

Johnson, Anna (2006). "Lebanon: Tourism Depends on Stability". Archived from the original on 13 January 2012. Retrieved 31 October 2006.

Julie Peteet (1996). "From Refugees to Minority: Palestinians in Post-War Lebanon". prrn.mcgill.ca.

Kadry, A. (2015). Gender and Tahrir Square: contesting the state and imagining a new nation. *Journal for Cultural Research*, *19*(2), 199-206.

Kamal Salibi (2003-11-15). A house of many mansions: the history of Lebanon reconsidered. I.B.Tauris. pp. 126–130. ISBN 978-1-86064-912-7.

Kingston, P. (2013). Reproducing Sectarianism: Advocacy Networks and Politics of Civil Society in Zbeeb, M., 2012. “$5 Million a Year: The Tip of the Sukleen Waste Pile.” Al-Akhbar, August 27.

Kollmar, C. F. (2013). Public Space in Beirut:-Environmental Justice-Heinrich Böll Foundation.

Koopmans, R., & Rucht, D. (2002). Protest event analysis. Methods of social movement research, 16, 231-59.

Larkin, C. (2010). Remaking Beirut: Contesting Memory, Space, and the Urban Imaginary of Lebanese Youth. City & Community, 9(4), 414–442. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6040.2010.01346.x

Lebanon Exiled and suffering: Palestinian refugees in Lebanon". Amnesty International. 2007.

Lebanon politicians are 'rotten like the garbage', BBC, 22 August 2015, available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-middle-east-34032861

Lebanon". Canadian International Development Agency. Government of Canada. 28 May 2009. Archived from the original (Governmental) on 30 May 2008. Retrieved 24 August 2009.

Lebanon". International Religious Freedom Report 2010. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor.

Lebanon: Haven for foreign militants. UN IRIN news. 17 May 2007. Archived from the original on 10 September 2011. Retrieved 17 January 2013.

Lebanon: Information on the treatment of Palestinian Christians by the government". Unhcr.org. 1 August 1996.

Lebanon’s #YouStink Anti-Government Protests, The Atlantic, 24 August 2015, available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2015/08/lebanons-youstink-anti-government-protests/402163/

Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects". United States Institute of Peace. 22 March 2009. Archived from the original on 22 March 2009.

Lebanon's Confessionalism: Problems and Prospects". United States Institute of Peace. 22 March 2009.

Leenders, R., (2012). Spoils of truce: Corruption and state-building in postwar Lebanon. Cornell University Press.

Lefebvre, Henri. [1974] 1991. The Production of Space. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Lehtovuori, P., (2005). Experience and conflict: the dialectics of the production of public urban space in the light of new event venues in Helsinki 1993-2003. Helsinki University of Technology.

Lehtovuori, P., (2012). Towards experiential urbanism. Critical Sociology, 38(1), pp.71-87.

Lehtovuori, P., (2016). Experience and conflict: The production of urban space. Routledge.

Lijphart, Arend (1969). "Consociational Democracy". World Politics. 21 (2): 207–225. doi:10.2307/2009820. JSTOR 2009820.

Lijphart, Arend. Multiethnic democracy, in S. Lipset (ed.), "The Encyclopedia of Democracy". London, Routledge, 1995, Volume III, pp. 853–865 ISBN 0871878887.

Low, S., & Smith, N. (Eds.). (2013). *The politics of public space*. Routledge.

Lutsky, Vladimir Borisovich (1969). "Modern History of the Arab Countries". Progress Publishers

Maguire, D., (2008). GIS and Science. ESRI.

McGarrigle, C. (2013) Forget the Flâneur, in Cleland, K., Fisher, L. & Harley, R. (Eds.) *Proceedings of the 19th International Symposium of Electronic Art*, ISEA2013, Sydney. http://ses.library.usyd.edu.au/handle/2123/9475

McGowen, Afaf Sabeh (1989). "Glossary". In Collelo, Thomas (ed.). Lebanon: A Country Study. Area Handbook Series (3rd ed.). Washington, D.C.: The Division. OCLC 18907889.

Mitchell, D. (2003). The right to the city: Social justice and the fight for public space. Guilford press.

Mohamed, A. A., Van Nes, A., & Salheen, M. A. (2015). Space and protest: A tale of two Egyptian squares. In *SSS10: Proceedings of the 10th International Space Syntax Symposium, London, UK, 13-17 July 2015*. Space Syntax Laboratory, The Bartlett School of Architecture, UCL.

Monroe, K. V. (2016). The insecure city: Space, power, and mobility in Beirut. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press.

Moubayed, Sami (5 September 2007). Lebanon douses a terrorist fire. Asia Times. Archived from the original on 8 July 2008. Retrieved 27 October 2009.

Mulderig, M. C. (2013). An uncertain future: Youth frustration and the Arab Spring.

Nada Bakri (17 August 2010). Lebanon Gives Palestinians New Work Rights. The New York Times.

Nagle, J. (2016). Power-Sharing and Sexual Minorities: A Comparative Analysis of Northern Ireland and Lebanon. *Available at SSRN 2753232*.,

Nagle, J. (2018). Beyond ethnic entrenchment and amelioration: an analysis of non-sectarian social movements and Lebanon's consociationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *41*(7), 1370-1389.,

Nakhoul, S. (2015). Lebanon's rubbish crisis exposes political rot. Reuters, September 7

Negri, A. (2018, December 19). Starting again from Marx. Retrieved May 16, 2021, from https://mronline.org/2018/12/19/starting-again-from-marx/

Park, H. (2009) Language Difference in Virtual Communities in Cyberspace: Blogosphere, Wikis and Social Network Sites, *School of Information University of California,* Berkeley, http://file.oksure.net/paper/FinalPaper_203_HyunwooPark.pdf

Park, Robert Ezra. (1972). The crowd and the public, and other essays. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Parkinson, J. (2009). Symbolic representation in public space: Capital cities, presence and memory. *Representation*, *45*(1), 1-14.

Parkinson, J. (2012). *Democracy and public space: the physical sites of democratic performance*. Oxford University Press.

Parkinson, J. R. (2013). How is space public? Implications for spatial policy and democracy. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, *31*(4), 682-699.

Peter Sluglett; Stefan Weber (2010-07-12). Syria and Bilad Al-Sham Under Ottoman Rule: Essays in Honour of Abdul Karim Rafeq. BRILL. pp. 21–23. ISBN 978-90-04-18193-9.

Political Party Mapping in Lebanon Ahead of the 2018 Elections, Konard Adenauer Stiftung, Lebanon.

Questions & Answers: Water Supply Augmentation Project, Lebanon". The World Bank. 30 September 2016.

Research Projects – History and Archeology. American University of Beirut (AUB). 2008

Rizkallah, A. (2017). The paradox of power-sharing: stability and fragility in postwar Lebanon. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *40*(12), 2058-2076.;

Rosiny, S. (2015). A quarter century of 'transitory power-sharing'. Lebanon's Unfulfilled Ta'if Agreement of 1989 Revisited. *Civil Wars*, *17*(4), 485-502.

Rothaermel, F. T., & Sugiyama, S. (2001). Virtual internet communities and commercial success: individual and community-level theory grounded in the atypical case of TimeZone. com. *Journal of management*, *27*(3), 297-312.

Said, A. (2015). We ought to be here: Historicizing space and mobilization in Tahrir Square. *International Sociology*, *30*(4), 348-366.

Said, A. S. (2014). The Tahrir Effect: History, Space, and Protest in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 (Doctoral dissertation).

Salama, H. H. (2013). Tahrir Square: A narrative of a public space. *ArchNet-IJAR: International Journal of Architectural Research*, *7*(1), 128.

Saleh, R. (2016, August 22). *Social Movement responding to the Lebanese Garbage Crisis*. Civil Society Knowledge Centre. https://civilsociety-centre.org/party/social-movement-responding-lebanese-garbage-crisis

Sawalha, A. (2010). *Reconstructing beirut : Memory and space in a postwar arab city*. Retrieved from https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.aub.edu.lb

Scheflen, A. E., & Ashcraft, N. (1976). Human territories: How we behave in space-time.

Scheflen, A. E., & Ashcraft, N. (1976). Human territories: How we behave in space-time.

Schmid, H. (2006). Privatized urbanity or a politicized society? Reconstruction in Beirut after the civil war. *European Planning Studies*, *14*(3), 365–381.

Scott, J. K., & Johnson, T. G. (2005). Bowling alone but online together: social capital in e-communities. *Community Development*, *36*(1), 9-27.

Simmel, Georg. (1903/1995). Soziologie: Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung (Sociology: Studies on the Forms of Social Organization). Gesamtausgabe, Band 11. Edited by Ottheim Rammstedt. Frankfurt, Germany: Suhrkamp.

Skinner, J. (2011). Social media and revolution: The arab spring and the occupy movement as seen through three information studies paradigms. *Working Papers on Information Systems*, *11*, 169.

Skocpol, T., and M.P. Fiorina, (1999). ‘Making sense of the civic engagement debate’, in T. Skocpol and M.P. Fiorina, eds, Civic Engagement in American Democracy, Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Solidere annual reports (2002 – 2014)

Sommer, R. (1969). Personal Space. The Behavioral Basis of Design.

Stryker, S. (2008). From Mead to a structural symbolic interactionism and beyond. *Annu. Rev. Sociol*, *34*, 15-31.

Taylor, R. B., & Brooks, D. K. (1980). Temporary territories?: Responses to intrusions in a public setting. Population and Environment, 3(2), 135-145.

Telmissany, M. (2014). The utopian and dystopian functions of Tahrir Square. Postcolonial Studies, 17(1), 36-46.

The Lebanese Demographic Reality" (PDF). Lebanese Information Centre Lebanon. 14 January 2013

The Lebanese town that has banned Muslim settlers". The National 2019. thenational.ae

The World Factbook — Central Intelligence Agency". www.cia.gov

Thebian, A. (2015). Mish al-zbāli elli ṭolʿit rīḥthā.. shī tāni bayn almajlis wel-sarāy! [It is not the garbage that stinks. It is something else in the Parliament and the Serail!]. 21 July 2015. Facebook.com. Availble at: https://www.facebook.com/assaadthebian/videos/10152919608227441/

Tonnelat, S. (2007). Keeping space public: Times Square (New York) and the Senegalese peddlers. *Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography*.

Tonnelat, S., (2010). The sociology of urban public spaces. Territorial evolution and planning solution: experiences from China and France, pp.84-92

Traboulsi, F. (2012). A history of modern Lebanon. Pluto Press

Vandenberghe, F., (1999). “The Real is Relational”: An epistemological analysis of Pierre Bourdieu's generative structuralism. Sociological theory, 17(1), 32-67

Verdeil, É. (2018). Infrastructure Crises in Beirut and the Struggle to (not) Reform the Lebanese State. *Arab Studies Journal, 26*(1), 85-113. Retrieved from https://search.proquest.com/docview/2290098950?accountid=8555

Warf, B., & Arias, S. (2009). Introduction: the reinsertion of space in the humanities and social sciences.

Wellman, B. (2001). Computer networks as social networks. *Science*, *293*(5537), 2031-2034.

Where We Work: Lebanon. UNRWA. 1 July 2014.

Wilson, Charles William; Hogarth, David George (1911). "Beirut". In Chisholm, Hugh (ed.). Encyclopædia Britannica. 3 (11th ed.). Cambridge University Press. p. 658.

Winegar, J. (2012). The privilege of revolution: Gender, class, space, and affect in Egypt. *American Ethnologist*, *39*(1), 67-70.

World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision". ESA.UN.org (custom data acquired via website). United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division

Yin, R. K. (2006). Mixed methods research: Are the methods genuinely integrated or merely parallel. *Research in the Schools*, *13*(1), 41-47.

Zieleniec, A. (2013). Space, social theories of. In B. Kaldis (Ed.), Encyclopedia of philosophy and the social sciences (Vol. 1, pp. 953-955). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc. doi: 10.4135/9781452276052.n362

Zucker, D. M. (2009). How to do case study research. *School of nursing faculty publication series*, 2.